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ABSTRACT
STATUS, REVISIONISM, AND GREAT POWER STRATEGY US-CHINA POSITIONAL COMPETITION AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR LEADERSHIP IN ASIA-PACIFIC
by
ÅBERG John Hugo Simon
Doctor of Philosophy

The dissertation addresses the core IR problem of revisionism and relates it to both the
declining superpower and the rising great power, both the United States and China. The
dissertation also offers a novel conceptualization of international order in terms of which
revisionism is understood. The theoretical innovation of the dissertation modifies
established structural realist theories and shifts the explanatory focus from security to
status. Since status, defined as social position, is composed of both power and prestige,
both change in the balance of power and the balance of prestige explain revisionism,
which then cause dissatisfaction in the form of status anxiety in the dominant state. This
leads the dominant power to revise the international order to maintain its leading status.
It then attempts to block the ascendance of the rising challenger, which frustrates the
status aspirations of the rising power who responds by carving out an alternative
international order that can satisfy its desire for status. The theory explains when and why
revisionism relates to both the status-maintenance strategy of the declining dominant power
and the status-enhancement strategy of the rising great power. The declining superpower
revises to maintain, whereas the rising great power revises to enhance. The dissertation applies
this insight to the positional competition for leadership in the Asia-Pacific and the struggle
between alternative regional orders. The US pivot to Asia under the Obama
administration exemplifies the revisionist status-maintenance strategy. China, after Xi
Jinping’s assumption of power, then begins to carve out an alternative regional order. On
the US side, the dissertation scrutinizes the cases of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and
America’s Principled Security Network. On the Chinese side, the dissertation scrutinizes
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and China’s project for an Asian Security
Order.
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1. Introduction
According to conventional realist wisdom, the dominant state is a status quo power by
definition, whereas rising states are inevitable troublemakers – revisionists poised to
upend the established international order. For sure, there is a certain logic to it. The
dominant state at the top of the pecking order will not freely give up its position of
power; and the rising state, well familiar with the fact that the king zealously guard his
thrown, knows that it will never reach the top unless positional barriers are dismantled
and the international order rectified. In the past, war determined the outcome in this
zero-sum positional competition, after which the winner rectified the international
order. Yet this folk wisdom does not stand on a solid scientific ground.
After all, the rising state is on the right side of history, in a domain of gain; the
dominant state, on the other hand, is in relative decline, in a domain of loss, to use the
terminology of prospect theory. Then why would the rising state sacrifice the strides
it has made prematurely? Knowing that history is on its side, the rising state can safely
bide its time and gain even greater strength. The dominant state, on the other hand,
knowing that its position is getting weaker in relative terms, feels that it has to act.1
Whether the First and the Second World Wars primarily should be attributed to actions
by a rising or a declining Germany is thus far from set.2 Whether it is appropriate to
speak of hegemonic wars at all when major wars often start small and grow big,
questions the characterization of major wars as an epic struggle between rising and
dominant powers.3
One of the main characteristics of the peace settlements after major wars in
1815, 1918, and 1945 is the increasing institutionalization of the international orders
that followed,4 which tell us that, apart from being merely about status or position, the

1

Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique (New York: Routledge,
2008); Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Powerbalancing in East Asia
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).
2
Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Cornell University Press, 2000); William C. Wohlforth,
“Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 01 (2009): 28–57.
3
Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow, “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?,” American Journal of
Political Science 36, no. 4 (1992): 896–922; Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, “Lost in
Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory,” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009):
389–410.
4
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after
Major Wars (Princeton University Press, 2001).
1

struggle over the international order, and hence revisionism, is just as much about
rules. Today, thanks to nuclear weapons5 and the immaterial foundation of the global
political economy that has made territorial conquest obsolete, 6 we do no longer have
to fear the recurrence of major wars among the core states of the international system.
Yet positional competition and the struggle over the institutional foundation of the
international order ceaseth not. After all, war, in the Clausewitzian sense, is merely the
continuation of politics by other means, and in the age of nuclear power and virtual
economies, war as a means for restructuring the international order is utterly irrational.
But man loves to compete nonetheless, 7 and human fallibility and lust for power
unfortunately prevents a utopian scheme. 8 Even so, the primary driving force of
positional competition is structural. 9 Hence, revisionism primarily relates to the
structural imperatives of the international system.
This brief introduction sets the tone for the topic of my dissertation; namely,
US-China positional competition and the struggle for leadership in the Asia-Pacific,
which focuses on the contemporary characteristics of status driven revisionism and
great power strategy. With this said, I will now specify the problems and puzzles of
the dissertation, state the research questions, and outline the aim and rationale of the
study.

John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the
Prospect of Armageddon (Cornell University Press, 1989); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and
Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (1990): 730–745.
6
John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations
Theory,” Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 72-77; Richard Rosecrance, The
Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
7
Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987).
8
Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1946); Reinhold
Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (Louisville, Westminster John
Knox Press, 2001).
9
Randall L Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict
Over Scarce Resource,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, ed. Ethan
B Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
2
5

1.1 Problems and Puzzles
A dissertation should seek to accomplish three principal things. It should address core
puzzles, strive for theoretical innovation, and scrutinize new data or cases. In the
following section, I will outline these three scientific components of the dissertation.10
In relation to the first scientific component, one of the most enduring questions
of IR concerns what China wants.11 Is China a status quo-seeking or a revisionist state?
However, the same type of puzzle applies to the United States. As the trend towards
multipolarity is steadily progressing, we should also direct our attention to the United
States. Some years before the 2008 Financial Crisis, Immanuel Wallerstein argued that
the United States was in relative decline and that “the real question was not whether
US hegemony was waning but whether the United States can devise a way to descend
gracefully.”12 Now, few are questioning American relative decline, yet Wallerstein’s
question remains one of the central puzzles for contemporary international relations –
how will the United States handle the fact that it no longer stands unchallenged at apex
of the global hierarchy? Hence, the question concerning the United States is of equal
importance: is the United States a status quo-seeking or a revisionist state?
However, the two core puzzles are not an either/or question. Instead, the core
puzzles that underlie the research relate to the fact that China and the United States
both seek to preserve and change the international order, that both, counterintuitively,
are status quo and revisionist powers.

Andrew Abbott, Methods of Discovery – Heuristics for the Social Sciences (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 2004); Richard Swedberg, The Art of Social Theory (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2014).
11
See, for instance, Douglas Lemke and Ronald L. Tammen, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of
China,” International Interactions 29, no. 4 (2003): 269–71; Alastair I. Johnston, “Is China a Status
Quo Power?,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56; Jeffrey W. Legro, “What China Will Want:
The Future Intentions of a Rising Power,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 03 (2007): 515–534; David C.
Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press,
2009); Feng Huiyun, “Is China a Revisionist Power?,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2,
no. 3 (2009): 313–34; G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign
Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008); M. Taylor Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing
China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion,” International Studies Review 12, no. 4 (2010): 505–32;
John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese
Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–96; Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After
Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International Security
36, no. 1 (2011): 41–72; Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); Kejin Zhao,
“China’s Rise and Its Discursive Power Strategy,” Chinese Political Science Review 1, no. 3 (2016):
539–64.
12
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New York:
The New Press, 2003), 27.
3
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Starting with China, previous studies claim that China is either a status quo
power13 or a revisionist power,14 and proponents of the different standpoints have their
daggers drawn about whose account is the most accurate one.15 Yet we need to escape
the trap of the either/or logic and open up to the possibility that China simultaneously
can be a status quo power and a revisionist power. This becomes obvious when we
consult primary official Chinese sources as well as secondary academic exegesis of
Chinese foreign policy. As Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
National People’s Congress Fu Ying makes clear, China has indeed “chosen to
integrate itself into the international order,” yet at the same time, it seeks to
“improve…its representation.”16 Similarly, Yong Deng, in his groundbreaking study
on China’s struggle for status, accentuates that “the CCP leaders have sought to
engineer China’s great power emergence within the world order,” but in doing so “they
have geared their diplomacy toward changing the international hierarchy to facilitate
China’s great-power ascent.” 17 Here we notice a tension between integrating and
accepting the rules of the game and changing the status order, as evidenced by China’s
admission to the WTO and its acceptance of global trade rules, while simultaneously
struggling to gain a greater position within the WTO hierarchy.18
If we turn to the United States, we can observe a comparable puzzle. For sure,
logically the United States cannot be a revisionist power in relation to the positional
status dimension of the international order. If it desires to maintain its preeminent
position, this unequivocally means preservation of the status-quo. Yet whereas Barack
Obama stresses the desire to maintain global leadership, he at the same time
emphasizes the need to write new regional rules to ensure leadership in the Asia-

See, for instance, Alastair I. Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”; Jeffrey W. Legro, “What
China Will Want”; Feng Huiyun, “Is China a Revisionist Power?”
14
See, for instance, John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm”; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for
Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2012).
15
See the contending perspectives of Walter Russel Mead and G. John Ikenberry. Walter Russel Mead,
“The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014):
69–79; G. John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order,”
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 80–90.
16
Fu Ying, “Debating the Contemporary International Order,” speech at Fullerton Hotel, Singapore,
July 29, 2015, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-fuying-d620, accessed February 25, 2016, emphasis added.
17
Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 17-18, emphasis added.
18
Scott Kennedy and Cheng Shuaihua, eds., From Rule Takers to Rule Makers: The Growing Role of
Chinese in Global Governance (Bloomington: RCCPB and ICTSD, 2012).
4
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Pacific.19 In their respective studies on the Bush administration’s “transformational
diplomacy,” Robert Jervis and Ian Hurd highlight that the United States, in that it wants
to preserve its dominant position in the international order, simultaneously “seeks to
change the rules of that order.”20 In this way, the United States is taking active part in
a “process of changing and remaking the social foundations of the international
system.”21 I hash out this problem at length in the conceptual section of the literature
view.
Status quo and revisionism are best conceptualized in relation to a struggle
between “alternative international orders,”

22

which makes the definition of

international order fundamental to the scientific enterprise of investigating
preservation and change in the international system. What is at stake, however, does
not fit a unidimensional conceptual framework. On the one hand, we are grappling
with a social-relational, positional dimension of the international order that concerns
status; on the other hand, we are dealing with a social-systemic dimension of the
international order that concerns institutions. Yet apart from a conceptual framework
that takes into account both the positional and the institutional dimensions of the
international order, we must also demonstrate how they relate to the two core domains
of the international order – the economic domain and the security domain. My
conceptual framework addresses this problem and makes a significant contribution to
the definitional parameters of international order, necessary to improve our
understanding of status quo-seeking and revisionism and the ongoing struggle between
alternative regional orders in the Asia-Pacific.
The second scientific component of the dissertation concerns theoretical
innovation. Even though the underpinnings of my theoretical framework to a large
extent build on structural realist insights, there are certain theoretical problems that
call for theoretical remodeling in order to enable the analysis of status quo-seeking and
revisionism to pierce both ways – towards explaining the policies of preservation and
change of both the rising great power and the declining superpower.

19

The White House, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Defense
Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC, 2012); Barack Obama, “President Obama: The TPP Would Let
America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade,” The Washington Post, May 2, 2016.
20
Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2006): 7.
21
Ian Hurd, “Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy,”
International Politics 44, no. 2 (2007): 198.
22
Steve Chan, Looking for Balance, 170.
5

Various structural realist theories essentially view the dominant state as
“always satisfied” and the rising power as dissatisfied and revisionist by definition.23
The theories can therefore not fathom that the US is a deeply conservative power in
that it wants to maintain its preeminence atop the global hierarchy, yet at the same
time, in both its neoconservative and liberal internationalist guises, a deeply revisionist
power that wants to rewrite the rules of the game.24 The theories can neither conceive
of China as simultaneously being dissatisfied with the international status order
dominated by the United States while being satisfied, in part, with the institutional
foundation of the international order, which serves its interests, incurs great benefits,
and largely underpins its rise. Yet despite their shortcomings, the major structural
realist theories all elucidate that the dominant power will take preventive measures to
block the ascendance of the rising state.25 As Mearsheimer states: “the United States
can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the
point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia.”26 These preventive
measures to maintain dominant status are revisionist.
In essence, we need to shift the theoretical focus from security to status. The
explanatory focus of structural realist theories relates status quo-seeking and
revisionism to issues of security and conquest, or rather insecurity and territorial
aggrandizement, with the analytical focus on either status quo or revisionism
depending on what structural logic one adheres to; whether defensive realism or
offensive realism, whether theorized as part of security-maximizing or powermaximizing behavior. 27 Various IR scholars have convincingly demonstrated that
states want status, and have accentuated the importance of status, rather than security,
in explaining revisionism and dissatisfaction with the status quo. 28 However, their
23

A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Robert Gilpin, War and
Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981); John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics; Steve Chan, “Can’t Get No Satisfaction? The Recognition of Revisionist States,”
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4, no. 2 (2004): 207–38; Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and
the Power-Transition Theory.
24
Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World”; John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” The
National Interest 111, Jan-Feb (2011): 16–34.
25
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics; for a discussion of more recent works by power-transition theorists that also acknowledge this
aspect, see Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power
Rivalry,” Review of International Studies 40, no. 01 (2014): 125–152.
26
John
Mearsheimer,
“Can
China
Rise
Peacefully?”
September
17,
2004,
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf, accessed February 13, 2014.
27
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979); John J
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
28
Randall L. Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System”; William C. Wohlforth,
6

theoretical focus repeats the flaws of the various structural realist theories by only
focusing on rising states and the link between status enhancement and revisionism,
leaving the link between status maintenance and revisionism unexplored. This is
problematic since “none of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with
the status quo,” as Samuel Huntington succinctly points out.29 Hence, status concerns
relates to both rising and declining powers.
Offensive realism explains revisionism in terms of power, hegemonic stability
theory incorporates the hierarchy of prestige and the rules of the system in addition to
power, and power-transition theory adds that power parity must be combined with
dissatisfaction. In contrast to offensive realism, change in the balance of power is not
the only explanatory factor, we also have to include change in the balance of prestige;
in contrast to hegemonic stability theory, prestige is not a mere reflection military
power, nor are the rules of the system always tilted in favor of the hegemonic state;
and in contrast to power-transition theory, dissatisfaction is not an autonomous
domestic-level variable, but is structurally induced. Since status, which I define as
social position, is composed of both power and prestige, we have to take into account
change in both the balance of power and the balance of prestige in explaining
revisionism, which then cause dissatisfaction in the form of status anxiety in the
dominant state, not the rising state. This leads to the hegemonic power to revise the
international order in order to maintain its dominant status. In doing this, it attempts to
block the ascendance of the rising challenger, which frustrates the status aspirations of
the rising state who responds by carving out an alternative international order that can
satisfy its status ambitions. Hence, my theoretical innovation makes a contribution by
providing an explanation for when and why revisionism relates to both the statusmaintenance strategies of the relatively declining superpower and the statusenhancement strategies of the rising great power. My theoretical contribution then also
addresses the temporal problem of structural realist theories – namely, that the rising
great power acts to revise, whereas the declining dominant power reacts to preserve –

“Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei
Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International Security
34, no. 4 (2010): 63–95; Steven Ward, “Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the Early 1930s,”
Security Studies 22, no. 4 (2013): 607–39; T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth,
eds., Status in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Reinhard Wolf, “Rising
Powers, Status Ambitions, and the Need to Reassure: What China Could Learn from Imperial
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by turning it on its head. The rising power is not the first-moving revisionist; instead,
the relatively declining dominant power moves first and revises to maintain, whereas
the declining dominant power reacts and revises to enhance.
One of the great contributions of liberal theories is that they bring to the fore
the increasingly expansive institutional mechanisms that “bind” and “lock in” states to
certain international orders.30 However, the logic of path-dependency of the liberal
historical institutionalist perspective has a status-quo bias that disregards active choice
at critical junctures; neither does institutional path-dependency have to favor the
dominant state, nor is the rules-based international order as open as liberals assume.
The central problem liberals fail to take into account is that the logical corollary of a
“lock in”-mechanism is a “lock out”-mechanism. Security provision by whom, and for
whom? A regional trade regime including whom? Whereas realists need to put
emphasis on the importance of rules for positional appropriation within systems of
monopolistic competition, 31 liberals fail to theorize the positional, social-relational
insider-outsider logic that perpetuates all form of politics; namely, that institutions
work in tandem with exclusionary social closure.32
Liberals and constructivists are right to point out that secondary states “buy
into” the international order;33 they defer to the leading state and form a “circle of
recognition” 34 that accepts its leadership. This accentuates the significance of
recognition for the performance of status functions. 35 In this sense, revisionism is
indeed prosocial. At the same time, the logic of positional competition still applies to
the rivalling leadership contenders that compete for the acquiescence of secondary
states in order to change the international order. Thus, by treating self-esteem as the
ultimate end of status recognition or status as an end in itself,36 one misses the mark.
30
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I define status as social position (see section 2.1.5.1 for an elaborate definition).
The struggle for status is a struggle for the end of influence, and both power and
prestige are means to that end.37 The struggle for power takes the form of a struggle to
acquire capabilities, while the struggle for prestige takes the form of a struggle to
increase “reputational capital”38 in order to gain the acquiescence of secondary states.
As such, the importance of “making friends,”39 in particular by providing international
public goods, makes it faulty to denote China as a “post-responsible power;”40 neither
is China a “responsible stakeholder” that passively accepts the US characterization of
responsibility. What is at stake is rather a “clash of responsibilities,” as part of the
positional struggle for regional leadership and contending alternatives for regional
order.
For if China is a “geopolitical insider,” as John Ikenberry likes to claim, then
why is China excluded from the TPP and why is it encircled by the US security
network in the Asia-Pacific? Moreover, how can one claim that China is satisfied with
the status quo of the regional security order when Xi Jinping stresses, “it is for the
people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the
security of Asia.” In addition, why did China establish the AIIB and why did the United
States and Japan refuse to accept the invitation? These empirical puzzles provide the
direction for the third scientific component of the dissertation, namely the
incorporation of new empirical cases. These cases – the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), America’s Principled Security Network, the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB), and China’s project for an Asian Security Order – include both the
economic and the security domain of the regional order of the Asia-Pacific.
The cases further connects to the problem of “Chinese assertiveness,” which
purportedly triggered the US “pivot” to Asia.41 Yet we should turn the causal arrow on
Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Steven
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its head. Faced with China’s rise, the US pivot to Asia was a proactive move to uphold
US sole superpower status and global leadership by revising the regional order. Thus,
it was not Chinese assertiveness that prompted the US pivot; the US pivot prompted
Chinese assertiveness. This connects to recent studies that claim that China indeed is
more assertive, and revisionist, now, but that it started to take shape after the US pivot
to Asia, in particular after Xi Jinping assumed power.42
Below follows the specific research questions.

1.2 Research Questions
The overarching research questions of theoretical interest are the following:
 When and why do great powers seek to revise the status quo?
 How can we reconcile the counterintuitive proposition that both the
dominant power and the rising power, simultaneously, can be
understood as status quo-seeking and revisionist powers?

The overarching research questions are given contemporary relevance through the
following specific empirical questions:
 Is there an ongoing positional struggle for leadership between the
United States and China in the Asia-Pacific?
 How can we understand the US pivot to Asia as a status-maintenance
strategy designed to change the regional order?
 How can we understand China’s reaction as a status-enhancement
strategy designed to change the regional order?
by strengthening the US presence in the region.” According to Kevin Rudd: the pivot was
“Washington’s response” to “a more assertive Chinese foreign and security policy.” And, as stated by
Elizabeth Economy, “for most observers outside China, it was Chinese assertiveness that was the action,
while the US pivot was, in large measure, the reaction.” Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot:
Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” CHINA US Focus, December 6,
2012,http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-problem-with-the-pivot-obamas-new-asiapolicy-is-unnecessary-and-counterproductive/, accessed June 28, 2014; Kevin Rudd, “Beyond the
Pivot: A New Road Map for U.S.-Chinese Relations,” CHINA US Focus, February 26, 2013,
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1.3 Aim and Rationale of the Study
The central aim of the study is to offer a contribution to the perennial question of IR
theory – what do states want? The traditional realist answer to this core theoretical
question is security. To be sure, security is man’s most foundational need, and so as
well for states, especially in a state of warre or anarchy, when self-preservation is the
closest we can come to a natural right. 43 Yet when one is safe, when times are
characterized by peace and development, then the primary objective of security and
the minimalist principle of self-preservation yields to the secondary objective of status
and the teleological and maximalist principle of status-maximization.44 In fact, the
advent of the nuclear age, and the ensuing robust non-appearance of direct wars
between great powers has produced a situation where the core states of the
international system enjoy an abundance of security. Then, what secure states want is
the “positional good” of status, and specifically the influence vested in status.45
Modifications and extensions of realist IR theory have convincingly
demonstrated that states want status and that it can be central to explaining
dissatisfaction with the status quo. However, as I substantiated above, their analytical
focus severs the link between status-maintenance strategies and revisionism by
omission; namely, by exclusively putting the attention on revisionism in terms of
status-enhancement. The purpose of the study is to develop a conceptual and
theoretical framework that take into account and explain, not just rising great powers
revisionist desires and what causes them, but also the revisionist strategies of the
relatively declining superpower. Instead of viewing the present competitive dynamic
between the United States and China in terms of security, the study elucidates concerns
about status and leadership and explains how both status-maintenance and statusenhancement strategies relate to revisionism. This is a matter of theoretical and
conceptual priority, not a claim that traditional considerations of security are
unimportant or irrelevant. Neither does the analytical focus on the competitive logic
of US-China relations mean the absence of substantial US-China cooperation. Again,
it is a matter of perspectival priority, not empirical one-dimensionality.
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What follows from the conceptual and theoretical purpose is the empirical aim
to demonstrate the adequacy of the framework by applying it to contemporary
international relations, in particular by demonstrating its usefulness in explaining the
ongoing positional struggle for leadership in the Asia-Pacific. The aim is to show how
my framework applies to four specific empirical cases, two from the economic domain
and two from the security domain of the regional order. The four cases are the
following: the TPP, America’s Principled Security Network, the AIIB, and China’s
project for an Asian Security Order.

1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
I organize the dissertation around 11 chapters inclusive of the introduction and the
conclusion. After this introductory chapter follows the theoretical chapter where I
discuss core concepts, review relevant theories, and outline my own theory. I examine
the shortcomings of competing IR-theories of revisionism and provide the rationale
and theoretical basis for the study. In particular, I hash out various significant
components and synthesize them into a new theoretical framework. After the
theoretical chapter follows a chapter on methodology where I discuss philosophy of
science, outline the research methodology, and present the data collection methods and
the material.
The next seven chapters are the empirical chapters. The first two empirical
chapters scrutinize the change in the balance of power and the balance of prestige. The
next chapter examine the institutional barriers that the United States faced in the AsiaPacific before the US pivot to Asia. Then follows a chapter that ascertains that the
change in the balance of power and the balance of prestige generated status anxiety in
the United States, which triggered the US pivot to Asia. The next chapter then deals
with the US pivot to Asia and includes two case studies: the TPP and America’s
Principled Security Network. The chapter substantiates these cases as projects
designed to revise the regional order of the Asia-Pacific in order to maintain US
leadership and an Americancentric world order. The next chapter scrutinizes Chinese
status expectations, how China perceives US relative decline and the US pivot as a
status challenge. After that follows a chapter on China’s revisionist regional projects:
the AIIB and China’s project for an Asian Security Order. The chapter outlines these
cases as projects designed to revise the regional order of the Asia-Pacific in response
12

to the US pivot and the exclusionary Americancentric project pursued by the Obama
administration. The last chapter of the dissertation is the conclusion.

13

2. Theory
In this chapter, I will critically evaluate the different conceptual and theoretical
problems of status quo-seeking and revisionism. I will discuss core concepts, review
competing IR theories of revisionism, and outline my own theory. The aim of this
chapter is thus to construct a coherent conceptual and theoretical framework that will
be applied to the empirical cases.

2.1 Core Concepts
In this section, I will discuss the core concepts of status quo, revisionism, and
international order. This discussion will result in a definition of status quo and
revisionism and a novel conceptual framework of international order in terms of which
the two core concepts are understood.

2.1.1 The “Double Hermeneutic” of Status Quo and Revisionism
In order to avoid ambiguity, the central concepts of status quo and revisionism need to
be clearly defined. First and foremost, we must separate the social scientific concepts
of status quo and revisionism from their popular meanings and connotations. The
“double hermeneutic” of social science means that layman notions, and even the takenfor-granted use of social science concepts by experts and policymakers, might intrude
on the scientific conception of researchers.46 Status quo and revisionism are thus not
merely “neutral” social scientific concepts, but also politically loaded notions. In
particular, revisionism is imbued with negative connotations, and political actors often
decry the label when being categorized as such. Dominant actors associate the status
quo as something positive and normatively desirable, whereas revisionism is
something negative and morally deplorable. More than just an analytical tool, this
normative bias turns revisionism into a rhetorical smearing device.
This conceptual condition can be traced to four particular factors. First, when
revisionism was coined as a reformist social-democratic concept, orthodox Marxists
embedded revisionism into their debunking strategies against persons accused of
eroding “true” Marxism. Second, although revisionism ought to be an acceptable
practice in the study of history, especially so as new facts come to elucidate earlier and
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University of California Press, 1984).
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less accurate historical accounts, after the Second World War revisionism became
associated with historians that denied the holocaust. Third, in the study of IR the
concept has long been intimately associated with major wars and historical actors such
as Nazi Germany, Maoist China, and Imperial Japan. Fourth, as challenges to the
established international order indeed fit under the label of revisionism, the defenders
of the status quo will use the revisionist label to debunk and delegitimize any such
perceived attempts.
In sum, the pejorative associations of revisionism need to be disentangled in
order to make it analytically non-controversial.

2.1.2 Reclaiming the Meaning of Revisionism
Revisionism means modification, amendment, reform, or change. It differs from the
sudden, radical, fundamental, complete, and violent change of revolution. In IR,
however, revisionism is strangely enough normally associated with the latter.
As a concept, revisionism was coined by Eduard Bernstein and based on a
reformist understanding of Marxism, which emphasized that socialism could be
achieved democratically, and peacefully, through progressive reforms. In essence,
revisionism emerged as a strategy distinct from the revolutionary way of political
change.47 One can make further connections to Deng Xiaoping’s guiding philosophy
for reform and liberalization – “crossing the river by feeling the stones” – and the later
emphasis on “gradualism, controllability and the taking of initiative” by Wen Jiabao.48
In IR, the mainstream understanding of revisionism connects the concept to major wars
and radical change that lead to the complete eradication of the old systemic
components – Jacobin style. Yet the more precise understanding of revisionism is
reform, modification, and gradual change.

2.1.3 From Brute Force to Military Restraint
Another problem with revisionism concerns its association with the use of force. IR
scholars normally define revisionist states as entities that use “military force to change
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the status quo.”49 However, this definition confuses means for ends. Instead, various
mitigating circumstances suggest that great powers are unlikely to engage in war for
revisionist purposes in the contemporary age, at least against other fellow great
powers. In other words, great power competition is not bound to take a violent form:
“intergroup competition does [not] exclude the possibility that particular types of
social practices might act as mitigating circumstances for intergroup violence.”50 One
primary mitigating factor, and three reinforcing mitigating factors, are of particular
significance in relation to revisionism and the irrelevance of the direct use of military
force between great powers.
Above all, nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD) work to
curb violent interstate conflict. “Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically
the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow
such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a
large and fearsome one).”51 In fact, nuclear weapons have revolutionized international
relations and brought great power relations into a new age of military restraint. In the
present great power system, the core states enjoy an abundance of security.52 Whereas
nuclear deterrence curbs inter-state conflict, it does not ameliorate positional
competition. This primary mitigating factor is supplemented by three reinforcing
factors.
First, self-extension and conquest do not follow the logic of the past since
mobile factors of production, global financial centers, and global information and
communication networks all “challenge the geographical basis of conventional
international relations theory,” which have eroded the formerly close-fitting
connection between territory and wealth.53 This accentuates that power is exercised
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through institutions “directly on people – not on land.”54 Invading another country
does no longer promise the same bounty or status that territorial conquest and colonial
possessions did in the past – great powers do no longer improve their position through
territorial conquest. The Russian annexation of Crimea is, perhaps, the most telling
example.
Second, even though theoretical perspectives differ, it can be argued that
economic interdependence fortifies “the pacific effects” already “induced by the
condition of mutual assured destruction”55 as it adds incentives to restrain international
disputes by raising the costs of conflict.56 This has given rise to the concept of Mutual
Assured Economic Destruction (MAED), which arguably characterize the relationship
between the United States and China.57 Third, it is “impossible to think seriously about
international relations without reference to the changes in norms relating to conquest
and security management,” 58 which have constrained the resort to violence in
“resolving political deadlocks.”59
These mitigating factors all contribute to the general evolutionary process of
“strategic restraint” and the way leading states preserve and change international
orders.60

2.1.4 The Problématique of International Order
The analytical use of status quo and revisionism, satisfied and dissatisfied states, stems
from classical realist thought. 61 At the very foundation lie the problématique of
international order. That is, status quo and revisionism are used as heuristic devices
against which state intentions, grand strategic orientations, and foreign policy actions
are judged in terms of either preservation or change of the international order. Status
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quo and revisionism are therefore best understood in relation to a struggle between
“alternative international orders.”62 This makes it necessary to specify and define the
fundamental concept of international order.
A.F.K. Organski differentiated between types of powerful and satisfied and
powerful and dissatisfied states. The latter type refers to latecomers and challengers:
rising states “who seek to upset the existing international order and establish a new
order in its place.”63 In the same vein, Aron Friedberg claims, “fast-rising powers are
almost invariably troublemakers.”64 The rising state, well familiar with the fact that
the king zealously guard his thrown, knows that it will never reach the top unless
positional barriers are dismantled and the international order rectified. Despite its
apparent logic, these claims are problematic since it assumes that the dominant state is
always satisfied and the rising state always dissatisfied.

65

The issue of

satisfaction/dissatisfaction often “appears as a post hoc construction” or is de facto
used as “an analytical constant,” instead of making it an object of empirical inquiry.66
We must avoid this use of status quo/revisionism, satisfied/dissatisfied, and not put on
conceptual blinders that prevent us from observing that both the dominant state and
the rising challenger can be satisfied or dissatisfied with certain dimensions of the
international order. Whereas the dominant power certainly is positionally conservative
in that it wants to maintain its position atop the global hierarchy, it can certainly be
dissatisfied with its position and the rules in a certain regional institutional
environment. The rising great power is certainly positionally dissatisfied until it
reaches the apex of the regional or the global hierarchy, yet it can be satisfied with the
regional and global institutional landscape, which incurs great benefits, underpin its
rise, and is commensurate with its values. Even though the sole superpower strives for
full-spectrum dominance, open markets, and diplomatic access, there has never been,
and their never will be, a dominant power will total control. The dominant power must
revise to maintain its sole superpower status.
Treating status quo and revisionism merely in terms of power or position67
leaves no theoretical room for dissatisfaction with the institutional order; and treating
62
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revisionism merely in terms of the rules of the game68 leaves no theoretical room for
dissatisfaction with the international status order. This conceptual problem lies at the
core of the analytical imprecision and the inability to make a coherent argument about
whether the United States and China are status quo-seeking or revisionist powers.
However, many scholars implicitly invoke notions of both status and institutions in
their assessments.
Arthur Kroeber makes the argument that “the notion that China-backed
financing institutions pose a threat to the international rules of the game is overblown.
For the most part, these institutions will simply create more competition. This might
discomfit the incumbents, but the economic impacts will on balance be beneficial.”69
This shows that China, on the one hand, favors the institutional status quo, yet on the
other hand, wants to establish new status hierarchies that might discomfit dominant
states, which is a matter of positional revisionism. Notwithstanding potential
beneficial economic consequences, the competitive dynamic is about positional
indivisibility, not economic benefits or systemic complementarity.
The gist of Scott Kennedy’s argument is the same. Kennedy fears “not that
China has been or will be an anti-status quo power, but that it won’t be, that it is so
wedded to the status quo that China will forestall important reforms that are
desperately needed.” He argues, however, that “China’s main goal here is to increase
its own influence over governance…not necessarily any specific substantive reform.”70
Since influence is vested in position, Kennedy’s argument about reform primarily
relates to rules. If the dominant power block positional ascendance within the system,
the rising great power will seek to break positional barriers, even if it is largely satisfied
with the institutional framework.
The China 2020 Research Team, spearheaded by Zhou Qiren of the National
School of Development at Peking University, also spells out a similar dynamic. The
China 2020 Research Team argues that China “should not…replace the existing world
order and set of values with a brand new one; rather it should work towards improving
the order currently in place, and gradually realize its objective of overtaking the US to
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become number one sometime in the latter part of the century.” 71 Similarly, Yong
Deng accentuates that “the CCP leaders have sought to engineer China’s great power
emergence within the world order,” but in doing so “they have geared their diplomacy
toward changing the international hierarchy to facilitate China’s great-power
ascent.”72
China’s overarching goal is, perhaps, primarily positional. In one way or
another, various scholars recognize China’s institutional status quo inclination, at least
in relation to the economic order, yet they simultaneously refer to a positional order
that China indeed desires to change in order to increase its influence. Besides,
whatever change China desires, such change is truly revisionist, that is, incremental
and reformist in nature.
In the case of the United States, we find a comparable dynamic, albeit a
reversed one, concerning the tension between the positional and the institutional
dimensions of the international order. Christopher Layne makes an important
clarification:
Although some scholars argue that as a hegemon the United States is a status quo
power, its grand strategy is actually a peculiar mix. The United States is a status quo
power in that it aims to preserve the existing distribution of power. Consistent with
the logic of offensive realism, however, the United States is also an expansionist
state that seeks to increase its power advantages and to extend its geopolitical and
ideological reach. To preserve the status quo that favors them, hegemons must keep
knocking down actual and potential rivals; that is, they must continue to expand. 73

That the United States seeks to preserve its dominant position, its sole superpower
status, is indeed an example of status quo-seeking. However, Layne faces problems
theorizing US revisionist expansionism since his professed theory, offensive realism,
conceives of revisionism only in terms of power, which leaves no theoretical room for
dissatisfaction with the institutional dimensions of the international order. Knocking
down rivals and expanding one’s reach in the contemporary era is a matter of erasing
institutional barriers in the most strategically significant region.
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Robert Jervis and Ian Hurd further highlight that the United States, in that it
wants to preserve its dominant position in the international order, simultaneously
“seeks to change the rules of that order.”74 In this way, the United States is taking
active part in a “process of changing and remaking the social foundations of the
international system.”75
With the above discussion in mind, I will now define the fundamental concept
of international order.

2.1.5 Defining International Order
The “problem of order” is the fundamental problem of the social sciences, 76 yet in IR
the concept of international order is surprisingly undertheorized. IR scholars address
components of international order without defining international order as a whole.
Realists primarily focus on the component of power or capabilities, 77 and at times
incorporate prestige and rules; 78 liberals primarily focus on rules or regimes; 79 and
constructivist focus on rules, norms, and values. 80 This is, of course, a schematic
divide, but it illustrates the problem of addressing components of international order
without defining international order as a whole. In this section, I will attempt to address
this problem and construct a novel conceptual framework of international order.
A major problem relates to the view of the international system as selfregulating.

Kenneth

Waltz’s

structural-functionalist

perspective

views

the

international system in terms of an auto-adjustment process; “patterns emerge and
endure without anyone arranging the parts to form patterns or striving to maintain
them,” and thus “order may prevail without an orderer; adjustments may be made
without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator.”81 In other words, if
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something like an international order exists, it is the result of a self-regulating pattern
devoid of intentional actors. With capabilities as the only structural component, one
certainly facilitates nomothetic generalizations, but faces problems in accounting for
social change and how great powers actively and intentionally try to modify and
change the international order.
Shiping Tang, in his eloquent examination of the concept of order, divides order
into various conceptual layers and provides a rigorous definition of order in terms of
its basic meaning, its differentiation, its measurement, and what accounts for its
stability and legitimacy. At the basic level, Tang defines order as “predictability of
things within a human community or social system,” and as such, he points to the fact
that “agents’ behavior, social interactions, and social outcomes…come under some
kind of regulation.”82 Tang underlines that order is also a continuum, ranging from
disorderly chaos to robust order, and given his definition at the basic level, the
conceptualization is open to encompass all types of order and all possible components
of order. Socio-political orders are indeed relational in that they encompass certain
groups or communities. Yet what Tang fails to highlight properly is that the
predictability or regularity of socio-political orders always exist according to some
basic ordering principle that structure the order in the most fundamental way. Tang’s
definition of order takes us a long way, but does not help us enough unless we specify
what ordering principle that is at stake.
Kenneth Waltz famously distinguished between two ordering principles:
anarchy and hierarchy.83 They are not mutually exclusive, but can coexist within the
international system. More than merely existing “in anarchy,” 84 states are better
described as interacting in an international system characterized by “hierarchy in
anarchy.”85 As Randall Schweller puts it, “the international system is oligarchical (or
hierarchic) precisely because it is an anarchic one, wherein might makes right and
differences in power and wealth serve to perpetuate inequality rather than alleviate
it.”86 Yet if we refer to anarchy as the mere nonexistence of a pan-national global
authority, this is not really an ordering principle, but rather the absence of a global
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political order. Instead, what we should refer to as the two fundamental ordering
principles of human communities are hierarchy and equality.
From the chicken-yard pecking order 87 to the dominance structures among
monkey and ape societies, social dominance hierarchies are omnipresent among
vertebrate societies, including human societies. In fact, they serve as the universal
“spinal cord” of human communities,88 and it can be questioned if undifferentiated
groups exist at all.89
In his treatment of rank, or status, Adam Smith deploys the notion of sympathy.
Smith puts emphasis on man’s natural propensity to sympathize with joy, with success
and achievement, which constitutes the very foundation of ambition and the
hierarchical ordering of society – in contrast to the much weaker human propensity to
sympathize with grief, and the many times outright disdain for misery and failure. This
basic “disposition of mankind” to sympathize with, or “to admire, and almost worship,
the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and
mean condition,” serves as the foundation of the hierarchical order and affords society
its stability through deference and subordination to those of superior rank. 90 As a
result, ambiguities about status and role differentiation breed unpredictability and
disorder.91
Despite sovereignty, the master institution of the Westphalian system, with all
states enjoying the same formal sovereign rights, status hierarchies exist side-by-side
in both formal (e.g. weighted voting rights, veto powers) and informal (e.g. imposition
of international custom) ways, and are structured by unequal access to capabilities and
prestige, and constituted in terms of recognition and nonrecognition. 92 Even if the
Westphalian system established sovereign equality among its formally recognized
subjects, European great powers have historically imposed social dominance
structures of superior-inferior relationships within their respective imperial and
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colonial domains. One might argue, however, that contemporary international politics
is different, that social dominance orders is a thing of the past now that colonialism is
brought to an end and we move towards a more peaceful, civilized, equal, rules-based,
and reciprocal institutional order. Yet in relation to great power management, the
market, and diplomacy, the differentiation of these primary institutions in terms of
status is still ubiquitous. Indeed, the major flaw of the English School of international
relations and the master concept of “international society” is that it fails to theorize
properly the hierarchical structuring of the international order.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the epitome of a hierarchical,
not an equal, international order where security management is the responsibility of a
few core states. Alliances are not always marriages of convenience between two equal
parts, they are often asymmetrical and serve to discipline and bind subordinate security
dependent states into a certain security order. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
adheres to the egalitarian principle of “one country, one vote,” yet key GATT decisions
were long made by the Quad group (US, Japan, EU, Canada), and in the contemporary
era major powers are increasingly forming new status groups that lead and coordinate
trade negotiations and decision-making processes in various issue-areas in the WTO.
Moreover, with an increasingly sluggish WTO process and the impasse of the Doha
Development Round, the organization of international trade through regional
economic blocs highlight the growing significance of different regional status
groupings in the trade landscape. The diplomatic landscape is also being shaped by
powerful actors trying to exclude or limit the influence of their competitors in various
multilateral arenas and forums. In relation to international law, without juristic
competence states do not stand a chance when attacked by armies of lawyers in
international arbitration processes, not to mention the capacity needed to bear the costs
of litigation. Thus, in a reciprocal, horizontal institutional order, capabilities affect
legal outcomes.93 Other, more controversial primary institutions such as human rights,
environmental stewardship, and nationalism, cannot be understood without the
concept of status. A liberal, cosmopolitan conception of global individual rights
requires imposition – the intervention from powerful actions in some form;
Manfred Elsig and Mark A. Pollack, “Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: The Politics of
Judicial Appointment at the World Trade Organization,” European Journal of International Relations
20, no. 2 (2014): 391–415; Jonas Tallberg and James McCall Smith, “Dispute Settlement in World
Politics: States, Supranational Prosecutors, and Compliance,” European Journal of International
Relations 20, no. 1 (2014): 118–44.
24
93

environmental regulation requires agreement between high-polluting high-status
actors; and the self-determination of certain nations requires recognition and active
support from powerful backers.
Although often associated with brute force, social dominance orders are not the
same as tyranny – even Baboons exercise social responsibility. The dominant players
at the apex of the hierarchy indeed have extensive rights, yet responsibilities are just
as significant. If duties are unfulfilled, looming threats of non-recognition will face the
dominant actors, with other pretenders ready to seize the throne. Even so, social
dominance orders are increasingly institutionalized and legal. States do not merely face
armies and navies, but nuclear weapons inspectors, Anglo-American law firms, and
global credit institutes. We are thus moving towards increasing legal-rational,
bureaucratic domination in the international system.
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Certainly, institutional

governance mechanisms need to be legitimate and one cannot escape the significance
of some form of consent. Nevertheless, there is an inherent and unescapable tension
between the master institution of sovereignty, and the reality of hierarchy within the
primary institutions of great power management, the market, diplomacy, and
international law. Hence, the rules and values that make up the institutional
environment only come into effect when they are acknowledged, strategically
deployed, and acted upon by dominant powers.
Amitav Acharya makes an important contribution to the study of the regional
order of Asia-Pacific, but misses the crucial point just stressed above. Acharya outlines
what he terms as a consociational security order, consisting of three central
mechanisms: balance of power, cooperative institutions, and elite restraint. However,
with this model, Acharya cannot explain the increasingly competitive US-China
relationship; neither the fact that rival projects for regional order are being erected.
The driving force behind US-China strategic competition is that, as the balance of
power and the balance of prestige undergo change, uncertainty about status and the
struggle for influence are breeding tensions. Balance of power as an institutional
agreed upon great power arrangement is fundamentally a matter of status recognition,
and implies distinct spheres of influence, whereas regional cooperative institutions are
frameworks that regulate interaction among groups differentiated by status and an
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insider-outsider logic. Elite restraint is certainly important, but it is more a product of
nuclear deterrence than anything else.
International order is fundamentally an institutional concept. As defined by
Craig Parsons, institutions are “properties of groups” consisting of “formal or informal
rules, conventions or practices, together with the organizational manifestations these
patterns of group behavior sometimes takes on.”95 Oran Young defines institutions as
“recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with collections
of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of those roles.”96
With institutions as properties of groups, status refers to membership and relative
standing within the group,97 whereas role is the behavioral expectations that come with
a certain status. Status and institutions thus regulate international orders. Yet it is
status, not institutions, that solves collective action problems.
The classic collective action problems refer to challenges in motivating actors
to make costly contributions and in coordinating group efforts. In particular, status
solves the “start-up” problem through initial contributions, and the “free-rider”
problem through subsequent contributions. In contrast to rational actor models that
focus on how individual motivation affects collective action problems, status secures
collective goods structurally and functions as a “coordination mechanism.” In this
way, high status actors take a proactive stance towards public goods provision; they
are central to “the initiation of, contributions to, and continuation of collective
action.”98 Consequently, there cannot be any cooperation “after hegemony” devoid of
high status actors that coordinate collective action and assume leadership
responsibilities for public goods provision, and therefore, the competitive positional
dynamic and clashing projects for international order cannot be avoided.99
In sum, we have two dimensions of any international order in terms of which
regulation and the “predictability of things” unfolds; namely, the social-relational
status dimension, structured by the ordering principles of hierarchy and membership,
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and the social-systemic institutional dimension, structured by normative ordering
principles. The scope of international order essentially takes two basic forms: global
or regional. The UN and the WTO resemble the closest equivalents of global order and
regional trade agreements and regional alliance systems are examples of regional
orders. International orders also consist of two principal domains: the economic
domain and the security domain.
I will now outline and define the core dimensions of international order.
2.1.5.1 The Three Ps of the Social-Relational Status Dimension: Position, Power,
Prestige
The core issue in the debate about the concept of status concerns whether it is an
objective structural reality or a matter of social evaluation.100 I contend that status is
an objective structural reality, which, however, consists of both objective and
intersubjective status attributes necessary for its materialization. At the center of my
conceptual apparatus is the notion of status as positional – a social position imbued
with certain rights and responsibilities within a grouping.101 Position is thus the core
status concept, yet power and prestige are means to the end of position; they are the
necessary objective and intersubjective status attributes that enable positional
attainment. Power is indeed a means to an end, yet when the primary objective of
security is realized, power becomes a means to the secondary objective of status.
Prestige is equally a means to an end,102 yet when one argues that prestige is a means
to the end of power, it is logically connected to a positional, social-relational notion of
power since intersubjectively ascribed prestige cannot be a means to achieved
capabilities, which result from self-effort. However, this positional notion of power103
is better conceptualized as status, status that is attained within the sphere of
international politics, and the sphere of politics is always the sphere of influence.104
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2.1.5.1.1 Status as Social Position
Status as social position relates to both the issue of membership in a specific grouping,
as well as an actor’s relative standing within the group.105 I further connect status as
social position to political struggles for influence and political control. Hans
Morgenthau argues that “the desire for power” is not characterized by “the individual’s
survival but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured,”
and this desire is only satisfied when no one is “above or beside him.”106 Morgenthau’s
classic assertion that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,”107
is thus properly read as a “struggle for position” to maximize international influence.108
This further connects to Robert Jervis view of primacy, which “implies that the state
has greater ability than any rival to influence a broad range of issues and a large number
of states.”109
Positional goods “are either (1) scarce in some absolute or socially imposed
sense or (2) subject to congestion or crowding through more extensive use.” 110
Traditionally, the connection between position and influence has been that between
great power status and “spheres of influence.”111 The growing institutionalization of
international politics means that the international order in fact develops a more
constitution-like character, 112 in which the struggle for the “positional good” of
leadership increasingly takes the form of a struggle to “set status in stone” through
institutional privileges. 113 The positional good of leadership is indivisible and the
exclusion of leadership pretenders are central to the struggle for alternative
international orders. This struggle is essentially about the hierarchical structuring of
the international order and the forming of the institutional landscape.
Hence, we cannot think of international orders outside the social relations that
constitute them and how certain actors and activities are kept together as well as apart.
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International orders do not only enable interaction, they also erect barriers to
interaction. This fact links status and recognition to questions of membership criteria
and exclusionary social closure, 114 which regulates the insider-outsider logic of
international orders. As Max Weber puts it, social closure occurs when “one group of
competitors takes some externally identifiable characteristic of another group…as a
pretext for attempting their exclusion.”115 Social closure “is an ever-recurring process,
it is the source of…group monopolies,” and “its purpose is always the closure of social
and economic opportunities to outsiders.”116 It is a central mechanism for controlling
access to social goods and resources or for appropriating “positional goods.”
However, status holds behavioral expectations, which we understand in terms
of the concept of role. 117 The actor occupying the position needs to live up to its
associated expectations by playing its corresponding role. Thus, “every status has its
‘dynamic aspect’ – a role.” 118 While status locates actors hierarchically within the
prevailing order, roles specify the expected and appropriate behaviors associated with
the particular social position. When actors put the rights and responsibilities that
explicitly or implicitly constitute statuses into effect, they perform roles. In other
words, the role is “what the status calls on one to do.”119 In particular, three types of
leadership roles stand out: structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership roles.
Structural leadership is a matter of translating material capabilities into leverage in the
bargaining process; entrepreneurial leadership is about agenda setting, policy
innovation, and institutional brokerage; and intellectual leadership concerns values,
ideas and shared understandings that come to shape the institutions.120
An actor’s status and the role it performs is inescapably tied to a “circle of
recognition” that participates in the performance.121 In fact, the leader “cannot perform
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his role without the cooperation of his circle.” 122 Hence, “collective acceptance or
recognition” is necessary to attain status. 123 By recognizing the leadership of the
dominant actor, the social grouping grants the actor certain rights and responsibilities.
Yet in order to gain status recognition the leader must possess both power and prestige
attributes that imbue it with the capacity and the reputation to perform the role, and
carry out the central tasks of public goods provision and influence rule making.
I will now define the status attributes necessary for positional attainment:
power and prestige.
2.1.5.1.2 Power and Prestige as Achieved and Ascribed Status Components
By viewing status as social position, there should now be few questions about what
status is, yet questions remain about the components of status. I claim that in order to
attain social position two status attributes are required: power and prestige. The
positional struggle is a struggle for the end of status, and the influence that derives
from that end, while power and prestige are means to that end. This relates to the
traditional sociological division between achieved and ascribed status attributes that
pertain to individuals in domestic societies. Achieved status attributes are attained
through personal effort (i.e. income, education), whereas ascribed status attributes are
known at birth (race, ethnicity, sex, age, family, religion).124 I adhere to this standard
conceptual scheme, yet I modify the meaning of ascribed status to suit the international
political realm. Power counts as the achieved status attribute par excellence concerning
states, and prestige counts as the socially ascribed status attribute. Although ascribed
status attributes traditionally are viewed as qualities known at birth and apparently
beyond individual control, the very process of ascribing certain attributes positive or
negative value is inherently a matter of power-laden social construction, or in other
words, a struggle for the “definition of value.”125
I define power in terms of capabilities in the standard structural realist sense.
There are five core capabilities of importance as outlined by Kenneth Waltz: economic
wealth, military strength, resource endowment, size of population and territory, and
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political stability and competence.126 The first two are the core capabilities that count
in the struggle for positional attainment; however, they certainly rest on a foundation
composed of the other three. For instance, without resources (natural and human
resources, material and immaterial resources) there can be no economic development
and thus no military advancement. The fusing of idea into matter – technological
innovation in its essence – is necessary for the development of a wealthy, powerful,
and advanced nation. Nevertheless, the analytical focus is on economic capabilities
and military strength as they relate to the core domains of the international order.
Power as a status attribute counts for states’ objective ranking in economic and military
hierarchies, whereas status as social position is about membership and relative
placement within a grouping. Yet, as will be emphasized below, power is not sufficient
by itself for the attainment of leadership position.
A “status situation,” as defined by Max Weber, refers to “social estimation of
honor.” 127 Weber emphasizes that “not all power…entails social honor…‘mere
economic’ power, and especially ‘naked’ money power, is by no means a recognized
basis of social honor. Nor is power the only basis of social honor.”128 What Weber
points to is that domestic social stratification is not based on a single principle – even
though Marxists (economic class) have long tried to claim so – but rests on multiple
principles or status attributes. Yet what about the international political arena? Is
international society a warrior society where military power provides the only basis
for status?
During European dynastic rule the ascribed status attribute of family was
“conferring status according to the whims of the marriage market” and religious lines
long divided Europe between Protestants and Catholics.129 Likewise, the Eurocentric
and colonial stratification system based on race prevented Japan from attaining great
power status in the early twentieth century.130 In the recent anthology Status in World
Politics, Deborah Larson, T.V. Paul and William Wohlforth list eight status attributes
relevant for contemporary international relations – both tangible and intangible – and
posit that status “cannot be read off a state’s material attributes” alone. 131 Similarly,
126
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apart from the status attributes of military strength and ideological appeal, Randall
Schweller lists various attributes that have become important for achieving
international status, such as culture, political development, technological
achievements, strength of national currency, foreign direct investment, among
others.132 In sum, the enjoyment of status in the international realm depends on both
hard (material) and soft, socially ascribed, (ideational) attributes.
I define prestige in terms of reputation and the admiration felt for someone
based on a valuation of its achievements and qualities. This relates to Thomas Hobbes’
view of glory, which he equates with reputation.133 It further relates to what Joshua
Kurlantzick calls a “nation’s brand” 134 and to Arthur Stinchcombe’s definition of
prestige as “reputational capital,” which one gains “by governing the use of one’s
name.”135 Prestige is therefore the foundation of a nation’s soft power, which affords
states with “the ability to shape the preferences of others” through attraction. 136
However, prestige and its associated soft power is not merely gained from values and
norms that attract followers. As Schweller points out, “economic might has supplanted
military strength as the primary currency of national power and prestige.”137 In this
way, economic achievements build reputation. Even so, the aspiring leader needs to
perform “honorable deeds” 138 and be associated with “reputable qualities,” which
satisfy the expectations of secondary states who form a circle of recognition that
approves of its leadership status. The dominant actor’s prestige is therefore the
outcome of the circle’s judgment of the aspiring leader’s role performance.
Service and sacrifice, protection and provision, are thus central to the
“responsibility of those with high status and office.” In this way, “those toward the
apex of the status hierarchy earn honor by living up to the responsibilities associated
with their rank or office, while those who attain honor by virtue of their
accomplishments come to occupy appropriate offices.”139 Even if we argue that the
“purpose” of prestige “is to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation
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actually possesses,” 140 what specific achievements and qualities that make up a
nation’s reputational capital and serve as the basis for positive or negative valuation in
a certain context cannot be deduced, but must be empirically adduced.141 This boils
down to the “international perception of [the] government’s policies” and actions.142
Yet gaining reputational capital is part of a struggle for the definition of value, which
engages leadership contenders in a productive process of negotiation and contestation,
of delegitimation and relegitimation,143 both in relation to each other and in relation to
the secondary states whose acquiescence is needed for the construction of the
alternative international order.
Social mobility in the power hierarchy unavoidably becomes a matter of selfeffort and a “struggle for achievement,” which cannot be separated from the climbing
of objective capability ladders. Conversely, social mobility in the prestige hierarchy
becomes a matter of a “struggle for reputation,” which cannot be separated from
intersubjective social evaluation. For instance, China does not necessarily have to
become more democratic or Western in order to gain leadership status. Instead, it has
to struggle to achieve power, perform honorable deeds, and fight for the elimination
of Western-style prestige attributes that validate leadership recognition.
In sum, leadership status is based on both power and prestige; both material,
objective, and achieved attributes and ideational, intersubjective, and ascribed status
attributes. In this way, both power and prestige are the necessary means necessary for
status recognition (see Table 1 and Figure 1).

Table 1. Material and Ideational Status Components
Material

Ideational

Status Components

Power

Prestige

Status Attributes

Achieved status attributes

Ascribed status attributes

Means of Change

Change through effort

Change of social evaluation
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Figure 1. Material and Ideational Components Necessary for Leadership
Status
Leadership Status

Power Hierarchy

Prestige Hierarchy

Achieved Status Attributes

Ascribed Status Attributes

(Capabilities, hard power)

(Reputation, soft power)

2.1.5.2 The Social-Systemic Institutional Dimension: Primary and Secondary
Institutions
In this section, I will define the social-systemic institutional dimension of the
international order. Institutions are ordering mechanisms that regulate state behavior.
There are primary and secondary institutions. The former is constitutive, the latter
regulative. Institutions are also imbued with certain values, which function as
normative ordering principles in that they guide the workings of the institutional
machinery in a certain way.
If we return to Craig Parsons’ definition of institutions as “properties of groups”
consisting of “formal or informal rules, conventions or practices, together with the
organizational manifestations these patterns of group behavior sometimes takes on,”144
this definition concerns what the English School of international relations term
secondary institutions. Whereas primary institutions are constitutive of “both the
pieces/players and the rules of the game,” secondary institutions are “expressions of”
primary institutions.145 As constitutive, primary institutions “do not just regulate, but
they also create the possibility of the very behavior they regulate.” 146 Whereas
secondary institutions or “regulative rules have the form ‘Do X,’ constitutive rules
have the form ‘X counts as Y in context C.” 147 For instance, since China certifies
certain conditions X, it counts as a great power Y, in the international system C. The
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regulative rules in the UNSC allows great powers to DO certain things, like using their
veto power X.
Barry Buzan further differentiate primary institutions in terms of master
institution and derivative institutions that spring from the master primary institution.148
Sovereignty is the master primary institution of the Westphalian international system,
and non-intervention and international law its derivatives, which in turn give birth to
secondary institutions with more specific regulative rules and values and
organizational manifestations. For instance, in the case of the primary institution of
sovereignty and its derivatives non-intervention and international law, they give birth
to the secondary institutions of the UN Charter, the United Nations, and ICC. The
primary institution of diplomacy has bilateralism and multilateralism as its derivatives,
whereas embassies, the United Nations, conferences, forums, and various IGOs and
regimes serve as secondary institutions. Great power management is another master
primary institution, with derivatives such as balance of power, alliances, and war, and
with secondary institutions such as the UNSC, NATO, and the US-led hub-and-spokes
alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. The primary institution of the market, with trade,
financial liberalization, and hegemonic stability as its derivatives, are connect to
secondary institutions such as WTO, NAFTA, IMF, and ADB. Barry Buzan also
includes territoriality, equality of people, nationalism, and environmental stewardship
in his list over primary institutions (see Table 2). However, I do not include
environmental stewardship; I subsume territoriality and nationalism under
sovereignty; and I only discuss equality of people if it relates to the core primary
institutions, which I argue are sovereignty, diplomacy, great power management, and
the market. These are implicated in the two primary domains of the international order,
the economic domain and the security domain.
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Table 2. Primary and Secondary Institutions

Source: Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the
Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 180-182

2.1.5.2.1 Rules and Values as Secondary Institutional Components
Rules and values are the two core secondary institutional components. Rules are
formal or informal, and range from binding agreements and legal contracts to
international custom, conventions, norms, and practices. They are prescriptions about
what actions are deemed permitted and appropriate or prohibited and illegitimate. In
case of binding legal agreements, rules are connected to international courts and
dispute settlement mechanisms or to formal alliance commitments. In case of informal
rules, they take the form of authoritative standards of established practice and
international custom. Rules are further permeated by political values, that is, “the
moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group.”149 As
Stefano Guzzini puts it: “Order is surely always for someone, but it also always stands
for something, some value.” 150 Interestingly, despite his standard emphasis on
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preponderance as the source of stability, Robert Gilpin seems to share this view:
“Governance at any level, whether national or international, must rest on shared
beliefs, cultural values, and, most of all, a common identity.”151 Samuel Huntington
agrees, stressing that the dominant state strive to “promote its values among other
peoples and to shape the international environment so as to reflect its values.” 152
Hence, rules work according to a certain ideational logic or normative ordering
principles. To exemplify, “as an ordering project, liberal internationalism seeks to
structure social and political power in ways conducive to the realization of particular
liberal principles.”153
In this sense, we can make a distinction between formal-procedural authority
and substantive-purposive authority, where the former puts the emphasis on rulefollowing and basic agreements concerning the necessary procedures, and the latter
puts the emphasis on the values that should direct a community towards an overarching
goal or guiding purpose. 154 Whereas the former connect rules to their procedural
legitimacy and evaluation of them in terms “of the fairness of the decision-making
procedures used by authorities and institutions,”155 the values that permeate rules are
assessed in terms of its objective legitimacy or its subjective legitimacy.156
Objective legitimacy is about whether there is a correspondence between rules
and an external standard of morality. Thus, “an observer postulates normative criteria
and this observer will then analyze to what extent” certain institutions live up to the
postulated standard. 157 Apart from being a mere academic exercise carried out by
scholars in the ivory tower, objective legitimacy is also central to political legitimation
strategies in which competing political projects are represented in terms of how well
they meet certain normative standards. Subjective legitimacy, on the other hand, turns
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the focus to the legitimacy beliefs of citizens or state leaders who, according to their
particularistic view about the rightfulness of a certain institutional arrangement,
“decide which normative standards they use to evaluate a regime.” 158 Subjective
legitimacy becomes crucial in relation to the compliance of secondary states. Yet when
secondary states accept or “buy into” the institutional arrangement of the international
order we are rather dealing with intersubjective legitimacy – shared values in its proper
sense.
Therefore, just as status cannot be separated from power and prestige, and
ultimately recognition, the rules-based governance mechanisms of the international
order cannot be separated from values and legitimacy. Recognition thus serves as the
intersubjective requirement for the agentic dimension of the status order, and
legitimacy serves as the intersubjective requirements for the systemic dimension of the
institutional order. Nevertheless, the rules and values that come to make up the
institutional components of the international order only do so when they are
strategically deployed and acted upon by the core states of the international system in
their efforts to gain acquiescence from secondary states.
In sum, on the one hand, international orders are social-relational and
hierarchically stratified and the most prominent status is that of leadership. Status is
not based on material positionality alone but equally rests on prestige and requires
recognition. Certain rights and responsibilities also accompany leadership status. On
the other hand, international orders consist of social-systemic primary institutions and
secondary institutional governance mechanisms, such as rules and values, and the
organizational manifestations of the institutions, evaluated in terms of their legitimacy.
Status puts the focus on positionality, the agency and steering capacity actors enjoy at
certain structural locations, whereas institutions have non-intentional and indirect
effects on state behavior in accordance with certain normative ordering principles. The
utility of status is influence, whereas the utility of institutions is compliance (see Table
3).
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Table 3. Definition of International Order
International Order
Scope: global/regional
Core Domains: economy, security
Meta-Dimensions of
International Order
Components of
International Order

Social-Relational, Positional
Status Dimension
Power

Prestige

Social-Systemic,
Institutional Dimension
Rules

Values

Intersubjective
Requirement of
International Order

Recognition

Legitimacy

Utility of
International Order

Influence

Compliance

2.1.6 Defining Status Quo-Seeking and Revisionism
With the above discussion in mind, I will now briefly define status quo-seeking and
revisionism.
Great powers seek leadership status to organize and influence the rules and
values of the international order. The key issue is who organizes the international
order. Declining states want to maintain their existing status and rising states want to
enhance their status. Both types of states thus engage in revisionist policies to further
these ends. In this context, there are two overarching types of status driven
revisionism:


Declining states: revise to maintain



Rising states: revise to enhance

However, we face two specific types of revisionism: positional revisionism and
institutional revisionism. Positional revisionism becomes a matter of status, of
“recognition and standing” rather “than specific alterations to the existing rules.”159 In
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contrast, institutional revisionism becomes a matter of changing “the rules by which
relations among nations work.”160 Hence, positional competition is not always only
about status, but, as Robert Jervis puts it, about setting the “‘rules of the game’ by
which international politics is played, the intellectual frameworks employed by many
states, and the standards by which behavior is judged to be legitimate.”161 The fact
that, in contrast to the game of chess, the players in the game of states, “can reinterpret
existing institutions as they go along,” and therefore “one needs to distinguish between
changes in and changes of primary institutions.”162 Yet in order to properly account
for the positional dimension of the international order one also needs to include
changes in and changes of secondary institutions. In this way, revisionism can be
viewed according to a typology of institutional change that span from deep to shallow
change (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Typology of Institutional Change
Deep--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Shallow
Change of

Change in

Change of

Primary institution

Primary institution Secondary institution

Change in
Secondary institution

Changes in secondary institutions is either positional or procedural. For
instance, the IMF reforms is an example of this kind of change. However, since
dominant states rarely allow free international political competition within the
organizations they control, such revisionism will hardly ever change the incumbent
position, it will only rearrange among the subordinate positions and change certain
decisionmaking procedures. This ceiling prevents status enhancement for rising
leadership pretenders that instead must engage in changes of secondary institutions.
Change of secondary institutions are positional in terms erecting new organizations
and groupings that change the hierarchical structure, including the top position, and/or
new rules and values that bring new normative content to the regulative rules and
160
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practices. The TPP and the AIIB are examples of such changes to the regional order
of the Asia-Pacific. Changes in primary institutions concerns changes in interpretation
of how a certain primary institution should constitute the actors and the fundamental
rules of the game. The Responsibility to Protect represent a prime example of change
in primary institutions by making sovereignty conditional upon states’ responsibility
to protect its citizens from mass atrocities. As will be demonstrated, the beginning of
the unipolar era implied a change in the primary institution of great power
management, and China’s current project for an Asian Security Order represents a
change to this post-Cold War configuration of a sole superpower and many great
powers. US reform of the regional security order as well as China’s project for the
regional security order are not merely about changes of and changes in secondary
institutions, but also relate to changes in the primary institution of great power
management.
However, I prefer to separate the positional and the institutional dimensions in
order to get a clearer analytical picture of the dynamic of change, as illustrated in Table
3 where I outline my definition of international order. If we combine the positional and
the institutional dimensions in terms of status quo and revisionism we end up with a
2x2 table that generates an even more fine-grained typology of status quo and
revisionism (see Table 4).
If we look at the 2x2 table composed of the positional and institutional
dimensions of international order, we end up with four particular types that we can use
for heuristic purposes to judge what types of projects for the regional order of the AsiaPacific the United States and China are pursuing. This plays out differently depending
on what domain of the international order that is analyzed, whether the economic or
the security domain. The types of projects that emerge from the 2x2 table are
conservative, reformist, aspirational, and transformational. The conservative project is
the epitome of status quo-seeking, where the project for international order is designed
to preserve both established positional and institutional arrangement. The reformist
revisionist project, although intended to preserve the status order, is designed to change
the institutional environment in order to make it more congenial for positional
preservation. The aspirational revisionist project, on the other hand, is designed to
change the international order for status-enhancement purposes, while leaving the
institutional environment more or less intact. Ultimately, the transformational
41

revisionist project is designed to change both the positional and the institutional
arrangement of the established international order.

Table 4. Positional and Institutional Dimensions of Status Quo and
Revisionism
Institutional Dimension

Status Quo

Revisionism

Positional Dimension

Status Quo

Revisionism

Status Quo(pos)-Status Quo(inst)

Status Quo(pos)-Revisionism(inst)

Conservative Project

Reformist Project

Revisionism(pos)-Status Quo(inst)

Revisionism(pos)-Revisionism (inst)

Aspirational Project

Transformational Project

2.1.7 From Rare Strategic Moments and Postwar Order Creation to

Piecemeal Reordering Processes and Parallel Governance Structures

In IR, due to the traditional emphasis of change to the international order through major
wars, revisionism relates to the “displacement type” of institutional change. Order
creation then takes place at “rare strategic moments” that occur “after victory.”163 The
mitigating circumstances outlined in section 2.1.3 and the institutional hallmark of the
contemporary international order suggest that we have to rethink this scenario – states
will no longer be given a clean slate to transform the international order wholesale in
their favor. Instead of rare strategic moments and postwar order creation, revisionism
becomes a matter of piecemeal reordering processes and incremental erection of
parallel governance structures. This resembles an “institutional layering” process in
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which parallel status orders and institutional structures exist side by side in a
multilayered international order.164
In order to grasp contemporary international political change in terms of a
reordering process, we thus have to consult the literature on institutional layering. As
Francis Fukuyama argues:

Given the enormous conservatism of human societies with regard to institutions,
societies do not get to sweep the decks clear in every generation. New institutions are
more typically layered on top of existing ones… [Therefore] it is impossible to
understand the possibilities of change in the present without appreciating this legacy,
and the way it often limits choices available to political actors in the present. 165

Moreover, as Mahoney and Thelen emphasize, “layering does not introduce wholly
new institutions or rules, but rather involves amendments, revisions or additions to
existing ones. Such layering can, however, bring substantial change if amendments
alter the logic of the institutions or compromise the stable reproduction of the original
core.” 166 For instance, Bo Rothstein posits that the growth of a parallel system of
private welfare provision in the Scandinavian countries might weaken the support for
the universal welfare programs among the middle class whose support is crucial to
upholding the Scandinavian welfare model. 167 Zhang Baohui examines the case of
Hong Kong and shows how various political stakeholders, in light of the unfavorable
political balance of power in relation to Beijing, have employed a layering strategy
that incrementally seeks to change the anti-democratic nature of Hong Kong’s
functional representation by adding new rules to the existing ones. 168 Conceiving
revisionism in terms of layering brings back the concept to its original focus on
incremental change.
However, in international relations, due the absence of a global polity, layering
becomes a matter of parallel status hierarchies and institutional arrangements existing
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side by side.169 Institutional layering does not add another floor on top of an already
existing house; it adds a neighboring house next to it. As such, the acquiescence of
subordinate states relates to how great powers assume new responsibilities, bind states
to new institutions, and erect alternative channels for the provision of public goods.
A process can be either owned or un-owned: “Owned processes are ‘doings’
attributable to a particular ‘doer,’” whereas “un-owned processes are ‘doings’ which
are not attributable to a particular ‘doer.’” 170 A reordering process is thus not
necessarily attributable to certain agents, but can be a “subjectless process which gives
rise to new configurations of relations.”171 Examples of such un-owned processes are
interdependence and regionalization. Although these processes indeed depend on
decisions and consist of concrete ties, they are not processes with agentic properties.
For instance, economic interdependence consists of trade linkages, foreign direct
investment, outsourcing, processes of specialization, and global division of labor that
create an intermeshed web of relations and mutual dependencies for the delivery of
goods and services. Regionalization simply means that this process takes a regional
form. Conversely, regionalism or a regional bloc is a configuration of owned processes
attributable to the purposive action of regional elites to foster greater political
integration, establish shared institutions, and construct a common regional identity.
Revisionism as a reordering process is an owned process.
We understand the intentionality of owned processes in terms of a project. The
project is identified “by the fact that it unfolds, or at least tries to unfold, according to
some generic plan; the plan is the unity of the project, lending interpretive coherence
to the various actions which make up the project. Without this overall goal, the various
activities would be meaningless.”172 The project incorporates the “ultimate ends” that
“provide legitimacy and cohesion to the political order.”173 In order to materialize,
however, to project needs to be performed. Erik Ringmar defines performances as
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“actions that are explicitly staged in order to achieve certain effects.” 174 These
performances strive to build one’s reputational capital and take place in front of
relevant audiences: “those people whom we are particularly keen to impress and those
whose recognition is particularly important for us.”175 Foreign policy orientations thus
manifest as foreign policy performances, which allow us to grasp what effects state
actors really desire to produce. Through these foreign policy performances, the telos
of the revisionist project is projected onto the international political stage. For the
project to be considered revisionist it must go against the positional and/or the
institutional characteristics of the established international order.

2.1.8 Two Contending Alternatives: Great Power Status, Regional

Leadership Role, and Regional Orders versus Superpower Status, Global
Leadership Role, and Global Order

Although we are dealing with piecemeal reordering processes and incremental erection
of parallel governance structures, the struggle over the international order is still
between two contending alternatives. The basic difference connects great power status
to regional leadership roles and regional orders, and superpower status to a global
leadership role and global order. This is a struggle in the primary institution of great
power management.
2.1.8.1 Great Power Status, Regional Leadership Roles, and Regional Orders
Hedley Bull gives one of the most elaborated definitions of great power status. He
defines great power status as consisting of three core aspects: first, the existence of a
club with certain membership criteria in relation to which the members are
comparable; second, the members of the great power club are in the top rank militarily
and holders of strategic nuclear weapons; and significantly, third:

Great powers are powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own
leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Great powers, for
example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining
issues that affect peace and security of the international system as a whole. They
accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their
policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear.176
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Bull stresses that great power status takes the form of special rights and responsibilities
attached to the specific social position. Along the same vein, David Lake reviews the
concept of status and argues that it is not necessarily a zero-sum “positional good,” but
a positive-sum “club good.” Lake asserts that researchers might miss the point when
they attribute status concerns as the causal driver behind rivalries, which are better
analyzed as conflicts about authority. 177 Certainly, as Bull also emphasizes, the
existence of a club with certain membership criteria is central to great power status,
and the UNSC is the prime example of a grouping in which great power status indeed
functions as a club good. However, great power status as a club good only relates to
the global order. It is also apparent from Bull’s conception that the very concept of
great power status implies a regional sphere of influence. The reluctance to confer
great power status connects to the very rights and privileges – or authority – that it
entails. The struggle for great power status or great power equality is about claiming
the very rights and privileges associated with the status. Once recognized as a true
equal, certain rights and responsibilities should follow and decision makers in other
polities should take the interests of the great power into consideration. Bull elucidates
how this relates to the unique managerial role that comes with great powers status,
which in essence relates to the management of the international order. Bull accentuates
that this managerial role takes six particular forms, with the last three relating
specifically to the authority of great powers:178

1.

Preservation of the general balance of power

2.

Avoidance and control of crises

3.

Limitation and containment of wars

4.

Unilateral exercise of local preponderance

5.

Spheres of influence, interest or responsibility

6.

Great power concert or condominium
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Bull does not discuss the first aspect in length apart from emphasizing that it includes
the preservation of the relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence. The second and third
aspects focus on the exercise of restraint in order to avoid crises and war.
The fourth and the fifth aspects are the more ambiguous in contemporary global
politics. In terms of the unilateral exercise of local preponderance, Bull posits that this
takes three forms: dominance, hegemony, or primacy. Dominance is characterized by
the “habitual use of force” against lesser states in the immediate neighborhood of the
great powers. Here US military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean,
until Franklin Roosevelt’s “good-neighbor policy” was introduced in the 1930s, is used
as the illustrative example. Hegemony refers to those situations when the great power
prefers to rely on other mechanisms than the use of force, which is only resorted to in
extreme cases. Bull argues that this was the guiding strategy of the United States in
Central America and the Caribbean and of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe during
the Cold War.
The great power is ready to violate the rights of sovereignty, equality and
independence enjoyed by the lesser states, but it does not disregard them; it
recognizes that these rights exist, and justify violation of them by appeal of some
specific overriding principle…The Soviet and American hegemonies both produce
a kind of order. The lesser states in each area cannot resort to force against each
other, nor can their governments be overthrown, except by leave of hegemonial
power.179

Primacy, on the other hand, is achieved without the use of force against lesser states
and is equal to leadership that takes place within “a group of states whose peoples
together display some of the signs of a single political community.”180 Here Bull makes
use of US leadership in NATO as the obvious example of primacy. However, primacy
within a specific grouping does not obviate the use of that group to dominate others,
and the definition of dominance as “habitual use of force” does not apply in the
contemporary age of international politics. Besides, as Kenneth Waltz highlights,
NATO is better viewed “as the instrument for maintaining America’s domination of
the foreign and military policies of European states.” 181 Nevertheless, what we can
extract from Bull’s conception of dominance, hegemony, and primacy is that they form
the basis of a continuum that ranges from the least consented and most forceful type to
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the most accepted and socially recognized type of social dominance, authority, and
leadership. As mentioned before, with growing institutionalization of international
relations we are moving towards increasing legal-rational, bureaucratic domination in
the international system.
In terms of spheres of influence, interest or responsibility Bull refers to more or
less informal agreements or established practice among great powers that
“confirm…their positions of local preponderance, and avoid collision or friction
between them.”182 More specifically:

We should distinguish an agreement or understanding between two powers to
recognize the fact of one another’s preponderance in some area, from an agreement
to recognize each other’s rights in that area. It is one thing for the United States and
the Soviet Union to recognize the fact that certain parts of the world are within each
other’s spheres of influence; it is another to treat such spheres of influence as
legitimate.183

The understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning their
respective spheres of influence was not based on formal agreement, but on implicit
rules and mutual acceptance of non-intervention within each other’s spheres of
influence. Such understandings can “arise from reciprocal declarations of policy, or
simply from behavior of the parties which is as if in conformity with a rule, even though
that rule is not agreed, not enunciated nor even fully understood.”184
Significantly, Bull’s notion of great power status and its corresponding
managerial role is intimately linked to a regional scope of international order in which
great powers act as leaders of their region and are granted specific spheres of influence
in their immediate neighborhood. Extra-regional powers should not meddle; neither
should lesser states in the region seek alliances with extra-regional powers. Hence,
recognition of great power status or great power equality relates to an explicit or
implicit acknowledgement of a great power’s legitimate right to a regional sphere of
influence, and that it can exercise authority and leadership, more than anywhere else,
in its region, and to do so undisturbed.
The sixth form that the managerial role takes – joint action in terms of a great
power concert or condominium – then really becomes a matter of great power
coexistence and respect for each other’s spheres of influence whilst engaging in
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cooperation in areas of shared interests, such as combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden
or fighting climate change. In order to protect the rules of coexistence, Bull suggests
that it is important to:


Contain ideological conflicts



Appease dissatisfied states “for what they regard as just change”



Secure acquiescence of smaller states when exercising special rights and
duties185

This is of course a dynamic game. The ambition of great powers is “to influence and
control circumstances,” while lesser states should “adapt themselves to circumstances
which, essentially, do not depend on them.” However, “such a contrast…is
oversimplified and expresses opinions rather than the reality: the manner in which the
small states adapt themselves to circumstances contribute to the form circumstances
actually assume.”186 Great powers can only perform their managerial roles if they are
recognized by a significant circle of recognition. This is where the struggle ensues, the
struggle for acquiescence of secondary states and the struggle against extra-regional
influence. Just as much as this can be depicted in terms of an inter-civilizational
struggle,187 encompassing both traditional geopolitics and geoeconomics,188 it is just
as much a clash that goes on within the region189 – a struggle for the very positional
and institutional components that will constitute the regional order in the first place.
Barry Buzan offers the closest contemporary illustration of an international
order in which the above great power conception can be accommodated:
I have argued here for a ‘third way’ between those who believe in ongoing US
hegemony and those who believe in the necessity for the US to take a more
accommodative leadership role in a multi-power world order. This ‘third way’
departs from the essentially Western status quo motivation of the mainstream
debates and both expects and welcomes a more radical transformation in the world
order. In this ‘third way,’ there are no superpowers only great powers and regional
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powers, capitalism in various versions is the accepted form of political economy,
regional orders are stronger than the global one, and at the global level there is a
well-grounded pluralist international society mainly motivated by coexistence, but
with significant elements of cooperation around collective problems (e.g. arms
control, environmental management) and projects (e.g. trade, big science)….The
unique feature of this ‘third way’ is that for the first time it combines both a
relatively even distribution of power worldwide and a densely integrated and
interdependent global system and society. This might be labelled decentred
globalism to contrast it with the centred globalism captured in the many core–
periphery characterizations of the modern world order. It is a label that expresses
the emergence of a truly post-colonial world order.190

With this in mind, I will not outline how great power status differs from superpower
status and that it, in fact, challenges the primary institution of great power
management.
2.1.8.2 Super Power Status, Global Leadership Role, and Global Order
The notion of coexistence that underpins great power status does not resonate with
superpower status and the post-Cold War international order. Superpower status is
qualitatively different from great power status. The unprecedented change that
followed the end of the Cold War meant the end of coexistence. What emerged was a
truly unipolar global structure with one preeminent power vastly superior to all other
countries. To capture this, Krauthammer proclaimed the “unipolar moment,” and
Fukuyama announced the “end of history.” In light of American preponderance, a new
global order characterized by economic globalization, complex interdependence, and
multilateral institutions would render the old game of great power rivalry obsolete.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was about to depict the world
in an image consistent with visions of liberal internationalism, and in which the United
States as the sole superpower became the guardian of human fate.
Instead of regional leadership roles performed by great powers, the superpower
exercises a global leadership role; instead of great powers that enjoy local
preponderance, the superpower exercises global preponderance; and instead of
regional rights and responsibilities assigned to great powers, the superpower is the
world’s police with rights to patrol a global sphere of responsibility. Superpower status
is thus about genuine “global statecraft.” 191 A superpower has “the reach and
capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world” and does so
Barry Buzan, “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture: A World Order without
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“with little reference to those of others.”192 At the core is the notion that only one
global set of legitimate rights and responsibilities apply everywhere. Gone is the
obsolete (and morally repugnant) notion of spheres of influence in favor of a global
sphere of responsibility, in which the superpower (the United States) command the
allegiance of a “coalition of the willing” in the fight for the common universal good,
and distribute roles to other major powers in the name of “burden-sharing” – with more
(Democratic administrations) or less (Republican administrations) engagement with
multilateral institutions.
Much more than being a great power among others, the United States is an
exceptional country that has a unique mission to “lead the world’s democracies in
spreading liberal values because defeating evil would make everyone more secure.”193
The traditional exceptionalist conception of the United States as a “city on a hill” of
higher values “that had to keep itself pure and distant from the unsavory practices of
European balance-of-power politics,” 194 is now reconceptualized as exceptionalism
that demands global activism. The difference between neoconservatives more prone
to use unilateralism and liberal internationalists that prefer to work more closely with
institutions is about preferred means, rather than a challenge to America’s exceptional
role as a superpower. It is an instrumental question. Whereas the Bush administration’s
transformational diplomacy “at the point of a gun” represents a “radical grand
strategy,”195 the Obama administration sees “no contradiction between believing that
America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and
prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability
to create partnerships…because we can’t solve these problems alone.” 196 Yet
democrats still leave the door open to go beyond the United Nations if it proves
sluggish and morally unworkable. In this way, the United States together with a group
of core Western powers “moved toward a view of the world in which defense of
humanity overrode not only the sanctity of state sovereignty but in certain
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circumstances the authority even of the UN itself.”197 As a result, the United States
infused superpower status with another notion of exceptionalism different from the
traditional conception, namely that the superpower stands “above the rules.”198
Superpower status thus implies a global hierarchy, a genuinely global
leadership role, within a truly global order in which the superpower has command of
the commons and global access.199 In contrast to Bull’s focus on containing ideological
conflicts among great powers and appeasing dissatisfied states, ideological crusade
and universalism is characteristic of US superpower status. There is less avoidance of
crisis, as superpower holy wars might lead to protracted wars and quagmires. From
Clinton to Obama, the United States have pursued “global hegemony.”200 The Kantian
cosmopolitan dream embedded in democratic peace theory and American
transformational superpower diplomacy would entail the creation of a “community of
mankind” led by the United States as the guardian of human fate who serves a higher
moral cause and protects world society from recalcitrant heretics, at the same time as
it establishes a “non-zero-sum game.”201 In effect, however, it means “a shift from
balance-of-power politics to logics of divide and rule.”202 Hence, US sole superpower
status and global order represent a challenge to the traditional understanding of the
primary institution of great power management and its derivative the balance of power.

Mark Mazower, Governing the World, location 6254.
John Gerard Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global Governance,” in
American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. Michael Ignatieff (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005), 304–38.
199
Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,”
International Security 28, no. 1 (2003): 5–46.
200
John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 18.
201
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 24-25
202
Daniel H. Nexon, “Discussion: American Empire and Civilizational Practice,” in Civilizational
Identity: The Production and Reproduction of “Civilizations” in International Relations, ed. Martin
Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 111.
52
197
198

Table 5. Great Power Status vs Superpower Status
Great Power Status

Superpower Status

Regional leadership role

Global leadership role

Exercising local
preponderance

Exercising global
preponderance

Regional sphere of
influence

Global sphere of
responsibility

Shared global rights and
responsibilities,
exclusive regional rights
and responsibilities

Special and exclusive
global rights and
responsibilities

Thin common moral
framework, intercivilizational coexistence

Thick common moral
framework, intracivilizational relations

Balance of power

Dived-and-rule

If we put everything together, international orders take two principal forms:
regional orders and global order. The Eurocentric Westphalian international system
and its conception of balance of power was essentially a regional construction, while
the rest of the world was subordinated in imperial and colonial schemes. Yet with
decolonization, the reform and opening of China, the collapse of Soviet communism,
capitalist globalization, and the “rise of the rest” we are witnessing the emergence of
a truly global political participation in international relations. Therefore, in the
contemporary era the primary institution of balance of power becomes a “world of
regions” with different legitimate regional hierarchies and institutional arrangements
– a world without no sole superpower, only coexisting great powers, spheres of
influence, “multiple modernities” and “varieties of capitalism.”203 Global order, on the
other hand, becomes globalist. A world with a sole superpower implies one global
security hierarchy and a global sphere of responsibility (full-spectrum dominance,
command of the commons), one dominant mode of capitalist modernity (global market
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access), and global intracivilizational relations (end of history), in which alternatives
figure as examples of recalcitrance or “backwardness” that are “in need” of a civilizing
mission. The chief issue of contestation between the sole superpower and aspiring
great powers “is the former’s intervention to limit, counter, or shape the actions of the
latter.”204 This is primarily a struggle between global and regional orders (see Table
5). Yet it is a long-drawn-out struggle of piecemeal reordering processes and
incremental erection of parallel governance structures.
The conceptual section is now completed. In the following section, I will
review competing IR theories of revisionism.
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2.2 Competing IR Theories of Revisionism
In this section, I will review competing theories of revisionism. In order to theorize, it
is imperative that you review and “know thy canon.” Theorizing must be placed on a
solid foundation of previous scholarly work, relating to the central catalogue of the
field of study. In order “to be a skillful theorizer,” as Richard Swedberg puts it,
You…need to know some social theory and be able to handle it well. You may, for
example, need to take a concept from one theory and combine it with a concept from
another theory. You may want to eliminate some part of a theory and replace it with
a new idea of your own, and so on.205

Hence, one must review, problematize, and critically evaluate the canon in order to
draw out conceptual pieces and put them to work in new ways. In this section, I will
draw out the various pieces, and in the following section, I will put them to work in
new ways.
Even though I deal with various theories, I will primarily engage the IR realist
canon. In the subsection that follows, I will start by dissecting classical philosophers
and political theorists, in particular Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith, and then
interject my evaluation of their work into my reading of the classical realist IR-canon,
in particular the work of Hans Morgenthau. The discussion will result in my core
assumption – status-maximization as influence-maximization. The subsections that
follow will primarily address various structural realist theories together with shorter
discussions of liberalism and constructivism and other more recent studies beyond the
IR realist canon. That will then lead to the creation of my own theory: “Theory of
International Order and Status Driven Revisionism.”

2.2.1 Setting the Assumption Straight: The Desire for Status and Influence

To be sure, security is man’s most foundational need, and so as well for states. When
one is not safe and survival not guaranteed, actions flow mechanically to preserve
one’s life. In a state of warre or anarchy, self-preservation is the closest we can come
to a natural right. The focus on the minimalist principle of self-preservation formed
the nucleus of Thomas Hobbes’s empirically grounded counsel. Hobbes was
delivering a perforating critique of the ideational drivers of the civil wars of his time,
rejecting the classical perfectionist principle of virtue as a false and dangerous delusion
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that pits man against man, group against group, in endless warfare. Yet he
simultaneously observed that individuals in the middle of the chaos struggled to protect
themselves. This anti-Aristotelian and anti-teleological critique upholds two core
natural laws: every man seeks peace; every man will defend himself. Living in an
orderly and stable society is thus akin to a natural right, a right guaranteed by the
Leviathan, and obeying the commands of the sovereign and promoting attitudes
conducive to the minimal good of civil peace (such as avoidance of pride, showing
gratitude, forgiveness, equal treatment of people, and acceptance of arbitration) is the
responsibility of the people.206 Up to this point, I have no quarrel with Hobbes.
Yet when one is safe, then what? When one is safe, when stability is imposed
and security guaranteed, then the traditional answer of security and the minimalist
principle of self-preservation yield to the teleological and maximalist answer of status,
power, and influence. Then the “struggle for existence” ceases to take the form of a
struggle for securing existence per se, and continues in the form of a struggle for what
kind of existence, in terms of what kind of existence we prefer. Without looming
existential threats, the “great purpose of human life,” as Adam Smith aptly puts it,
channels towards “bettering our condition.”207 The desire for continual development
and progress, for achievement, is what drives man in his endeavors when he is secure,
because status, or “rank, distinction, preeminence, no man despises, unless he is either
raised very much above, or sunk very much below, the ordinary standard of human
nature.”208 Thus, when we are securely rooted, we start cultivating ambition. Instead
of fighting to survive, we struggle to thrive. We enter “a contest for distinction,” as
Jeremy Bentham befittingly puts it, “not a struggle for existence.”209 Reinhold Niebuhr
reverberates the same message: “the will-to-live becomes the will-to-power.”210
Today, more than ever, the great power relations in the international system
resembles such a world. As spelled out above, the principal mitigating factor of nuclear
deterrence makes great power interstate warfare obsolete. In fact, nuclear weaponholding great powers reside in a world of abundance of security. Ascertaining this is
not the same as neglecting the fact that blood-stained proxy wars are still occurring,
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neither the fact that severe human security concerns are affecting the everyday life of
millions, if not billions; it only means that the principal power wielders in the
international system are facing an external environment fundamentally different from
the traditional insecure great power landscape. Labelling the Cold War a “Long
Peace”211 does not repair the limbs of men, women and children, victims of land mines
in proxy wars from Angola to Afghanistan, yet it captures the fact that the robust nonappearance of direct war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and other
great powers, during the Cold War is theoretically significant. We essentially move
from the realm of security to the realm of status where a struggle for position
characterizes the competitive logic among great powers.212
Thus, at the most fundamental level, we can separate between two core
principles: the minimalist principle of self-preservation, and the maximalist principle
of status-maximization. Security means that one seeks to defend oneself, while status
means that one seeks to better oneself.
In Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiment, I discern a tension between
positional rivalry and social approbation. Smith stresses that when ambition “has got
entire possession of the breast” it allows “neither a rival nor a successor,”213 yet he
treats social approbation or the desire “to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind”
as the ultimate end of ambition.214 Similarly, Richard Ned Lebow, in his focus on the
three core innate human drives – appetite, spirit, and reason – also brings this tension
to the fore. Lebow treats Morgenthau’s famous treatise of the human animus
dominandi as part of a spirit-based drive, yet this is, from my point of view, a
misreading of Morgenthau, whose positional account most closely resembles the drive
of appetite:

[T]he desire for power is closely related to [selfishness] but is not identical with it.
For the typical goals of selfishness, such as food, shelter, security…have an
objective relation to the vital needs of the individual….The desire for power, on the
other hand, concerns itself not with the individual’s survival but with his position
among his fellows once his survival has been secured. Consequently, the selfishness
of man has limits; his will to power has none. For while man’s vital needs are
capable of satisfaction, his lust for power would be satisfied only if the last man
became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that
is, if he became like God.215
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Lebow interprets “the desire for power” and the individual’s desire for “position
among his fellows” as an expression of the spiritual drive directed towards the end of
self-esteem.216 Yet what is at stake here is both the status enhancing desire of man and
the basic human need to belong; man’s desire to excel and reach greater positional
heights is not contradictory to man’s fundamental need to belong. Status is a social
concept manifested as membership and relative position within a social grouping.
Leadership must be recognized and the rules and values of the group must be
legitimate. The desire for preeminence or leadership primarily concerns the drive of
appetite, and capabilities (achievement) and prestige (reputation) are the necessary
means for status recognition and the quenching of the positional thirst. The problem
with the positional appetite for power is that it cannot be consumed, like wealth or
food; instead, it should be understood as a metaphor, central to describe the statusenhancing nature of man where the insatiable desire for greater heights simultaneously
takes place within a human setting where it is dependent on recognition – yet it is
influence, not self-esteem, that is the ultimate end for states.
Hence, in contrast to Lebow, I argue that it is the power and influence one gains
at the top of the pecking order that is the source of the craving, and which allows for
the implementation of the political project. Wealth (power) and honor (prestige) are
indeed instrumental goods, yet not for the end of self-esteem, but for the end of
influence, which derives from positional attainment – the power to set the agenda,
shape the rules, and institutionalize one’s dominance. Lebow admits that appetite and
spirit are often intertwined and “difficult to disentangle.”217 From my point of view,
this is because not only influence is vested in position, so is rightly self-esteem. Selfrealization occurs positionally, and self-esteem is the result of a successful matching
between self-identity and status. Exceptional great power identities are satisfied when
leadership roles are assumed, which certainly imbues the nation and its leaders with a
tremendous sense of self-worth. In this sense, spirit and appetite are indeed
intertwined, but it does not trump appetite as the core driver of positional competition.
The fact that states are relational, not atomist, does not outdo the positional logic and
the desire for power and influence.
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In his attempt to demonstrate the explanatory salience of the basic human drive
of the spirit, Lebow brings his analytical confusion to the fore:
Hitler’s rhetorical strategy and the basis of his support indicate the extent to which
the spirit was central to his rise to power and subsequent popularity. Ian Kershaw,
author of the most comprehensive study of Hitler’s speeches, concludes that he
‘always enjoyed a particular talent, approaching demagogic genius, for appealing to
the populist national emotions, hopes, and aggression of increasing numbers of
ordinary Germans, in particular by exploiting deep-rooted resentments which the
name ‘Versailles’ conjured up.’ He wisely refrained from talking about his wider
imperialist aims, as they could not be achieved without a second world war. Hitler’s
racism, which vaunted the superiority of the Aryans over other races, was also
intended to enhance his listeners’ self-image and self-esteem. Economic
improvements and stability, valued in their own right, were also portrayed as a means
of restoring German dignity and self-esteem.218

What Lebow outlines above is not about Hitler’s or the German ruling elite’s drive or
motivation, but a matter of the German national sentiment. Nazism became a potent
means for rallying the German populace by playing on one of the most powerful
notions of the human spirit – the nation. However, this spiritual foundation does not
equate with the greedy motives of Hitler’s “wider imperialist aims.” What Lebow
describes is nothing more than Hitler’s cunning exploitation of the self-identity needs
of the battered and humiliated German nation in order to garner support for an
unquenchable imperialistic appetite. Lebow surely pinpoints important factors behind
Hitler’s domestic rise to power, but fails to grasp Hitler’s and the ruling elite’s
motivation. One might claim that irrational idiosyncratic and psychological factors
played the biggest explanatory part behind Hitler’s actions, 219 yet overall, the
analytical focus on spirit (drive) and self-esteem (end) cannot answer the following
question: Why seeking world domination when already highly esteemed by your
people at the nation’s current level of standing?
Friedrich Nietzsche viewed power as the ultimate telos of man, yet it is not a
matter of power defined as capabilities in the structural realist sense, but a matter of
overcoming obstacles, gaining advantages, and subduing the environment. The “will
to power” is not a matter of survival in terms of a reactive adoption to the environment,
but a matter of the proactive objective to dominate the environment.220 Capabilities
are certainly necessary for this end, yet the end is different from capabilities.
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Morgenthau’s animus dominandi connects to this Nietzschean notion. What
Morgenthau emphasizes is the simple truism that political positional appetite cannot
be quenched; that political actors are only satisfied as long as they enhance their
position, and when they have reached the top, they are only satisfied as long as they
maintain that position. Just as vote-maximizing political party machines crave votes
in domestic elections, states crave higher and higher positions within the international
order. Hence, what secure great powers want is the “positional good” of leadership
status, and in particular, the influence that is vested in leadership status, which enables
the materialization of the international political project. Properly understood, I am in
this way referring to status-maximization as influence-maximization.
Morgenthau views politics as “governed by objective laws that have their roots
in human nature.”221 More than a cause, this is a theoretical assumption; human nature
is an analytical constant. As such, it does not point to the underlying cause that drives
positional competition, which is material; namely, fundamental structural change or
redistribution of power in the international system. Even so, power is not causally
sufficient for status, since both power and prestige are necessary to attain status.
Hence, the maximization of power and prestige works to serve the goal of statusmaximization, and it is through status that states maximize influence.
I will now critically evaluate the central works of the structural realist canon:
neorealism, offensive realism, power-transition theory, and hegemonic stability
theory.

2.2.2 Neorealism’s Structural-Functionalist Status Quo Bias and the

Absence of a Competitive Positional Logic

Kenneth Waltz’s core neorealist postulation, that in a system of anarchy “security is
the highest end” and the “concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain
their positions in the system,”222 is accurately criticized for its “status quo bias.”223 It
begs the significant question: “When survival is assured, what does neorealism
explain?”224
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However, it is important to keep in mind that Waltz’s logic follows from the
functionalist and evolutionary reasoning that Waltz relies upon in his structural model.
Responsible for Waltz’s status quo bias are processes of socialization and competition:
“In social sectors that are loosely organized or segmented, socialization takes place
within segments and competition takes place among them. Socialization encourages
similarities of attributes and of behavior. So does competition. Competition generates
an order, the units of which adjust their relations through their autonomous decisions
and acts.”225 The isomorphism of Walt’z model – the development of similar units –
derives from these structural pressures and “the functional requirements” of the
international system, which produce functionally equivalent units “by selecting out
dysfunctional behaviors”226 – behaviors not conducive to survival, such as pacifism.
Thus, claiming “that ‘the structure selects’ means simply that those who conform to
accepted and successful practices more often rise to the top and are likelier to stay
there.”227 In other words, in a competitive environment, if states do not adhere to the
structural pressures of the system they will be punished (not survive). Security seeking,
or status quo behavior, is thus functional to Waltz systemic theory, and not necessarily
an empirical depiction of state motivation. Waltz makes this clear:

Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may
range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone.
Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the
goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities. The survival motive
is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured,
rather than as a realistic description of the impulse that lies behind every act of
state.228

As the objectives that states seek “may be endlessly varied,” Waltz does not mean that
revisionist behavior is non-existent, only that there is no causal imputation located at
the system-level of analysis that can explain revisionist behavior. Waltz accentuates
that “patterns emerge and endure without anyone arranging the parts to form patterns
or striving to maintain them.”229 This systemic auto-adjustment is the invariant and lawbound pattern of a recurrent balance of power that characterizes Waltz’s view of the
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international system. This logic also favors balancing behavior against bandwagoning,
as a revisionist bid for hegemony will be checked by balancing mechanisms that work
according to the overarching functional “need” of the system to retain equilibrium.
Since, for Waltz, the system-level offers no causal explanation for revisionist behavior,
he urges us to search for explanations for social change at the unit-level of analysis.230
As explained by Fareed Zakaria, “the international system pressures states towards
moderate behavior only, anything else must be explained at some other level of
analysis.” 231 Scholars that adopt Waltz logic therefore always resort to state-level
factors to explain foreign policy outcomes that go beyond the expectations of securitymaximization.232 On this point, his model is logically consistent, but the question is: is
it relevant?
The international system certainly pressures states towards moderation, yet the
international order can be changed in peaceful ways. Contrary to other structural
functionalist accounts, Waltz does not include institutional or cultural systems into his
systemic model.233 As anarchy and the distribution of capabilities are the only structural
properties included in Waltz model, he has no theory of international order. Waltz
certainly facilitates nomothetic generalizations spanning millennia, but faces problems
in accounting for system-level of pressures that induce revisionism. Although
competition is a central part of Waltz functionalist theory, the focus on securitymaximization in fact blurs the competitive positional dynamic of international politics.
Even though Waltz claims that great powers are fairly assured that they will not be
attacked by other fellow great powers due to the effect of credible nuclear deterrents,234
his theory of international politics does not provide a theoretical basis at the systemlevel of analysis that can account for competition among secure great powers. States
are not happy with adequate security; secure states do not desire to maintain their
positions, but want to maximize status. No one elucidates this better than Randall
Schweller whose apposite critique of Waltz’s structural realism deserves to be quoted
at length.
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Neorealism’s assumption that states seek to maximize their security (not power or
influence) transforms classical realism from a game of pure positional competition to
one of collaboration with mixed motives. This is because, among security-seeking
states, there is no inherent competition—no state seeks to win at the others’ expense.
This is not to suggest that security is never a positional good. The familiar concept of
the security dilemma explains how one state’s gain in security necessarily makes
others less secure. But the security dilemma operates only under very specific
conditions: (1) when security is scarce (offense has the advantage over defense), (2)
states cannot signal their true intentions (offensive weapons and doctrines are
indistinguishable from defensive ones), and (3) there is no true aggressor (otherwise,
states are arming to defend themselves against a real threat). In theory and under most
real-world conditions, security is a positive-sum value; it can be both commonly
desired and commonly shared without diminishing its enjoyment for any individual
actor. The same cannot be said for positional goods, such as prestige, status, political
influence, leadership, political leverage, or market shares. All states cannot
simultaneously enjoy a positive trade balance; and if everyone has status, then no one
does. Indeed scarcity confers status. Positional competition is therefore zero-sum, in
that a gain (loss) for one player becomes a corresponding loss (gain) for the
opponent(s).235

This positional logic is absent in Waltz’s structural realism. When positional
competition is the name of the game, there cannot be “appropriate” or “sufficient”
amounts of power, 236 only the need to maximize power and prestige in order to
maximize position and influence. I will now turn the critical lens to John Mearsheimer’s
offensive structural realism, as his work represents a major departure from Waltz’s
status-quo bias and security-maximizing logic.

2.2.3 Offensive Realism’s Revisionist Bias and Analytical Problems
At the core of John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, we find the argument that clashes
over the status quo emerge due to persistent security concerns under the condition of
anarchy. In anarchy “states can never be certain about each other’s intentions” and
cannot know “whether they are dealing with a revisionist state or a status quo
power.” 237 This encourages power-maximization, not security-maximization and
status quo-seeking, as it is only by maximizing power that states can increase their
security. Mearsheimer states,

Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary,
they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have
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revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they
think it can be done at a reasonable price.238

As such, “[t]here are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the
occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential
rivals.”239 This represents what we can call Mearsheimer’s revisionist bias. However,
this bias is analytically opaque.
As obvious as it may seem, to conceptualize all states, except for the hegemon,
as revisionists have shortcomings. Intuitively, one wonders: why do we not observe
chaos and perpetual warfare? Mearsheimer explains this empirical enigma by adopting
a singular definition of revisionist means and ends: the “ultimate aim” of all great
powers “is to gain a position of dominant power,” and thus change “the balance of
power” through the means of “force” – if the price is right.240 Mearsheimer makes use
of the geographical factor of US naval isolation – the “stopping of the water”241 – and
the temporal notion of revisionist challengers “biding their time” or “wait[ing] for
more favorable circumstances”242 to explain the absence of revisionism.
Mearsheimer is right in that the ultimate aim of great powers is to gain the
position of dominant power, yet properly understood that is about the end of statusmaximization, whereas power-maximization is about acquiring the means to that end.
Mearsheimer takes a contradictory leap by defining revisionists as actors that want to
change the balance of power by force when the price is right. As such, by plain
definition, not all states can be revisionists. The price will almost never be right, as it
is impossible for other great powers to act on their ultimate aim with the necessary
means. A potential revisionist challenger has to wait until it can conquer the United
States in the Western hemisphere with force. Even though revisionist intentions should
be the normal according to Mearsheimer’s own account, we will search endlessly
without finding a revisionist state. First, we started out with the notion that all states
are revisionists, yet if all states are revisionists we will only discover revisionists,
which becomes tautological. By claiming that there are no status quo powers,
Mearsheimer in fact treats revisionism as constant, when it should depend on variation
in the material environment in order to connect to a solid structural logic. Yet by
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addressing the disturbing empirical problem that many states, if not the vast majority
of states, de facto display status quo behavior, Mearsheimer entangles himself in a
theoretical predicament where the use of force, great power forbearance, and
geographical hurdles literally extinguish potential revisionists. Although the systemic
incentives to change the status quo should be greater than the constraints, this logic
becomes suspicious when revisionist behavior shines with its absence. For now, states
hold their fire until they have acquired the necessary amount of military capabilities to
change the balance of power with force. In essence, this becomes power-transition
theory without the inclusion of the analytical concept of dissatisfaction.
Mearsheimer’s understanding of revisionism can in fact not help us identify
revisionists in the present great power system. States no longer improve their position
through territorial conquest. In an age of abundance of defense, at least among great
powers, positional competition short of violent conflict characterizes intergroup
competition. While useful in Hobbesian orders governed by the logic of brute force,
conquest does not translate into positional rewards in the contemporary age. As Yan
Xuetong puts it: “Colonization or territorial expansion can no longer make any country
a superpower.” 243 The sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea
illustrates the downside of territorially expansionist strategies. In fact, increasing
capabilities do not automatically convert into status within international orders, and as
offensive realism neglects the institutional hallmark of the current international order
it unfortunately becomes unworkable. With the focus on capabilities, geography, and
force, Mearsheimer’s theory omits “a host of other ways of gaining and exercising
influence.”244
In addition, John Mearsheimer’s offensive logic of power-maximization
squares badly with his underpinning assumption of security as the primary goal. Power
is indeed a means to an end, yet when the primary objective of security is realized
power seizes to be a means to the end of security, but to the end of status. The offensive
logic, or rather the proactive, assertive, aspiring, and forward-deployed logic pertains
to social mobility, position, and influence – not security. Hence, power-maximization
is a means for positional attainment. This brings further light on the shortcomings of
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Mearsheimer’s focus on regional hegemony. Mearsheimer is right in that the regional
hegemon indeed wants to prevent other powers from gaining regional hegemony, but
why would the offensive push of the regional hegemon halt? Rather than being
satisfied with regional hegemony and a strategy of offshore balancing, the regional
hegemon continues to strive for global hegemony,245 or sole superpower status, global
leadership, and world order, which implies leadership status in the region of the rising
challenger. Certainly, rising powers seeks regional hegemony or leadership in the
regional order and thus influence at the expense of the dominant state. However,
hegemony or leadership status in the regional order depends on power and prestige,
which is the dual basis for status recognition, not just material capabilities. With
capabilities as the only factor that makes up the dominant power, Mearsheimer omits
a crucial status component as well as he overlooks institutional revisionism by the
dominant state.
Rising powers strive to maximize status and influence, but they are not always
revisionists; they might always desire to be able to revise the international order in its
favor, but they are not always engaged in a strategy to revise the international order.
The superpower or the hegemon is not always revisionist; it certainly does not always
desire to change the international order that largely was its own making, but the
measures to prevent the rising challenger that Mearsheimer acknowledges 246 are
indeed revisionist, and it is this attempt to block the ascent of the rising power that in
turn triggers the revisionist strategy of the rising power. More about this later, for now
I will turn to power-transition theory and hegemonic stability theory.

2.2.4 Power-Transition Theory’s Prestige Stasis and Hegemonic Stability

Theory’s Institutional Stasis

Power-transition theory (PTT) differentiates between “powerful and satisfied” and
“powerful and dissatisfied” states. The satisfied states are those that designed the
“rules of the game” after the last major war, while dissatisfied states are newcomers
and “challengers”: states that “seek to upset the existing international order and
establish a new order in its place.”247 The central theoretical claim of PTT revolves
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around parity and dissatisfaction, and what it aims to explain is hegemonic war. Once
a more symmetric power relationship is reached between the dominant power and the
rising dissatisfied challenger, hegemonic war will occur.
PTT is often mischaracterized and used as the straw man in journal articles.
For instance, that China is a rising power and dissatisfied by definition is often treated
as a PTT argument.248 However, dissatisfaction is not taken-for-granted or viewed as
an inevitable consequence of increasing capabilities. More specifically, “while parity
defines the structural conditions where war is most likely,” the significant “motivation
driving decisions for war is relative satisfaction with the global or regional
hierarchy.” 249 PTT certainly views parity as a causally necessary factor, yet it is
insufficient by itself to produce effects and needs to coincide with dissatisfaction to
produce hegemonic war. As already emphasized above, the conceptual one-sidedness
of treating the use of force as a necessary revisionist means for a necessary revisionist
event – hegemonic war – cannot be retained, yet the significant factor that needs to be
specified is dissatisfaction.
Several power-transition theorists have identified status inconsistency as a
source of dissatisfaction in times of power transition.250 Status inconsistency “depends
upon a stratification system ordered not on a single principle but on multiple principles,
and these multiple principles establish orderings that may be, in empirical fact,
relatively independent of one another.”251 Hence, one’s position in the power hierarchy
does not necessarily correspond to one’s position in the prestige hierarchy. It is this
notion of a mismatch between power and prestige that is at the core of PTT research
on status inconsistency. While I recognize the analytical usefulness of dissatisfaction
and its potential compatibility with status inconsistency, the analytical treatment of
status inconsistency has flaws.
The detachment of the concept of prestige from social, institutional reality, as
exemplified by the operationalization of prestige as an objective, quantitative measure
in terms of a country’s number of embassies,252 is problematic since it neglects “the
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multilateral context of great-power relations.”253 Status is a matter of social position,
and prestige is an intersubjective, socially ascribed status attribute that has relational
effects in terms of positional placement and membership status within the international
order. Another problem, in light of Organski’s original one-sided focus on the rising
state as the revisionist actor, is that the power-prestige mismatch at the core of status
inconsistency is assumed to be tilted against the rising power. That is, the rising power
increases its power, which generates a mismatch since the prestige hierarchy still
favors the dominant power. The rising power is assumed to suffer from a prestige
deficit as the balance of power undergoes change. This makes the balance of prestige
static and sluggish, while the balance of power is dynamic and changeable. However,
both power and prestige are dynamic and subject to change. It is when the power and
prestige balances change, and with it, the growing possibilities for the rising power to
institutionalize leadership status, that the dominant power becomes anxious. That the
dominant state remains satisfied as the rising power gains in strength and reputation is
logically implausible. Indeed, the rising power also evaluates the international order,
and if it views it as prohibitive to the realization of its status aspiration, it gives rise to
dissatisfaction. Yet this happens after, not before, the dominant power attempts to
prevent its ascent.254
Robert Gilpin’s version of hegemonic stability theory (HST) connects to this.
According to Gilpin, the international order consists of a tripartite “governance
structure” that includes distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules
of the system. In view of that,

The most destabilizing factor is the tendency in an international system for the
powers of member states to change at different rates because of political, economic,
and technological developments. In time, the differential growth in power of the
various states in the system causes a fundamental redistribution of power in the
system.255

Gilpin views power as the primary dynamic component of the international order, but
he also stresses that, in “eras of relative peace and stability…the prestige hierarchy has
been clearly understood and has remained unchallenged,” however, “a weakening of
the hierarchy of prestige and increased ambiguity in interpreting it are frequently the
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prelude to eras of conflict and struggle.”256 Accordingly, Gilpin recognizes that the
distribution of prestige is changeable, and if there is an increased ambiguity in
interpreting the hierarchy of prestige, this logically relates to the rising great power as
much as to the declining superpower.
A problem with HST, however, is its treatment of the rules of the system as
disproportionately favoring the dominant power. This makes the institutions of the
international order static. Even though the international order was created by the
hegemonic power “after victory,” the institutional structures of the international
system undergo change incrementally and might follow a trajectory that the dominant
power views as unfavorable. Revisionism for the dominant power in relative decline
might therefore become a matter of combating institutional unfavorability and creating
a new institutional landscape that maintains its preeminent status. Hence, we must
move beyond the institutional stasis built in to HST and factor in development
trajectories that incrementally change, not only the power and prestige balances, but
also the institutional components of the international order in a way that the
superpower views as unconducive for the maintenance of its dominant status.
However, these institutional barriers to status maintenance only become salient with
fundamental structural change.
Thus, in order to explain revisionism by the dominant power we have to move
beyond the prestige stasis built into power-transition theory, and the institutional stasis
built into hegemonic stability theory. With this said, I will now evaluate the liberal
canon.

2.2.5 Dissecting the Liberal Canon: Collective Action Problems, Normative

Bias, and the Status-Quo Bias of Institutional Path-Dependency

In the 1980s, during the height of the debate about US decline, neoliberal
institutionalists argued that institutions and regimes, not preponderance, would do the
work in maintaining a favorable and cooperative international order “after
hegemony.”257 Scholars, both neoliberals and neorealists, started to approach the study
of international order with particular attention to “international regimes.”258 As power
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became less concentrated with the rise of new powerful actors (then Japan),
international regimes would continue to steer international order in a benign (liberaldemocratic) way. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet
communism, multilateralism and economic cooperation started to encompass greater
spans of the globe and made the perspective of great power coexistence redundant (if
not already morally corrupt).
The analytical focus turned to different issue-areas in which states, together
with a variety of non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and transnational corporations (TNCs), jointly exercised power and expanded the
range of cooperation. This leads Stefano Guzzini to point out that the biggest
contribution of regime theory is the focus on the expansion of the scope of governance,
which, however, simultaneously becomes its biggest weakness:

Whereas initially, [regime theory] was meant to be read in parallel to the realist
research programme, projecting a different picture of the international order and its
governance, its empirical curiosity implied that it could expand to virtually all issues
which showed at least some political salience. Opening up the complexity of the
international order, the different ways of governing it in all its sub-parts, made a
wonderful research agenda (there was always ‘more research to be done’), but it was
bound to make it increasingly more complicated to see the forest (global governance)
for all its trees (regimes). 259

However, apart from expanding the scope of governance, regime theory introduced a
functionalist/utilitarian institutional logic to the study of international order. While
acknowledging the existence of anarchy, neoliberal institutionalists stressed that selfinterested states engage in rational cost-benefit calculations that increase
institutionalized cooperation and solve collective action problems. As states and other
actors interact in anarchy they become increasingly enmeshed in webs of
interdependence, they set up regimes and achieve joint gains by pursing their material
self-interests. In this way, institutional cooperation is not a onetime game, but an
iterated game, making repeated cooperation more beneficial than the one-off benefits
of defection. This point is important, for in place of power, at times of relative decline,
institutionalized cooperation effectively becomes the new foundation for a stable
international order according to liberals. Regimes become devices that solve collective
action problems through actors’ self-interested behavior, which produce benign
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structural outcomes under the uncertain condition of anarchy. States can essentially
build order through voluntary cooperation due to the repeated game incentives.260
Despite the sophisticated glare of neoliberal institutionalism, it suffers from
one major theoretical flaw: it is status, not the self-interested actions of wealthmaximizing states, that solves collective action problems. The classic collective action
problem refer to challenges in motivating actors to make costly contributions and in
coordinating group efforts. In particular, status solves the “start-up” problem through
initial contributions, and the “free-rider” problem through subsequent contributions.
In contrast to rational actor models that focus on how individual motivation affects
collective action problems, status secures collective goods structurally and functions
as a “coordination mechanism.” In this way, high status actors take a proactive stance
towards public goods provision; they are central to “the initiation of, contributions to,
and continuation of collective action.”

261

Consequently, there cannot be any

cooperation “after hegemony” devoid of high status actors that coordinate collective
action and assume leadership responsibilities for public goods provision. For instance,
the Paris Treaty on climate change would be irrelevant without the joint leadership of
the United States and China. Yet in areas where high status actors do not share a
common interest, the competitive positional dynamic cannot be avoided, leading to
contending alternatives for the organization of the international order.
Other fellow liberals have criticized the neoliberal institutional logic from a
different standpoint:

The focus of neoliberal institutional theory is the way in which institutions provide
information to states and reduce the incentives for cheating. But this misses the
fundamental feature of the prevailing order now so deep and pervasive that the kind
of cheating that these theories worry about either cannot happen, or if it does it will
really not matter because cooperation and the institutions are not fragile but
profoundly robust.262

Adopting a historical institutionalist perspective, John Ikenberry shows that the “most
important characteristic of interstate relations after a major war is that a new
distribution of power suddenly emerges,” which produce “new asymmetries between
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powerful and weak states.” 263 According to Ikenberry, the international order
established after the Second World War is structured around three core components: a
multilateral and negotiated rules-based order; provision of public goods; and “voice
opportunities” for secondary states whose elites “buy into” the normative structure of
the order. The argument goes: “if the leading state can bind itself and institutionalize
the exercise of power” it increases the willingness among weaker states to partake in
institutional cooperation, which enables the leading state to “lock in” their “policy
behavior” and, through the logic of “path dependency,” create a robust and durable
international order.264
Ikenberry stresses that two core variables shape the incentives and capacities
of the victors to institutionalize political control after major wars: power disparity and
state type.265 The greater the power asymmetry is and the more democratic the states
are, the greater the opportunities for successful institutional binding and construction
of a durable postwar order. Despite Ikenberry’s eloquent contribution to the crux of
postwar settlements and order creation, he leaves us with two conundrums related to
the core variables that concern order maintenance, which questions the robustness of
the international order:
 Since the construction of the postwar orders is based on large power
asymmetries, then why will the established international order stand firmly
grounded when the balance of power and the balance of prestige undergo
change? Even though the United States institutionalizes its power, why would
positional competition end? Why would a rising power that is approaching
parity with the United States, accept subordinate status within an Americanled international order?
 Democratic states form the core of the established liberal international order,
then why would the United States relinquish primacy and give up its
leadership position when challenged by an undemocratic hegemonic
pretender?
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To answer these questions, Ikenberry would use his much-repeated response: rising
powers are beneficiaries of the open American-led liberal international order – they
are geopolitical insiders that all benefit from the status quo. 266 At the core of
Ikenberry’s argument, we find that (1) clashes over the status quo only emerge when
states’ material well-being is threatened; (2) that economic interdependence has
restraining effects on intergroup competition; and (3) that liberal engagement
eventually, and inevitably, lead authoritarian states to become democratic. In this way,
“there is an optimist assumption lurking in liberal internationalism that states can
overcome constraints and cooperate to solve security dilemmas, pursue collective
action, and create an open, stable system.”267 As rising states tie their development
trajectories to the global capitalist system they become deeply intertwined within a
beneficial web of interdependence that makes it outright foolish to challenge the
system.
However, Ikenberry’s answers suffer from a range of problems. First of all,
“status or position is often more important than wealth or other physical goods.”268
One line of research suggests that actors do not pursue status as a means to a material
end, but “as an end in itself.” 269 Yet more than an end in itself, states crave the
influence that springs from status.270 In any case, we have to move away from the
assumption that “a state’s satisfaction with its place in the existing order is a function
of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.” 271 Economic growth and
material well-being will not ameliorate intergroup conflict, on the contrary, it will
increase as competition for scarce positional goods and political influence will
intensify with growing prosperity.272
Albeit Ikenberry is right in emphasizing that secondary states must “buy into”
the leading state’s project for international order, there is a normative bias in liberal
theory. At the center of the majority of post-Cold War liberal IR theories, we find the
conviction that Western democracies have “a duty or a burden to remake the
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betterment of ‘global humanity.’” 273 This is intimately associated with a view of
international progress and modernization that is “based in the necessity of American
world leadership.” 274 However, we cannot escape the fact that the rise of China is
effectively quelling liberal optimism as the Chinese economic model and authoritarian
politics question the inevitability of Western-style, liberal modernization.275 In spite
of Ikenberry’s optimism, he simultaneously, and dissonantly, argues that “there is an
authority crisis in today’s liberal order” and emphasizes that the foundations upon
which the post-1945 liberal order was built might be eroding:276
The question today is how will the system evolve – and how will the United States
respond to a successor liberal order in which the United States plays a less
dominating role? How necessary is the United States as a liberal hegemonic leader
to the stability and functioning of liberal internationalism? And will the United
States remain a supporter of liberal order in an era when it has fewer special
privileges? For half a century, the United States essentially had liberal order built to
its specifications. What happens when this special status ends?277

These questions are of crucial importance, and, in particular, they elucidate the
weakness of the institutional “lock in” mechanism and the logic of “path dependency”
embedded in Ikenberry’s historical institutionalist perspective. The Achilles heel of
Ikenberry’s account is that it contains a logic of institutional reproduction that is overly
deterministic and suffers from a status quo bias,278 specifically in its treatment of how
institutions will always favor the dominant power. As I stressed above, the socialrelational and institutional structures of the international system might change
incrementally and follow a trajectory that the hegemonic power views as unconducive
to maintain its dominant status. Exogenous shocks or changes in the environmental
might lead to the creation of new institutions that do not have to be in the interest of
the dominant state. When faced with an evolving institutional landscape deemed
unfavorable for status maintenance, why would the superpower sit still and accept the
status quo? From a power-distributional perspective, the argument that institutions can
mitigate rivalry is also questionable as “political conflict and strategic bargaining” is
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central to both the creation and change of institutions.279 Even if rising powers benefit
from the social-systemic institutional set-up and do not display dissatisfaction in that
dimension, why would they accept positional subordination when the power and
prestige balances shift? And why would the dominant state yield to their demands?
The crux of the matter is positional. In essence, “institutions are fraught with
tensions because they inevitably raise resource considerations and invariably have
distributional consequences. Any given set of rules or expectations, formal or informal,
that patterns action will have unequal implications for resource allocation.” 280
Institutions are not mere neutral problem-solving arenas, but configurations of
privilege and sites of power and contestation.281 Realists stress that concerns about
relative gains and distributive matters make states more reluctant to cooperate than
liberals assume.282 This becomes particularly evident at unsettled times of fundamental
structural change when entrenched stakeholders try to block institutional change and
thus contribute to the emergence of what Francis Fukuyama terms a “dysfunctional
equilibrium”283 or when they create new institutions that maintain their special status
and “lock out” competitors trough exclusionary social closure. 284 Rising powers, on
the other hand, strive to “set status in stone,” either through institutional privileges in
existing organizations285 or through the creation of new ones. In essence, “locking in”
is about convincing actors to accept their positions and the associated roles, yet this
task becomes increasingly difficult as the international system undergoes fundamental
change. Ikenberry is thus overly utopian when he suggests that the United States
should “accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the
regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s
core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East
Asia.”286 In the struggle for the positional good of regional leadership, you cannot have
the cake and eat it too.
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Whatever Ikenberry means when he argues that China is a “geopolitical
insider,” it is a fact that the United States excluded China from the TPP and the US
alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, and it is equally true that the United States does
not figure in China’s project for regional order. Liberals thus fail to properly take into
account that the logical corollary of a “lock in”-mechanism is a “lock out”-mechanism.
Security provision by whom, and for whom? A trade regime for whom covering what
rules? Hence, liberals fail to theorize the positional insider-outsider logic that
perpetuates all form of politics; namely, that institutions work in tandem with ceilings
to positional enhancement and exclusionary social closure. While actors occupying the
throne will attempt to avoid the painful experience of downward mobility and do
whatever they can to maintain their special status and influential position at the top of
the pecking order, new leadership pretenders will carve out alternative institutional
arrangements that satisfy their desire for status.

2.2.6 Constructivism: The Promise and Problem with Ideational Factors
Since status is a matter of social position, and prestige one of its necessary attributes,
we also have to discuss constructivism. Prestige, defined as a nation’s reputation or
image, is an intersubjective, socially ascribed status attribute. It is a matter of social
evaluation, and ultimately ideas about the leading state and its honorable conduct. In
this sense, prestige is what dominant powers jockeying for status and influence make
of it, and what secondary states think of it. However, status is not what any state make
of it, because status always also depend on power, the hard-core capabilities needed to
organize the international order and provide public goods. Leadership status is what
great powers with great amounts of power strive for in order to institutionalize the
exercise of power. Preponderance, as hegemonic stability theory makes clear, is
needed to organize the international political order. At the same, as hegemonic stability
theory also highlights, we cannot ignore prestige. Both power and prestige are causally
necessary to attain leadership status, and prestige, since it is a matter of reputation,
ultimately becomes a matter of ideas, morality, and social evaluation.
Thus, we cannot ignore the ideals or values embedded in the international
political project. Yet political values about how to organize the international order
necessitate power for its implementation. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and
the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America (ALBA) have
great ideals, but not great power, and hence they will remain toothless projects for the
76

international order. As classical realist E.H. Carr made clear, realism and morality –
power and prestige; power and ideals – are different sides of the same coin,287 and that
coin is status. This very much connects to what Samuel Barkin terms realist
constructivism, which he views as fruitful to “address the phenomenon of political
change.”288 As Barkin makes clear:
Waltz’s theory of the structure of power, without scope for morality, becomes static
in the same way that theories of the structure of morality without power do. Neither
pure realism nor pure idealism can account for political change, only the interplay of
the two, subject to the assumption that morality is contextual rather than
universal…Realism argues that no universal political morality exists and, therefore,
if we want ours to triumph, we must arrange to have it do so through the application
of power.289

The atomistic realist self that overlooks the relational nature of man, and by extension
the relational ontology of the state and the international order, cannot be retained.290
Great powers that desire to gain regional leadership and organize the international
order cannot do so in isolation. At the same time, the logic of positional competition
still applies to the struggle between leadership contenders for the acquiescence of
secondary states.
At the center of constructivism lies the claim that state identities and
international order are constructed through discourse. Thus, the benign identity and
the objectives of the international political project cannot be understood outside their
“discursive condition of emergence.” 291 However, discourses are only systems of
meaning which cannot produce effects without agency.
A focus on discourse is…bound to obscure many pressing research questions –
notably issues of agency. After all, discourse denotes a structure of signification, a
system of meaning, and as such it has no subjectivity and cannot act. Discourse in
and of itself is mute, like a book on a shelf before someone reads it. As a result,
interpretative approaches are badly suited to explain political events and, by
implication, changes in the international system.292
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Through narratives, the state is viewed as a particular character, with particular values
and beliefs, with unique historical memories and future purposes that come alive
through official and semi-official narratives, which “create a presence…in space and
time.”293 Yet narratives are not merely constructed; they are enacted – performed on a
“world stage.”294 These geopolitical performances are dependent on recognition from
relevant audiences: “those people whom we are particularly keen to impress and those
whose recognition is particularly important for us.”295 The aspiring leader therefore
struggles to “lock down” the meaning of “cultural resources” 296 that rationalize its
claim to leadership. The production and reproduction of such “imaginative
geographies,”297 and the struggles over which concrete rhetorical commonplaces that
will be deployed, “are always also struggles about the identity of some particular actor,
and hence part of the active process of bounding that actor.”298 Hence, it is through the
performance of “honorable deeds”299 that the leadership pretender gains “reputational
capital”300 in order to gain the acquiescence from secondary states, which constitute a
“circle of recognition.”301
In order to be an object of positive valuation the leader must possess both
power and prestige attributes that imbue it with the capacity to perform the role, and
carry out the central tasks of public goods provision and rule making. By recognizing
the leadership of the dominant actor, the social grouping grants the actor certain rights
and responsibilities. The dominant actor’s prestige is therefore the outcome of the
circle’s judgment of the aspiring leader’s role performance, which, if successful,
enables “relational power”302 and influence over the dependents that subscribe to the
dominant political project. The managerial role of the great powers thus relate to the
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development of “shared understandings of responsibility and by exploiting their own
unequal power over subordinate states within their spheres of influence.”303
This connects to a view of hegemony, shared by English School theorists and
neo-Gramscian scholars, as “a social relation that produces a hierarchy among actors
in which the defining feature is the legitimation of power inequalities” 304 and the
socially recognized nature of the hegemon.305 This further relate to the conception of
“strategic social construction”306 and its combination of both rational and normative
considerations to overcome the battle between rationalism and constructivism as we
recognize that states do engage in means-ends calculations for the sake of obtaining
needs and wants. “Actors are making detailed means-ends calculations to maximize
their utilities,” but “the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other
players utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the
[actors]” 307 – in order to secure their acquiescence to the revisionist project for
international political order.
My distinction between positional and institutional dimensions of international
order thus sheds light on two fundamental characteristics of international order. Yet
status in the positional hierarchy is not solely the result of power, but of prestige and
recognition. And institutions and rules are not value-neutral sites of political
cooperation, but incorporate certain political values that form the basis of their
legitimacy. Both prestige (and recognition) and values (and legitimacy) are ideational
and depend on intersubjective meanings and shared understandings. However, in
contrast to Janice Bially Mattern, these shared understandings are not, by themselves,
causally sufficient sources for international order. 308 Hard-core capabilities is
necessary, without which there would be no order, and the failure to grasp this is
constructivism’s biggest flaw.
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2.2.7 Beyond the IR Canon – Examining Other Relevant Research
Beyond the IR canon, several scholars have made important contributions to the study
of revisionism by putting light on the revisionist behavior of the dominant state. Steve
Chan makes a noteworthy contribution:

That a hegemon has already attained the largest share of benefits from the existing
international order should not preclude it from trying to gain even more benefits.
Contrary to the existing tendency in the relevant literature to treat the hegemon as a
status-quo power by definition, it is quite plausible for this country to pursue a
revisionist agenda in order to transform the international system in a direction that
it finds even more congenial than the current system. 309

Although Chan is correct in pinpointing an important problem in the existing literature,
his view of revisionist motives is not convincing. Chan relegates revisionism to a
matter of instrumental pursuit of whatever is beneficial. However, revisionism does
not relate to a vague notion of benefits, but to making the international order more
amiable for the maintenance or enhancement of status. This occurs when distribution
of power and prestige change and give rise to obstacle courses that threaten the status
of the dominant power.
Robert Jervis provides another important account of hegemonic revisionism.
Rather than being “a status quo power continuing the order in which it now wields
significant power,” Jervis accentuates that “a variety of systemic, national, and
individual reasons explain why the United States is a revisionist hegemon seeking a
new and better international system.”310 Even though it seems as if Jervis wishes to
write an all-inclusive academic cookbook that includes ingredients from all three
levels of analysis, his primary focus is on the structural logic of unipolarity combined
with the ideational factor of belief in international progress. The specific structural
logic of position that characterizes unipolarity is that of being unrestrained, of being
an actor that faces a minimal obstacle course. Together with the belief in international
progress, the structural environment did not inhibit the hubris of the Bush
administration’s “transformational diplomacy,” which Jervis claims is not
idiosyncratic to Bush; instead, it is an enduring phenomenon,311 at least it seemed so
until the election of Donald Trump.312
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Nevertheless, the greatest explanatory weight is on the structural logic of
position. The revisionist policies of the Bush administration was concentrated to a
particular time and place – a time when its structural position was unchallenged, and a
place (the Middle East) where its status position in fact was unthreatened. Thus, while
I have no quarrel with Jervis concerning his explanatory logic, my analytical focus
covers a different time and place – a time of multipolarity when US power is declining
in relative terms, and a place (East Asia) where its status position is under challenge.
The ideational basis is not structurally induced hubris, but structurally induced status
anxiety. In fact, unipolarity presents a relatively indeterminate structural logic – you
strike where you please. Or rather, it opens for other more idiosyncratic explanatory
factors. Yet emerging multipolarity and relative decline gives rise to a much stronger
structural determination – the region of the rising challenger becomes the target of the
relatively declining superpower.
Recent studies about China’s status ambitions and US-China relations also
bring important aspects to bear in mind and evaluate. Yong Deng dissects various
theoretical insights about status, but unfortunately, he does not develop a clear
theoretical model that synthesizes his informed discussion into a parsimonious model
that specifies the causal logic.313 Hugh White stresses that the core problématique of
US-China relations and the regional order of the Asia-Pacific lie in “matters of status
and identity.”314 However, White mostly provides a descriptive account and suggests
that the United States and China should share power in Asia, yet he offers no clearly
specified theory of why the United States would give up its dominance in East Asia,
and why China would want to share power with the United States in the region.
Another significant perspective comes from Graham Allison and his notion of
a US-China Thucydides Trap, which points to “the attendant dangers when a rising
power rivals a ruling power.”315 Historically, out of the 16 major historical examples
when a rising power challenged the ruling power, 12 cases led to war.316 Accordingly,
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“based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the
decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the
moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not.”317
Consequently, Allison argues, “the defining question about global order for this
generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap.”318
As Thucydides famously put it: “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this
inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.” As such, the core variables are rising
capabilities and fear, yet Thucydides locates fear in the dominant state – the rise of
Athens inspired fear in Sparta, not in the rising state. Research conducted on the topic
of preventive war follow this reversal away from the traditional analytical focus on the
rising state.319 This is part of structural, domestic, and cognitive processes; the ruling
elites of the hegemonic state perceive that fundamental structural change is occurring
and come to believe that preventive action is necessary “while the advantage is still on
one’s side.” 320 However, out of the four cases when war was avoided, three cases
occurred after the advent of the nuclear age and the ensuing stabilization of
international relations among the core states of the international system. In fact, the
last three power-transitions all avoided war, and instead of extrapolating from the
previous historical pattern, we should instead refer to the emergence of a new, peaceful
trend in the competitive relations among great powers. The robust nonappearance of
direct war between nuclear weapon holding great powers clearly informs us that a
focus on hegemonic war in an age of abundance of defense is obsolete. Indeed, as
China steadily increases its nuclear capabilities, 321 we can expect greater strategic
stability,
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yet positional competition, on the other hand, will increase in

intensification. It also makes accommodation less likely as the usual war-avoiding
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incentives to appease the rising great power 323 seize to make sense. Thus, as both
options the dominant previously had in its arsenal to deal with impending power shifts
(preventive war and accommodation) are no longer as relevant, it opens up for
sustained positional competition through exclusionary social closure, institutional
revisionism, and the erection of parallel international orders.
In fact, when great powers are secure, the core variable apart from power and
prestige is not fear, but anxiety. Instead of physical fear, the emergence of a rising
challenger inspires status anxiety in the dominant state. 324 It is the concern about
downward mobility aroused by the increasing competitive pressure that causes the
dominant state to engage in closure strategies to prevent the rising power from
occupying the top position. Hence, fundamental structural change causes status
anxiety, not fear, which leads the dominant state to reassess the region of the rising
challenger and pushes it to revise the regional order. It is when the dominant power
tries to change the international order in its favor and blocks the ascendance of the
rising power that the rising state feels it must respond. Tudor Onea aptly elucidates
this aspect:

In relation to the dominant state, rising powers prefer adopting a conciliatory
approach, which would allow them to consolidate their position without triggering a
clash. When rising powers accept the risk of a rivalry pitting them against the
dominant state, they do so only after the latter blocks their further advancement. 325

This connects to Steven Ward stimulating account of Japanese revisionism in the
1930s. Ward contends that “rising great powers become incapable of or unwilling to
orient themselves toward reassurance, not because of increasing capabilities but rather
due to the domestic political effects produced by perceptions of status immobility – the
idea that the status quo is unable to accommodate the rising state’s claims to increased
status.”326 However, despite its elegance, Ward’s study omits a vital point. Perceptions
of status immobility are caused by an institutional reality that frustrates the status
ambitions of the rising state. The institutional reality of the unequal London Naval
Treaty represented Japan’s real hindrance and its perceptions of status immobility
could not exist without this concrete institutional reality. In terms of causation, the
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institutional “logic-of-position” necessarily comes first, whereas the ideational “logic
of interpretation” of status immobility is secondary.
Ultimately, many studies and assessments conceive the US pivot to Asia in
terms of security327 – that it was a security induced move. Yet such analyses miss the
point. Robert Kelly provides the most problematic account of the security-induced
nature of the US pivot to Asia. 328 Kelly combines basic insights of realism and
liberalism and posits that states pursue four broad foreign policy goals – national
security, economic growth, prestige, and promotion of values – which also explain the
US pivot to Asia. First, he tries to explain the specific with the general – Kelly
essentially brings out the IR cookbook consisting of realist, liberal, and constructivists
ingredients and stirs it into an explanatory mess. In other words, a descriptive allinclusive list evades putting the attention on the particular causal mechanism that
explains the outcome. It offers a safe hiding place for a scholar that shies away from
social scientific judgement, from ascertaining which explanation one finds most
convincing and parsimonious. Second, as Kelly uncritically accepts the standard
paradigmatic narratives of mainstream IR-theory, he fails in bringing novel theoretical
insights that can shed new light on the topic. As such, he merely reiterates the muchrepeated claim that China is growing into a major national security challenger for the
United States. He further posits that national security is the highest goal, a goal that
Kelly also assumes to be the primary purpose of the US pivot to Asia, despite
acknowledging, strangely enough, the absence of existential threats facing the United
States. Kelly further argues that an East Asian Security dilemma would not affect the
United States security very much; neither would a change in the balance of power.
Hence, claiming that the main driver behind the US pivot to Asia is national security
is contradictory and unconvincing.
The US pivot to Asia was not about survival in the sense of an existential threat,
but about who that is going to be the guardian and leader of the Asia-Pacific regional
order, and who that is going to exert decisive influence about how that very order
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should be constituted. The concerns about China’s A2/AD capabilities is not a matter
of survival, but concerns a challenge to US military superiority and its command of
the commons, and ultimately, who that is going to call the shots in the Western Pacific.
In relation to the militarization of the Asia-Pacific, the US is not a victim of attack, but
is actively buttressing its position and taking measures to uphold its global managerial
role as structural change ensues. The TPP is not merely about economic growth, but
about who that is going lead and control the direction of regional economic integration.
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Obama administration Martin
Dempsey makes clear, the overseas basing is secure and “the homeland is safe,”329
and as spelled out in the RAND report Choices for America in a Turbulent World:
Strategic Rethink, the United States faces no existential threat.330 Thus, understanding
the US pivot in terms of the traditional notion of security is ill conceived, instead, the
core theoretical focus should be on status. The Obama administration’s concern about
China and the Asia-Pacific region was not about fear and physical insecurity, instead,
relative decline generated status anxiety, which directed its grand strategic pivot to
Asia. This move and its associated project for an Americancentric region, in turn,
triggered China’s response; it prompted positional competition for regional leadership
and China’s rival projects for regional order.
I will now build on the above discussion and specify my own theory – “Theory
of International Order and Status Driven Revisionism.”
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2.3 Theory of International Order and Status Driven Revisionism
In this section, I will outline my theory. I will synthesize the major points of criticism
I raised above and construct my own theoretical alternative – “Theory of International
Order and Status Driven Revisionism.”

2.3.1 Core Assumptions
First of all, we have to do away with neorealism’s assumption of securitymaximization. When great powers enjoy abundance of security, they struggle for
something different; when the primary objective of security is assured, they struggle
for the secondary objective of status. These objectives are not mutually exclusive.
States can be engaged in struggles for security and status simultaneously. Yet with the
advent of the nuclear age, the revisionist strategies of great powers are no longer about
security, but about status in the international order.
Second, we need to modify offensive realism’s assumption of powermaximization. Great powers indeed maximize capabilities. Yet this maximization does
not merely serve the end of security, rather, in the contemporary era great powers
maximize power to attain status in the international order. John Mearsheimer partly
and implicitly acknowledges this by arguing that the ultimate end of great powers is to
become regional hegemons. But to become a regional hegemon is not solely a matter
of power. Power is indeed necessary, and primary, but it is not sufficient. Both power
and prestige are necessary to attain leadership status in the international order, and
since influence is vested in position, states maximize status to maximize influence.
Robert Gilpin’s view of the competitive logic of the international system in
terms of a “recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a
state of anarchy”331 therefore needs to be modified. More specifically, the competitive
logic in the anarchical international system is about a recurring struggle to acquire
power and prestige in order to attain status and influence in the international order.
The logical corollary of this understanding of politics is that human progress cannot
transcend competition, conflict, and struggle. 332 The dominant form of struggle is
“positional competition” among groups in which “the primary goal of the players is to
win or, at a minimum, to avoid relative losses.”333
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Third, great powers are assumed to be rational actors. Even though status
ambition, the aspiration for distinction and for attaining the admiration of others, is an
emotion or a drive, it needs to be mobilized in order to be realized; it must aim towards
objects that will grant distinction and admiration. The status ambition of great powers,
the aspiration for leadership and for attaining the admiration of a certain circle of
recognition, is calculative. It is deliberately channeled towards acquiring power and
prestige, which are instrumental for the attainment of status. The quest for status is
thus rational; it requires instrumentality for its success. 334 Yet the successful
achievement of status is not about self-esteem. From a realist perspective, the utility
that great powers derive from leadership status in the international order is influence,
which allows the leading state to organize the international order and exercise power.
Fourth, “the essence of social reality is the group.”335 This “tribal” nature of
man serves as the foundation for intergroup conflict and further connects to status
groups as fundamentally constituted by an insider-outsider logic.336 Even though the
units that comprise the international system are groups, i.e. nations, the group dynamic
of particular interest pertains to the status dimension of the international order. In this
sense, as already stated above, revisionism is prosocial. Yet the logic of positional
competition simultaneously applies to the rivalling leadership contenders that compete
for the acquiescence of secondary states in order to change the international order.
Fifth, great powers seek regional leadership status, and thus seek to lead,
influence and shape the regional order. Conversely, superpowers seek global
leadership status, and thus seek to lead, influence, and shape the global order, and
especially the region that is the “world center.” Thus, a superpower performs a global
leadership role, whereas a great power performs a regional leadership role. A world
without superpowers implies a “world of regions” with coexisting great powers,
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spheres of influence, “multiple modernities” and “varieties of capitalism.”
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Conversely, a world with a sole superpower implies one global security hierarchy and
a global sphere of responsibility (full-spectrum dominance, command of the global
commons), one dominant mode of capitalist modernity (global market access), and
global intracivilizational relations (the End of History). The chief issue of contestation
between the superpower and aspiring great powers “is the former’s intervention to
limit, counter, or shape the actions of the latter.”338
Apart from assumptions, a theory must offer a causal mechanism with a logical
set of causal components that explain why states pursue status driven revisionism. In
the following section, I will outline the causal mechanism.

2.3.2 The Causal Mechanism of Status Driven Revisionism
Socio-political international orders consist of a social-relational status dimension and
a social-systemic institutional dimension (see Table 3). Great powers seek leadership
status to organize and influence the rules and values of the international order. The key
issue is who that organizes the international order. Declining states want to maintain
their existing status and rising states want to enhance their status. Both types of states
pursue different types of revisionist projects to further these ends (see Table 4). I will
now outline why and when the dominant power engages in revisionist statusmaintenance strategies and why and when the rising power engages in revisionist
status-enhancement strategies.
The realist focus on the competitive nature of the zero-sum anarchic
international environment offers an indispensable foundation for the understanding of
international political processes. Various structural realist theories accurately pinpoint
that the primary cause that drives positional competition is change in the distribution
of power. However, since both power and prestige are necessary to attain leadership
status, we must also include change in the distribution of prestige. As Robert Gilpin
succinctly puts it, “[a] decline of prestige is…an injury to be dreaded.”339
Hence, we are dealing with two logics, one material and one ideational. The
change in the balance of power follows a causal logic-of-position, whereas the change
in the balance of prestige follows a causal logic-of-interpretation. The material logicBarry Buzan, “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture; John M. Hobson, “Part 2 –
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of-position treats the material environment as a given, as “existing in an objective state
separate from the actors,” and we thus explain action as a “direct consequence” of
actors’ “position vis-à-vis exogenously given material structures.”340 Here it relates to
how the logic-of-position is consequential to one’s status. The ideational logic-ofinterpretation explains by demonstrating “that someone arrives at an action only
through…interpretation of what is possible and/or desirable.”341 Here it relates to an
interpretation of what the balance of prestige means for one’s status. Both the balance
of power and the balance of prestige operate at the system-level of analysis, yet they
induce certain perceptions among officials and foreign policy elites at the domesticlevel of analysis. In terms of the balance of power, we assume objective rationality in
line with the distribution of capabilities and actors’ material positionality; in terms of
the balance of prestige, we assume (a)rationality, that is, the perceptions of the
distribution of reputational capital work according to a specific form of rationality in
line with a specific ideational logic-of-interpretation.
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Hence, “no coherent

explanation of human action bypasses mental processes.” 343 I thus engage the
domestic-level of analysis in terms of how decision-making processes are affected by
perceptions of one’s material positionality and one’s reputational capital as these
factors undergo fundamental change. However, these state-level perceptions are not
autonomous domestic-level variables, but are induced by the system-level factors of
power and prestige.
For long, the dominant power has been the primary organizer of the
international order, but what happens when there is more than one high-status actor in
town? What happens when unipolarity erodes and the balance of power and the
balance of prestige undergo fundamental change? Instead of the traditional focus on
the rising power as the first-moving revisionist, we should make a theoretical reversal
and first focus on the dominant power in relative decline, particularly by focusing on
how it is affected by, and how it responds to change in the two core status components
of power and prestige. After all, the rising state is on the right side of history, in a
domain of gain; the dominant state, on the other hand, is in relative decline, in a domain
of loss, to use the terminology of prospect theory. Then why would the rising state
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sacrifice the strides it has made prematurely? Knowing that history is on its side, the
rising state can safely bide its time and gain even greater strength and reputation before
it challenges the established international order. The dominant state, on the other hand,
knowing that its position is getting weaker in relative terms, feels that it has to act.344
States are not always revisionist; instead, revisionist action is induced by
fundamental change in the distribution of power and prestige. As the rising power
rapidly acquires power and prestige, it will be perceived as a status threat to the
dominant state in relative decline, which has “to struggle to maintain its international
position.” 345 Yet rather than physical insecurity and fear among domestic foreign
policy elites, the change in the power and prestige balances induces status anxiety.346
Status anxiety refers to concerns about relative position in the social hierarchy; it is the
feeling of impending downward mobility or positional challenge.347 “The closer the
rising power will get to supplant the dominant state, the more intense the latter’s status
anxiety, and the higher the likelihood of rivalry.” 348 Hence, the change in the
distribution of power and prestige induces status anxiety, a state-level factor felt and
experienced by officials and foreign policy elites. This change, however, is combined
with the efficient cause of a crisis or critical juncture (or “formative moments,”
“unsettled periods,” “constitutional moments”),349 which prompts status anxiety in the
relatively declining dominant state.
Status anxiety is not a matter of an irrational psychological condition that
paralyzes the actor; on the contrary, status anxiety discloses the opportunity and
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motivates action. Status anxiety indeed unsettles the dominant state as the taken for
granted reality of being at the apex of the established international order is now
challenged, yet it simultaneously reveals the possibility and the necessity to act. As
Søren Kierkegaard elucidates, anxiety “awakens…freedom’s possibility,” anxiety
becomes “a ministering spirit” that guide action.350 In other words, it sets in motion
the “vigorous activity” of the leading actors “to hold their high positions.”351 It leads
the dominant state to take preventive measures. As Tudor Onea explicates, “Dominant
actors are likely to resist the efforts of upcoming powers to claim status superior to
their own because they fear that they will lose their upper rank.”352 Hence, “status
anxiety motivates a dominant actor to impede the new arrivals’ advancement, to
conserve superiority in the areas in which it is still ahead, and to recoup losses in those
in which it has fallen behind.”353 This is similar to what John Mearsheimer argues
when he states that, “the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain
China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the
roost in Asia.” 354 These preventive measures to maintain dominant status are
revisionist and target the rising state.
Faced with fundamental change in the distribution of power and prestige,
together with the efficient cause of a crisis, status anxiety pushes the declining
superpower to revise the regional order of the rising power so as to make it more
congenial for the maintenance of its dominant status and prevent the ascent of the
rising challenger – revise to maintain.
To maintain status, the dominant power seizes the opportunity to “lock out”
the rising challenger; it contests the growing influence of the rising power trough
exclusionary social closure and revises the institutional environment of the regional
order. In fact, “[h]igh-status groups can maintain their privileged position only as long
as they perform exclusionary acts.” 355 In order to maintain dominant status, global
leadership, and world order, the sole superpower must attain leadership in the region
where the rising challenger resides and prevent it from becoming the regional
hegemon. This exclusionary mechanism of positional appropriation is intensifies
350
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strategic rivalry and status competition by excluding the rising great power,
disavowing it a leading position, and upsetting its status ambitions. Tudor Onea further
elucidates this aspect:

In relation to the dominant state, rising powers prefer adopting a conciliatory
approach, which would allow them to consolidate their position without triggering a
clash. When rising powers accept the risk of a rivalry pitting them against the
dominant state, they do so only after the latter blocks their further advancement. 356

However, despite this conciliatory approach and the fact that the rising power is biding
its time, the rising state nonetheless cultivates expectations for further gains. In
contrast to the relatively declining dominant power, fundamental change does not
trigger status anxiety in the rising great power, but rather status expectations – the
feeling that by being on the right side of history it enjoys prospects for greater
positional rewards. However, by blocking the advancement of the rising power, the
dominant power frustrates these expectations, which, in turn, triggers dissatisfaction
in the form of status frustration, the feeling that the dominant power’s new project for
the international order is prohibitive to the realization of the rising power’s status
aspiration. The exclusionary practices of the dominant state and the feelings of status
frustration they generate in the rising state give birth to “ideas of rectification,”357
which leads the rising power to revise the international order. The only way to release
the tension is to react to the competitive pressure and carve out an alternative regional
order that can satisfy its status ambitions – revise to enhance.
While the dominant state engages in exclusionary closure, the rising state
engages in usurpationary closure. The aim is to “secure for itself a privileged position
at the expense of some other group,”358 more specifically the aim is the positional good
of leadership359 and “the closure of social and economic opportunities.”360 Exclusion
is the use of power downwards to maintain position; usurpation is the use of power
upwards to enhance position.361 As Frank Parkin emphasizes, closure strategies are
always “directed against competitors who share some positive or negative
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characteristic,” and “[t]he nature of these exclusionary practices, and the completeness
of social closure, determine the general character of the distributive system.”362
Two particular forms of status disavowal emerge from these closure strategies:
either the competitor is subordinated through a positional ceiling or it is excluded
altogether. Furthermore, since the institutional landscape follow various trajectories,
we move beyond the institutional stasis of hegemonic stability theory and the
determinist logic of path dependency of liberal historical institutionalism and factor in
development trajectories that incrementally change both the social-relational,
positional dimension and the social-systemic, institutional dimension in ways that the
dominant power views as unfavorable for the maintenance of its preeminent status. As
new secondary institutions emerge and evolve, the dominant state might in fact face
unfavorable institutions in the regional order of the rising challenger. The notion of
systemic unfavorability captures this institutional condition.
Both status disavowal and systemic unfavorability thus capture what is at stake
both before and after great powers attempt to revise the regional order. Hence, the
institutional structures of a particular international order give rise to certain constraints
or barriers. However, positional and institutional obstacles to status maintenance in
regional secondary institutions only become salient in times of fundamental change
associated with crisis and status anxiety/status expectations. It is only when the
causally necessary factors are in place that great powers launch revisionist protects to
dismantle the barriers, with the purpose of maintaining/enhancing status.
Variation in revisionist projects for the international order thus depends on the
existence or non-existence of positional and institutional barriers (see Table 4).


Positional barriers either take the form of a positional ceiling or social
exclusion (status disavowal). Positional revisionism then becomes a matter
of revising those barriers that are prohibitive to the attainment of status, but
not necessarily the rules and values of the prevailing international order.
Change becomes a matter of position.



Institutional barriers are unfavorable rules, practices, and values (systemic
unfavorability). Institutional revisionism then becomes a matter of revising
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the rules and values that are unfavorable to the attainment of status. Change
becomes a matter of institutions.

To sum up, fundamental change in the distribution of power and prestige + the
efficient cause of crisis induce status anxiety/status expectations, which motivates
action. Then, the existence of institutional barriers (status disavowal and/or systemic
unfavorability) necessitate a revisionist project. Along these lines, we have a dynamic
theory of status driven revisionism that relates to both the declining superpower and
the rising great power and their struggle to change the international order to satisfy
their ambitions for status and leadership (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3. The Causal Mechanism of Status Driven Revisionism
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3. The Three M’s of Scientific Inquiry: Methodology, Methods,
and Material
All research is imbued with underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions, more
or less explicitly pronounced. These are questions of methodology, or the “concern with
the logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry.”363 Thus, methodology should not
be confused with methods, which are the various techniques for gathering material. In this
chapter, I will outline the methodological underpinnings of the research and what method
I have used to collect material.

3.1 Methodology
In terms of ontology, we can refer to two types of ontology: philosophical ontology and
scientific ontology. The former is about philosophy of science and the fundamental
presuppositions about “how we as researchers are able to produce knowledge in the first
place.” The latter is about the processes and factors that researchers uncover to explain
things in the world. With this division, “philosophical ontology is logically, and necessary,
prior to…scientific ontology,” because “we cannot make defensible claims about what
exists until the basis on which we are doing so has been clarified.”364
In terms of philosophical ontology, I adopt a critical realist approach. On the one
hand, critical realism puts emphasis on ontological realism, underlining that reality exists
independently from the mind. The world is out there, and whether we like it or not, it will
continue to exist independently of our being. In other words, critical realism adopts a mindworld dualist approach.365 However, this reality consist of real but non-observable “deep”
structures. In fact, one cannot see or touch the balance of power or the international order.
Hence, our knowledge of this world is conceptually mediated; ontological realism is
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therefore combined with epistemological relativism. To use the terminology of Roy
Bhaskar, the “intransitive” side of knowledge (ontological realism) is combined with the
“transitive” side of knowledge (epistemological relativism). We can try to penetrate the
“depths” of reality as profound as possible, but we will never be able to reach its “bottom,”
so to speak.366 And since we always need concepts to make sense of reality, the “facts” of
the world are theory-dependent, or to use David Easton’s apt definition: a fact is “a
particular ordering of reality in terms of a theoretical interest.”367
Critical realists put emphasis on what they term INUS-conditions, which emphasize
causal complexes in which factors jointly produce effects, in contrast to independent factors
that individually produce effects. To spell out the INUS-condition, it means combination
of factors that are Insufficient and Nonredundant but part of a causal complex that is
Unnecessary but Sufficient to explain an outcome. 368 Thus, instead of an independent
variable explaining the dependent variable, we have a causal complex with interlacing
factors that jointly explain an outcome.
The causal complex that produces effects is what we might better define as a causal
mechanism. Gudmund Hernes defines a causal mechanism in the following way:
A mechanism is a set of interacting parts – an assembly of elements producing an effect not
inherent in any one of them. A mechanism is not so much about ‘nuts and bolts’ as about
‘cogs and wheels’ – the wheelwork or agency by which an effect is produced. But a
mechanism or inner workings is an abstract dynamic logic by which social scientists render
understandable the reality they depict.369

This connects to the definition outlined by Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen who
state “[e]ach part of the theoretical mechanism can be thought of as a toothed wheel that
transmits the dynamic causal energy of the causal mechanism to the next toothed wheel,
ultimately contributing to producing outcome Y.” Thus, “causal mechanisms can have
effects that cannot merely be reduced to the effect of X, making it vital to study causal
366
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mechanisms together with causes instead of causes by themselves.”370 As such, the causal
mechanism is the whole machinery, and the various causal components form the vital parts
of the machinery.
In the Popperian conception of science and progress, scientists are eternally
producing new hypotheses that are tested against empirical facts, upon which they are either
refuted or accepted, leading theories to either degenerate, getting tossed on the dump of
obsolete erroneous knowledge, or to proliferate, providing an ever-stronger foundation for
the edifice of science. This model of scientific progress “is gradualist and incremental”371
– brick by brick science progresses, or if metaphorically conceived of as a snowball, layer
by layer, science is growing its circumference in perpetuity.
However, multiple logics and rationales can be in the mind of decision makers
simultaneously, and the rhetorical evidence coming from a certain politician utilized to
ascertain a particular scientific claim can be contradicted when the same politician speaks
in front of a different audience. Different measures of power can also radically alter the
moment when power-transition occurs. Much also depends on how the researcher
interprets history. Whether one views Germany’s actions in the First World War as directed
against Great Britain or as a preventive enterprise aimed against Russia has consequences
for the theoretical insights. 372 In the first case, Germany becomes a rising state engaging
in offensive warfare against the dominant state – Great Britain. In the second case Germany
becomes a dominant state launching a preventive war against the rising state – Russia.
Moreover, if we dig into recent trade research, we find similar problems. For instance,
Eichengreen, Rhee, and Tong applied a gravity approach to model China’s trade flows to
show how they affect other Asian countries. They find that advanced Asia benefits from
the rise of China, whereas the opposite is true for developing Asia.373 Strangely enough,
four years later another group of researchers used a similar approach, yet their results are
370
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the reverse.

374

Although scholars adopt similar approaches, their research yield

contradictory results, and in this case, whether China’s impact is beneficial or
disadvantageous to other Asian trading nations remains elusive.
Hence, the various theoretical schools of IR will not be discarded because someone
manages to falsify a certain hypothesis. Instead, social scientific IR-theories are better
viewed as paradigms, as perspectives, more or less relevant in certain areas, times and
places. It is a matter of perspectival priority, not empirical one-dimensionality. With this
in mind, a core justificatory reason behind my methodological approach is the existence of
a large body of research that explains revisionism and dissatisfaction with the status quo in
various sophisticated ways.375 Unlike the “closed” and controlled experimental setting of
the laboratory in the natural sciences, the presence of “open systems” in the social
sciences 376 prevents progress in the Popperian sense, but still, an attention to causal
mechanisms gain “increased precision, power, or elegance in the large-scale theories.”377
In terms of scientific ontology then, it refers to the concrete “stuff” or the factors
and processes that make up my causal mechanism. In section 2.3, I have outlined my
“Theory of International Order and Status Driven Revisionism,” and in Figure 3, I have
illustrated the causal mechanism. There is therefore no need to repeat the causal factors
that represent the scientific ontology of the dissertation.

3.2 Methods
I make use of “within case” process tracing to show how my causal complex makes
empirical sense.378 Process tracing is a well-suited method used to pinpoint the causal chain
of events and connect it to the specific outcome. In this way, the links of the causal chain
“is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps,” and “the investigator looks for observable
evidence of each step.” 379 Through a retrospective perspective, the temporal aspect is
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captured by tracing the process back in time.380 As highlighted by Sandra Halperin and
Oliver Heath:
Using case studies and within-case analysis, the researcher searchers for evidence of the
causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case, through examining data from
histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, or others sources. These might help
reconstruct the sequence or structure of events, or reveal the motives or perceptions of
government officials or decision makers.381

The main purpose of the study is to demonstrate the conceptual and theoretical adequacy
of my model. The cases I choose therefore serve as “crucial cases”382 in that they serve to
generate new theory that goes against conventional wisdom, here by highlighting how both
the dominant power and rising power can be understood as revisionists, and by changing
the theoretical focus from security to status. The cases thus highlight how the dominant
state in relative decline is pursuing a revisionist status-maintenance strategy, and how the
rising great power is pursuing a revisionist status-enhancement strategy.
The four specific cases also serve to illustrate how states can be revisionist in
relation to either one or both dimensions of the international order, as outlined in the 2x2
table in section 2.1.6 above (see Table 4). The cases are also crucial in the sense that they
represent contemporary examples of how the relatively declining superpower and the rising
great power are behaving in the midst of ongoing fundamental change, and thus departs
from the normal examination of historical cases where scholars shy away from saying
something about contemporary political circumstances.
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3.3 Material
The strength of the case study is that it can handle many different types of empirical
material.383 I make use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are “direct
or first-hand evidence…that show minimal or no mediation between document/artefact and
its creator,” whereas secondary sources “contain information that has been interpreted,
commented, analyzed, or processed in some way.”384 The primary sources that I use are
speeches, interviews, policy documents, factual accounts from newspapers, and other
records from government agencies and research data from international organisations. In
terms of secondary sources, I make use of books and academic journal articles written by
scholars as well as biographies, newspaper articles, and reports from international
organizations and think tanks that contain interpretive content. This multifaceted use of
material is central to process tracing.385
Since I do not read Mandarin, the research faced a language barrier in relation to
material about China. However, this language barrier is surmounted by the fact that the
Chinese government publishes an extensive amount of information in English and provides
professional and well-functioning government websites with up-to-date information.
White papers and policy documents from Chinese government agencies as well as speeches
by Chinese officials are all available in English. Chinese official newspapers and state news
agencies also publish their information in both Mandarin and English, which provide
another source of information. I also conducted interviews with Chinese scholars and thinktank professionals with an expertise in Chinese foreign policy, which serve as a
complement to the other sources. Interviews made it possible to get a more detailed and
comprehensive understanding about the research subject.
Hence, both primary and secondary sources, both qualitative and quantitative data,
serve as the material for the dissertation. With the methodological chapter now completed,
I will begin with the empirical examination.
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3.4 Limitations of the Study
Apart from the language barrier mentioned above, the study suffers from a few other
limitations. In terms of theory, there is always a tension between parsimonious theoretical
explanations and rich empirical accounts. To a certain extent, I have followed the rule of
parsimonious theorizing: explain as much as possible with as little as possible. Yet I have
departed from structural realism’s sole focus on power, since I contend that it is not
sufficient to gain status in the international order. And while I eschew thick empirical
description without clear theoretical content, I still wish to make my study empirically
relevant. In this sense, embedded in the dissertation is a tradeoff between theoretical
parsimony and empirical thickness.
In terms of method, the cases I examine are crucial cases – one case for each core
domain of the international order, one case for the regional economic order and one case
for the regional security order. In relation to the Obama administration, the two selected
cases stand on a solid ground, as does the case pertaining to China’s efforts to create an
Asian security order for Asians. However, one might argue that the One Belt, One Road
(OBOR) initiative would serve as a better case to examine than the AIIB. Yet at the start
of the dissertation, the nature of OBOR was unclear, whereas the AIIB stood out as the
clearest empirical example of China’s grand strategy and its pursuance of leadership in the
regional economic order. It is a clear example of how China’s institutionalizes leadership
status, whereas this remains to be seen in relation to OBOR. Even so, OBOR figures in
China’s comprehensive vision for the regional order at large, and I therefore mention
OBOR as appropriate when I examine the Chinese cases.
Another limitation is the fact that I only examine the United States and China. The
dissertation does not include case studies of how Japan, as an autonomous and independent
player, competes with China for leadership status in Asia. Japan is by no means excluded
from the dissertation, yet I only deal with China-Japan competition before the US pivot to
Asia as well as I examine how Japan forms a crucial element of the Obama administration’s
reformist revisionist project for the regional security order. In this sense, I essentially treat
Japan as a reinforcing part of the United States’ status-maintenance strategy.
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4. Fundamental Change in the Balance of Power
In this chapter, I will ascertain the primary causal driver behind the increasing positional
competition between the United States and China – fundamental structural change in the
balance of power. I will analyze the economic and military balances separately.

4.1. Fundamental Change in the Balance of Economic Power
Though opinions differ as to its significance, the rise of China and the relative decline of
the United States is a fact.386 The gradual emergence of East Asia as the new world center
is of similar factual magnitude. China’s rise presents the greatest challenge to the sole
superpower status of the United States, whereas East Asia is replacing Europe as the central
stage for geopolitical – geoeconomic and geostrategic – competition.
During the three decades between 1979 and 2009, China experienced an average
annual GDP growth rate of 9.9% (see Table 6). According to the mathematical “rule of
70,” a ten percent growth rate doubles a nation’s GDP every seven years, which has been
the case for the last three decades. Even though China’s current growth trajectory is
heatedly debated, the Chinese government has set the target to double its 2010 GDP level
by 2020. China’s impressive growth has been dubbed an “economic miracle” 387 and the
World Bank calls China’s economic transformation “the most remarkable development of
our time.”388 On top of that, China has made the notable achievement of lifting around 700-
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800 million people out of poverty and displays the fastest expansion by a major country
ever recorded in history.389

Table 6. China’s Average Annual Growth Rate
Years

China’s Average Annual
Growth Rate (nominal GDP)

1979-2009

9.9%

1990-1999

10.7%

1980-1990

10%

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); China Statistical Yearbook, 2010,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexeh.htm

In 2005, China surpassed the United Kingdom and France in terms of nominal GDP and it
outstripped Germany in 2007. In 2010, China reached another milestone as it overtook
Japan as the second-largest economy in the world.390 In just ten years, from being the sixthlargest economy in the world in 2000, China rose to occupy second place in the global
economic hierarchy. To put it differently: “In 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, the
American GDP was eight times greater than China’s, but less than ten years later it is less
than three times greater.” 391 In 2009, China overtook Germany as the world’s largest
exporter,392 and in 2010, China displaced the United States as the largest manufacturing
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country in the world.393 In 2013, China surpassed the United States as the largest trading
nation,394 and on top of that, China is the biggest market for a wide variety of products,
ranging from automobiles,395 steel396 and smartphones397 to semiconductors398 and luxury
goods. 399 China is also the world’s largest energy consumer 400 and the biggest oil
importer.401
In 2006, the United States was the number one trading partner for 127 countries,
yet by 2011, that position had been drastically reversed. China had then become the number
one trading partner for 124 countries, while the US remained number one for 76
countries.402 In 2009, China became ASEAN’s largest trading partner, displaying a 20.9 %
increase in trade between 2010 and 2011. On average, bilateral trade has grown over 20
percent per year over the last two decades.403 China is also the top trading partner of both
Korea and Japan, significantly ahead of the United States and the rest of their trading
partners.404 In contrast, between 2000 and 2010, the share of US exports in the Asia-Pacific
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declined by 43 %. 405 Thus, “China’s size, location, and dynamism exert an inexorable
gravitational pull,”406 which seem to depict that “the economic fundamentals are moving
against the United States.”407
By all measures, US relative decline is an objective fact. As stated by Joshua R.
Itzkowitz Shifrinson:
In economic affairs, China is now the world’s second largest economy; and over the course
of 1991 to 2011, it narrowed the ratio of U.S. GDP to Chinese GDP from 15:1 to 2:1.
Moreover, its annual GDP growth has been greater in absolute terms than the United States’
since 2006.408

If we use purchasing power parity (PPP) as the gauge, China has already surpassed the
United States as the largest economy in the world.409 If one uses the “inclusive wealth”
measure recently developed by the United Nations to get a more comprehensive grasp and
analysis of a country’s productive base, the situation looks slightly different. It measures a
country’s wealth rather than its income in terms of three capital types: manufactured capital
(investment, output growth, population, productivity, etc.); natural capital (fossil fuels,
minerals, agricultural land, fisheries, etc.); and human capital (employment, educational
attainment, health, etc.). If we consider this measure, China drops in the ranking – from
being the first- (PPP) or the second-largest economy (GDP) in the world, China is instead
the fourth wealthiest country in the world (see Table 7). Nevertheless, the difference is not
very drastic as China is soon to overtake Germany and claim third place in the inclusive
wealth index. Moreover, as stated by the China 2020 Research Team, “different indices
will have discrepancies in the results; but generally speaking, China has already become
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one of the most important economic bodies in the world.”410 As outlined above, China is
the world’s largest market for a great range of important commodities, but it is also the
largest investment location,411 and the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves.412

Table 7. Distribution of Economic Power
GDP (2015)
in millions of
current 2015
US$

World GDP, PPP
Rank (2014)
in millions of
2014 US$

World
Rank

World
Rank

2

Inclusive
Wealth (2010)
in millions of
constant 2005
US$
143,824,201

United
States

17,947,000

1

17,419,000

China

10,982,829

2

18,017,073

1

31,969,803

4

Japan

4,123,258

3

4,655,494

4

54,693,320

2

Germany 3,357,614

4

3,757,092

5

35,855,483

3

Source: IMF, World
Economic Outlook
Database (online),
October 2016

Source: World Bank, World
Development Indicators
(Online), April 2016

1

Source: UNU-IHDP and
UNEP, Inclusive Wealth Report
2014, pp. 220-226

Apart from the rise of China, Asia as a whole is recovering its former strength:
In the half century since 1950, Asia has been the fastest growing part of the world economy,
outperforming all other regions. This was in stark contrast with past experience. In the
four and a half centuries from 1500 to 1950, Asia stagnated whilst all other regions
progressed. In 1500, Asia accounted for 65 per cent of world GDP, and only 18.5 per cent
in 1950. Since 1950, the Asian share has doubled. 413

However, as recently as 1990, the global economy was still dominated by North America,
Western Europe, and Japan, which accounted for around half of world GDP, and two thirds
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of world trade. This structural environment has changed significantly since then, a change
that started to accelerate following the “global financial crisis” in 2008. Although
economies all over the world felt the impact of the economic turmoil, the crisis was mainly
confined to North America and Western Europe more than it was truly global, and East Asia
in particular experienced a speedy recovery.414 What stands out is that in contrast to the
situation in 1990, the gap between advanced and emerging economies has not only been
reduced, but has been reversed (see Table 8). In addition, if we compare Europe and East
Asia & Pacific – the declining old world centre, and the rising new world centre – the trend
looks the same (see Table 9 and Table 10).

Table 8. Shares of World GDP (PPP), 1990-2020
Group of Countries

1990

2000

2010

2015

2020

Advanced economies

63.9%

57.0%

47.4%

42.4

39.2%

Emerging economies

36.1%

43.0%

52.6%

57.6%

60.8%

The gap between them

27.8%

14.0%

5.2%

15.2%

21.6%

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (online), April 2016

Table 9. Shares of World GDP (PPP), 1990-2020
Regions

1990

2000

European Union

26.6%

Emerging and
Developing Asia

12.5%

2010

2015

2020

23.7% 19.0%

16.9

15.6%

16.7% 25.8%

30.6%

35%

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (online), April 2016

European Union

25%

22.9% 19.0%

17.3% (2014) Projection n/a

East Asia & Pacific

20.2%

23.9% 28.8%

31% (2014) Projection n/a

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online), April 2016

World Bank, “Emerging Stronger from the Crisis: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update 2010, Volume
1” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010).
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Table 10. Shares of World GDP (nominal), 1990-2020
Regions

1990

2000

European Union

31.2%

Emerging and
Developing Asia

4.8%

2010

2015

2020

26.5% 25.9%

22.2%

20.8%

6.9%

21.3%

25.4%

14.8%

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (online), April 2016

European Union

33.6%

26.5% 25.8%

22.1%

Projection n/a

East Asia & Pacific

20.9%

24.4% 25.4%

29%

Projection n/a

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online), April 2016

China accounts for the vast bulk of the growth of what is categorized as emerging
economies, equally so in terms of the growth of East Asia. Instead of a global economy
dominated by North America, Western Europe, and Japan, it is preferable to talk about
regionalized tripolar global economy consisting of North America, the European Union,
and East Asia. Together these three regions roughly account for 80% of World GDP (North
America 26.5%, European Union 22.1%, East Asia & Pacific 29%, see Table 11), whereas
the economic output of the rest of the world is unevenly spread among a few stronger
countries, such as Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. This tripolar structure is further
pronounced if we consider intraregional trade. The share of intraregional trade exceeds 50%
in all three regions: in North America, the share of intraregional trade is 50.2%, and in
Europe and Asia respectively, the share is 68.5% and 52.3% (see Table 12). The rest of the
world is far behind these three core regions. The share of intraregional trade in Latin
America is 25.8%, in Africa 17.7%, and in the Middle East 8.8%. Besides, there is one
significant caveat to these numbers. Since the WTO does not disaggregate the intraregional
trade data for East Asia, and instead embeds it into the larger category of Asia, it seems safe
to claim that East Asia’s share of intraregional trade is higher than 52.3% given that its
production networks are denser than those in South Asia.415
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Table 11. Shares of World GDP
Share of World GDP
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Table 12. Share of Intraregional Trade
Share of Intraregional Trade
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The Asia-Pacific is thus emerging as the new world centre and replacing Europe as the
central stage for geostrategic competition. The United States, since it is both a Pacific and
an Atlantic country, will remain connected to the centre stage of geostrategic competition
even as the power gap between East Asia and Europe increases.416
Yan Xuetong, “Power Shift and Change in the International System,” in The World According to China.
Chinese Foreign Policy Elites Discuss Emerging Trends in International Politics, ed. Binhong Shao (Leiden:
Brill, 2014), 141.
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Furthermore, despite the global economic slowdown, Asia “remains the engine of
global growth,” as director of the Asia and Pacific Department of the IMF Changyong Rhee
accentuates:
While Asia’s growth is moderating, the region remains the engine of global growth and
the region is expected to grow by 5.3 percent in 2016 and 2017, which is 2 to 4 percentage
points higher than the growth rate in other regions. And also, this growth rate accounts for
two-thirds of global growth as it has been since 2010. So Asia remains the engine of the
global growth.417

In addition, as Stephen Roach makes clear, the largest contributor to this growth,
outcompeting all other countries by far, is China:
If Chinese GDP growth reaches 6.7% in 2016 – in line with the government’s official target
and only slightly above the International Monetary Fund’s latest prediction (6.6%) – China
would account for 1.2 percentage points of world GDP growth. With the IMF currently
expecting only 3.1% global growth this year, China would contribute nearly 39% of the
total.418

Yet even though the above trends are hard to deny, the picture becomes more nuanced if
we disaggregate the data. If we return to the inclusive wealth measure, in terms of which
the United States holds a clearly dominant position, what accounts for the biggest bulk of
the US inclusive wealth is human capital. Whereas human capital accounts for 78% of US
inclusive wealth, it only accounts for 47% of China’s inclusive wealth composition.419
Among the five core capabilities that Kenneth Waltz outlines, the capability that holds
particular weight in a virtual and service-dominated global economy is resource
endowment, or rather human resource endowment. This can be connected to charges for
the use of intellectual property (payments and receipts for the authorized use of intellectual
property rights through licensing agreements and the like) in which the United States totally

IMF, “Transcript of Asia and Pacific Department Press Briefing” (Washington, D.C., April 14, 2016),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2016/tr041416b.htm, accessed May 17, 2016.
418
Stephen Roach, “Global Growth - Still Made in China,” Project Syndicate, August 29, 2016,
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-still-global-growth-engine-by-stephen-s--roach-2016
-08, accessed September 22, 2016.
419
International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change, “United States,”
Inclusive Wealth Project, 2014, http://inclusivewealthindex.org/countries-2012/#united-states-2012,
accessed September 22, 2016; International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental
Change, “China,” Inclusive Wealth Project, 2014, http://inclusivewealthindex.org/countries-2012/#china2012, accessed September 22, 2016.
417

111

dominates the market in comparison to China’s meager performance. The United States
received 130 billion US dollars in earnings in 2014, whereas China received 676 million
US dollars in receipts in 2014 (excluding the 574 million received by Hong Kong). In
contrast, China was charged 22 billion US dollars for the use of others’ intellectual
property.420
Moreover, in a global capitalist economy organized around global and regional
production networks and global values chains (GVC’s), we need to take trade in valueadded into account. Even though East Asia is emerging as the new world centre, the nature
of China as the “world’s factory” has long been in the form of being a hub for the assembly
of intermediate goods that are exported to US and European markets. In 2011, the total
share of foreign value added in Chinese exports was 32.3%, whereas the foreign value
added share of US gross exports was 15%. Yet if we disaggregate the data further, we find
that China’s domestic value added as a share of production in the industrial sector of
electrical and optical equipment only amounted to 15.4%, whereas the equivalent figure
for the United States was 59.5%. Out of China’s intermediate imports of electrical
products, almost 65% end up in exports. 421 A large and significant share of exports of
value-added from Japan and Korea pass through China before the products reach their final
destination in advanced consumer markets.
Whereas PPP is a measure of the price on a range on non-tradeable goods useful to
catch differences in living standards between two locations, GDP is a measure of all the
output (the value of final goods and services) produced within a country in a given period
and tells us more about a country’s international purchasing power. Yet without taking
trade in value-added into account one inflates the value of trade. For instance, the USChina trade balance would be significantly lower if calculated in valued-added terms:

The 2005 US-China trade shortfall would have even been cut by more than half, from US$
218 to US$ 101 billion, if it had been estimated in value added and adjusted for processing
trade. Similarly, in 2008, the US$ 285 billion bilateral deficit would have been reduced
by more than 40 percent.422
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One detects the same pattern concerning the Japan-China trade balance as well as the trade
balance between the Western EU countries and China. If gauged in terms of value-added,
the EU15-China trade balance would be 49% less than the gross terms and China’s trade
balance with Japan would change from a surplus in gross trade terms to a deficit in terms
of value-added.423 As a whole, it shows that technological expertise and design are powerful
assets that account for a nation’s competitiveness, and that a country’s placement in the
global value chain presents a different picture of its economic standing that is somehow
blurred if one merely takes into account gross GDP figures.
The paradoxes of China’s relative economic strength and weakness pertaining to
the impact of its sheer market size and its placement in the global value chains can be further
illustrated by two well-known examples involving the American tech giant Apple.
All Apple’s flagship products – iPod, iPhone, iPad – are assembled in China, but
the Chinese value-added represent a minor share of the total value of these hi-tech devices.
They make a substantial contribution to China’s exports, but the products contain
intermediate components that corporations from advanced economies like Japan, Taiwan,
Korea, Germany, and the United States manufacture. These intermediate inputs are
imported to China for assembly. Many of these corporations outsource some of their
production of intermediate goods to China itself, and so the big bulk of the value is either
added outside China or repatriated to foreign-owned companies. 424 As such, China’s
position and influence at the lower ends of the value chain is not as pronounced as observers
sometimes believe.
However, another example involving Apple paints a slightly different picture. In the
recent court case between Apple and Xintong Tiandi (a Chinese company that sells leather
products branded with the name IPHONE) about the iPhone trademark, the Beijing
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Municipal High People’s Court ruled in favor of Xintong Tiandi, which can continue to use
Apple’s famous global brand name.425 The court ruling took place against the backdrop of
a number of actions that have serious ramifications for Apple. Previously, new Chinese
regulations that outlaw foreign ownership of online publishing services had been imposed,
which forced Apple’s iBooks and iTunes Movies to store their online content on servers
based in China, resulting in a shutdown of Apple’s services. Besides, billionaire investor
Carl Icahn reportedly “blamed China’s economic slowdown and worries over government
interference” when he recently sold all his shares in Apple as the company faced a
remarkable 26% plunge in iPhone sales on the Chinese mainland. 426 As BBC business
reporter Dave Lee makes clear, China’s impact on Apple is unequivocal:

Slowing sales in established markets has not been too much of a problem for Apple,
as China has always been there to prop up its earnings and keep it posting quarter
after quarter of record-breaking profits. But with revenues in China taking a hit, the
whole company suffers.427

In other words, you cannot ignore China, or you do so at your own peril. China is by no
means giving up the competitive race to develop a more sophisticated economy. Its
ambition is to climb the global value chain and turn the country into a true regional center.
In fact, China is making strides in climbing the global value chains and is acquiring an
increasingly sophisticated manufacturing base:
There is clear evidence that China is moving up the value chain. The domestic value-added
content of China’s exports has risen across all sectors and now exceeds that of both Korea
and Taiwan Province of China. This has been driven both by a decline in the importance
of what is known as the processing trade, which is characterized by a low degree of value
addition, and by a decline in the import intensity of many of China’s exports. There is
evidence that China is increasingly becoming a global export leader in parts that it
previously imported from advanced Asian economies—liquid-crystal display (LCD)
screens are a particularly striking example, though similar patterns hold for many other
components.428
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Even though China still lags behind the United States, Japan and Europe in terms of
innovation competitiveness,429 figures from the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) show that China is rapidly improving its position.
In 2014, China accounted for the largest number of patent applications received by any
single IP office – a position it has held since 2011. It received more applications than Japan
and the US combined…Of the top 10 IP offices, China’s IP office (+12.5%) saw the fastest
annual growth in filings received in 2014.430

As well, in 2014, the leading PTC applicant431 was Huawei Technologies of China, which
published 3442 applications, ahead of Qualcomm of the United States and Panasonic of
Japan. Strikingly, Huawei recorded a 63% growth in applications, whereas Panasonic
declined by 41%.432
Furthermore, China’s attractive market, and its appeal as both an investment
location and a foreign investor endow it with considerable advantage. In terms of
infrastructure, China has long been a key player and is the number one investor in the
world.433 According to Deutsche Bank global strategist Sanjeev Sanyal, China is a “world
investor,” especially so “amid growing demand for infrastructure investment in other
developing countries.”434 Besides, in terms of foreign exchange reserves, as former US
Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman points out, “no nation is wealthier.”435 Certainly,
accumulating large foreign exchange reserves primarily denominated in US dollars serves
as a wise strategy to insulate the national economy from future crises; it does not challenge
the international financial order, instead it props up the US dollars and helps the United
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States to maintain its position as the global currency leader. However, the fact that China
still holds the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, around 3.2 trillion US dollars
by February 2016, despite the recent slowdown in its economy and massive stimulus
spending,436 gives China a substantial source of influence that can be used for productive
purposes to enhance its position. This is especially true concerning the China created
multilateral development banks NDB and AIIB. In these banks, China institutionalizes its
leadership position and provides public goods, which makes friends and boosts its influence.
Even the most vocal proponents of the endurance of America’s sole superpower
status claim that American “economic dominance has eroded from its peak,”437 and that in
the economic domain of the international order “the world is not unipolar at all.”438 Even
though they highlight China’s weaknesses, they recognize that China truly is “the only
country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United States.”439 Then,
as fundamental structural change ensues, the mainstream view that China is on a trajectory
to overtake the United States as the leading economic power, notwithstanding the
differentials in time frame the various estimates brings forth, has not been erased from the
consciousness of scholars, experts, and officials alike. It is not a matter of if, but when,
China will surpass the United States. Whether it will happen 2019,440 2020 or 2025441 is a
matter of debate. Hence, with China as the second largest economy in the world and East
Asia as the new world center, the world has undergone fundamental structural change.
At the height of the “unipolar moment” not many scholars believed that unipolarity
would be short-lived,442 and the debate about American relative decline in the 1980’s was
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rapidly silenced as “seemingly overnight the threats to United States’ military and economic
supremacy were removed from the international chessboard” with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War.443 Yet two decades after the triumphant victory over
Soviet communism, the ongoing redistribution of power and the regionalized tripolar
structure of the world economy indicate that the US top position no longer is unchallenged.
Before the 2008 financial crisis, Immanuel Wallerstein argued that the US was in relative
decline and that “the real question was not whether US hegemony was waning but whether
the United States can devise a way to descend gracefully.”444 Now, few are questioning
American relative decline,445 yet Wallerstein’s question remains one of the central puzzles
for contemporary international relations – how will the United States handle the fact that it
no longer stands unchallenged at apex of the global economic hierarchy?

4.2 Change in the Balance of Military Power
The change in the balance of military power is not yet a matter of fundamental change that
implies a challenge to US global military preponderance, but China’s military expansion
indicates a challenge to US regional superiority. I will ascertain this claim below.
The United States is by far the biggest military spender in the world. According
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the military expenditure of the
United States as a share of GDP was 3,3% in 2015. This represents a notable decrease since
2010 when the military expenditure amounted to 4,7% of its GDP, a change attributed to
sequestration or the automatic spending cuts in the US federal budget implemented in 2013
in order to reduce the fiscal deficit. The military expenditure of China, Japan and India as
a share of GDP have on the other hand been relatively constant, amounting to 1,9%, 1%
and 2,3% respectively in 2015 (see Table 13). However, considering the fact that China and
India are rapidly rising economies, the size of their respective shares have been growing,
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whereas the size of Japan’s share has remained constant due to its stagnant economy. Even
so, China’s military budget of 214 billion US dollars in 2015 far exceeds that of India (51
billion), as well as that of Japan (46 billion), and as China steadily increases its military
budget while the United States undergoes sequestration, the military expenditure gap
between the two largest economies in the world is shrinking. In 2010, there was a 600
billion dollar gap between US and China, yet in merely 5 years this gap has been reduced
to less than 400 billion. This becomes evident when we look at gross military expenditure
instead of gauging the military budget as a share of GDP (see Table 14).
If we go back to 1990 as the starting point for our comparison, the magnitude of the
change in military expenditure becomes even clearer. In 1990, China and India were at a
level of rough parity in terms of military expenditure, and considerably below the level of
Japan. Yet over the last 25 years China’s military spending has skyrocketed in comparison
to Japan and India (see Table 15). This period also displays the marked increase in military
spending that took place during the Bush administration and the global War on Terror,
which started to decrease from its peak under the Obama administration with the 2011
Budget Control Act (see Table 16).
In fact, China’s military spending is larger than that of all other countries in East
Asia, South Asia, and Oceania combined. Implying that China, in terms of share spending,
is the regional military power. However, the United States still outspends the world in
terms of military expenditure, and spends more than China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, United
Kingdom, India, France, and Japan combined, relating to the fact that the US is the global
military power.
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Table 13. Military Expenditure as Share of GDP, 2004–2015
US

2004 2005
3,8% 3,8%

2006
3,8%

2007
3,8%

2008 2009
4,2% 4,6%

2010
4,7%

2011
4,6%

2012 2013
4,2% 3,8%

2014
3,5%

2015
3,3%

China

2,1% 2,0%

2,0%

1,9%

1,9% 2,1%

1,9%

1,9%

1,9% 1,9%

1,9%

1,9%

Japan

1,0% 1,0%

1,0%

0,9%

1,0% 1,0%

1,0%

1,0%

1,0% 1,0%

1,0%

1,0%

India

2,8% 2,8%

2,5%

2,3%

2,6% 2,9%

2,7%

2,6%

2,5% 2,4%

2,5%

2,3%

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

Table 14. Military Expenditure, in constant (2014) US$ b., 2004–2015
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
US

582, 610,
400 176

China 72,
415
Japan 47,
245
India 33,
403

79,
809
47,
155
35,
548

619, 635,
653 921

682, 737,
967 747

757,
992

748, 706, 650,
646 082 081

609,
914

595,
472

92,
586
46,
558
35,
718

113,
527
45,
515
41,
003

144,
383
46,
527
48,
470

155,
898
47,
161
48,
940

199,
651
45,
867
50,
914

214,
787
46,
346
51,
116

103,
716
45,
954
36,
151

137,
401
46,
364
48,
277

169,
321
46,
584
48,
766

182,
930
46,
380
48,
406

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
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Table 15. Military Expenditure 1990-2015, China, Japan, and India

Military Expenditure, in constant (2014) US$ b., 1990–2015
250

200

150

100

50

China

Japan

India

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

Table 16. Military Expenditure 1990-2015, US, China, Japan, and India

Military Expenditure, in constant (2014) US$ b., 1990–2015
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

USA

China

Japan

India

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
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2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

0

Another way of gauging the military balance of power is offered by the Correlates
of War Project and the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). This index
includes military budget, military personnel, iron and steel production, energy
consumption, urban population, and total population. According to this indicator, China
had already surpassed the United States at the turn of the millennium, and its CINC ranking
is vastly superior to both Japan and India (see Table 17). This result, however, should
immediately give one pause on its own. That China in 2000 should have surpassed the
United States in national capability proves the irrelevance of the CINC as an index of
military power and national capability. It simply deviates too much from reality.
David Singer founded the Correlates of War Project in the 1960s with the aim
generating systemic scientific knowledge about war.446 The various inputs that make up
the concept may have been useful in the previous eras of the World Wars when steel
production and mass armies certainly played an important role for national strength and the
building of powerful militaries. Yet that China’s massive contemporary stock of steel,
much greater than that of the United States and other advanced economies, should give
China greater military strength does not reflect the contemporary era of advanced and
technologically sophisticated warfare, nor does it say anything about power projection
capabilities.
In order to gauge the strength of modern militaries Credit Suisse developed another
index. The Military Strength Index (MSI) consists of six key inputs; namely, aircraft
carriers, aircrafts, attack helicopters, submarines, tanks, and active personnel. This index
provides a more accurate picture of the military balance of power. The United States, with
a fleet of 20 aircraft carries, 13900 aircrafts, 920 attack helicopters, and 72 submarines,
clearly discloses America’s military superiority as compared to its closest rivals.447 After
the United States, the top four countries are Russia, China, Japan, and India (see Table 18).
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Table 17. Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
2000

2001

2002
US

2003
China

2004
Japan

2005

2006

India

Source: Correlates of War Project, available at: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/datasets/national- material-capabilities

Table 18. Military Strength Index
Country

Ranking

Score

US

1

0.94

Russia

2

0.80

China

3

0.79

Japan

4

0.72

India

5

0.69

Source: Michael O’Sullivan, “The End of
Globalization or a More Multipolar World?” (Credit
Suisse Research Institute, 2015), 41.
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2007

Even though this index provides a more accurate outline of the current military
hierarchy, it only measures conventional forces and do not take nuclear capabilities into
account, nor the qualitative difference of capabilities, platforms, and weapons systems.
Neither is the disruptive potential of anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and other
cyber and space technologies included. Yet if we take into account nuclear capabilities, it
would only strengthen the top position of the United States and Russia since they account
for nine tenths of the world’s nuclear arsenal.448
In fact, no nation on earth rivals the United States in terms of global military power
and power projection. Just the mere fact that the United States divides the world into six
geographic

command

zones

–

USAFRICOM,

USCENTCOM,

USEUCOM,

USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM – that are subsumed under the Unified
Command Plan, which set forth the missions and responsibilities of the combatant
commanders around the globe, is notable in itself (see Figure 4). Apart from the geographic
division, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and the United States Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) are also incorporated in the Unified Command Plan. The USSOCOM
is responsible for a wide range of special operations, ranging from short duration strikes
and special reconnaissance to psychological and counterinsurgency operations; the
USSTRATCOM is responsible for deterring and detecting strategic attacks against the
United States, and is in charge of “US nuclear capabilities, space operations, global
surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence, communications, computers, global missile
defense and combatting weapons of mass destruction”; and the USTRANSCOM “provides
the Department of Defense with an aggregate of transportation capabilities and assets” that
support “a diverse array of joint mobility missions.”449 No other country in the world has
a similar global outlook, dividing the continents into different zones of responsibility – a
clear illustration of US sole superpower status.
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449
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Figure 4. US Unified Command Plan

Source: US Department of Defense, “Unified Command Plan,” available at https://www.defense.gov/About/
Military-Departments/Unified-Combatant-Commands

According to data from Flight Global, the overall number of US aircrafts is 13,717,
compared to 2942 for China. Whereas the numbers of American aircrafts are evenly
distributed between the US Air Force and the US Navy and US Army, Chinese Aircrafts
are heavily tilted towards the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), which holds
1977 units.450 Moreover, apart from differences in quantity, there are qualitative difference:

The compositions of the fleets also differ. The United States has around 2,200 short range
fighters, compared to about 1,200 for China. Weighting by quality, the United States has
an even more substantial advantage; China continues to fly over 400 J-7s, an effective
aircraft, but not competitive in any sense with the U.S. fleet. The United States also has
massive advantages in other aircraft types. The United States, for example, owns 78 percent

Cited in Robert Farley, “China’s Military Has Nearly 3000 Aircraft. Here’s Why That Matters,” The
Diplomat, May 17, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/chinas-military-has-nearly-3000-aircraft-hereswhy-that-matters/, accessed September 2, 2016.
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of the world’s tanker aircraft; a unique capability for a state that views itself as having
unique responsibilities.451

Whereas no country is challenging the global military presence and unique sole
superpower status of the United States, the picture changes if we take a closer look at the
regional balance of military power. Here we can observe a significant ongoing change in
the balance of power in East Asia, which present challenges to the US Pacific Command,
particularly along China’s maritime periphery.
According to Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Deployments
Involving the People’s Republic of China released by the US Department of Defense,
China’s military capabilities greatly surpass those of Taiwan. In terms of air forces, China
is ahead of Taiwan in terms of fighters, bombers, transport, and special mission aircrafts
(see Table 19). In addition to that, China has a large number of ballistic missiles (see Table
20). How China’s military capabilities translate into power projection is further presented
in the report The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving
Balance of Power, 1996-2017, released by the RAND Corporation. The report gauges
United States’ and China’s advantages and disadvantages in ten operational areas: Chinese
air base attack, US vs Chinese air superiority, US airspace penetration, US airbase attack,
Chinese anti-surface warfare, US anti-surface warfare, US counterspace, Chinese
counterspace, US vs China cyberwar, and nuclear stability. The report also includes two
scenarios (Taiwan scenario and Spratly Islands Scenario), as well as a time frame that
gauges the development since 1996 until the present day. The assessment of the power
projection capabilities ranges from major advantage, advantage, and approximate parity to
disadvantage and major disadvantage. Nuclear stability is gauged in terms of confidence
in second-strike capability.452
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Table 19. Taiwan Strait Military Balance in 2015, Air forces
China Airforce
Total

Within range of

Taiwan Airforce
Total

Taiwan
Fighters

1700

130

384

Bombers

400

200

0

Transport

475

150

19

Special Mission

115

75

25

Aircraft
Source: US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, DC, 2016), 109.

Table 20. China’s Missile Forces
System

Missiles

Launchers

Estimated Range

ICBM

75-100

50-75

5,400-13,000+ km

MRBM

200-300

100-125

1,500+ km

SRBM

1000-1200

250-300

300-1000 km

GLCM

200-300

40-55

1,500+ km

Source: US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, DC, 2016), 109.

In 1996, China faced a major disadvantage in almost all operational areas in both
scenarios, but by 2010, the situation had changed markedly, particularly in relation to the
Taiwan scenario, and in 2017, the situation in relation to the Spratly Islands scenario has
also changed significantly. In 2017, in relation to the Taiwan scenario, China has the
advantage in Chinese airbase attack and Chinese anti-surface warfare, and has reached the
level of approximate parity in the operational areas US vs Chinese air superiority, US
airspace penetration, US counterspace, and Chinese counterspace. In relation to the Spratly
Islands Scenario, China does still not have the advantage in any operational area. However,
in the operational areas Chinese air base attack, Chinese anti-surface warfare, US
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counterspace, and Chinese counterspace the balance of power has reached a level of
approximate parity.453
In terms of a Chinese airbase attacks China’s number of intermediate, short-range,
and cruise missiles have increased rapidly since 1996, and they possess much greater
accuracy. This was also highlighted in the 2016 Annual Report to Congress by the US
Department of Defense; namely, that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) “is developing and
testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, including a hypersonic glide
vehicle; forming additional missile units; upgrading older missile systems; and developing
methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.”454 China has also developed unique antiship ballistic missiles, which presents a new and distinctive challenge to US aircraft carrier
strike groups (CSG’s).
China is also replacing many of its obsolete older generation aircrafts. While fourthgeneration aircrafts now make up around half of PLAAF, fifth-generation aircrafts enter
service within a few years and “will significantly improve” the PLAAF. 455 China has also
developed sophisticated over-the-horizon (OTH) intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and systems that can detect stealth aircraft.456 Moreover,
China’s rapid expansion of attack submarines, including nuclear-powered, diesel electric
and air-independent powered submarines, adds to China’s significant military expansion.
The sheer number of PLA navy vessels, as well as the large quantity of coast guard
and maritime law enforcement vessels, also testify to China’s rapidly expanding presence
in the region. The PLA Navy has the “largest force of principal combatants, submarines,
and amphibious warfare ships in Asia.”457 The PLA navy widely outnumbers Japan’s naval
forces and is more numerous than the United States in terms of submarines, amphibs, and
small combatants, while the US Navy has the edge in terms of aircraft carriers and large
combatants (see Table 21).
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Although China only has one operational aircraft carrier, with a second one under
construction, this new capability poses a looming threat to the United States’ dominant
status in the Western Pacific. Regardless of China’s intentions, the sustained development
of even larger, more modern naval forces, including aircraft carriers, is in itself
incompatible with US sole superpower status, full-spectrum dominance, and command of
the global commons.

Table 21. Naval Power in the Asia-Pacific
Naval Combatants US

China

Japan

Aircraft carriers

1

0

21 (11 aircraft carriers
and 10 carrier air
wings)

Large Combatants

92

79

46

Small Combatants

43

107

0

Amphibs

33

53

3

Submarines

55

64

18

Source: US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense
Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
2014), 39-41.

Source: US Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific
Maritime Security Strategy (Washington, DC: US
Department of Defense, 2015), 12.

The above illustrates the change in the regional balance of power and China’s
robust and expanding presence in the air and maritime domains, which accounts for
China’s disruptive military power, or its A2/AD capabilities (for a complete depiction of
the US-China military score card, see Figure 5). In other words, you simply cannot ignore
the lateral pressure – as the balance of power changes and Chinese capabilities increase,
China acquires the means to exert greater political influence and becomes able to exercise
regional rights and responsibilities commensurate with its great power status. Even though
China’s military modernization is far from complete, the quality of China’s military
capabilities is increasing rapidly. In just ten years, the ratio of modern naval surface forces
and air forces has increased from below 5 percent in 2000 to around 25 percent in 2010. In
terms of submarine forces and air defense forces, the modern ratio has increased from under
10 percent in 2000 to 55 percent and 40 percent respectively in 2010 (see Table 22).
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Figure 5. US-China Military Score Card

Source: Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the
Evolving Balance of Power, 1997-2017 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html.
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Table 22. PLA Modernization

Source: US Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016” (Washington, DC, 2016), 43.

The change in the balance of military power is not yet a matter of fundamental
structural change that implies a challenge to US global military preponderance, but it
nonetheless indicates a challenge to US regional superiority. As Matteo Dian points out:

Even though the PLA is not able to disrupt the US military access to commons on a global
scale and for extended periods of time, vast investment in conventional and asymmetric
A2AD capabilities has enabled it to challenge US freedom of action in specific regions
such as the area within the First Island chain for at least limited periods of time. 458

China’s rise thus has implications for the original regional balance of power that existed
after the end of the Cold War between China, predominately a land power, and the United
States, the preeminent sea power. That strategic balance is now being broken with China’s
growing military presence in its near seas. As Zhang Tuosheng points out:

[A]fter the end of the Cold War, on the basis of China having a strong land-power
advantage and the US having a strong sea-power advantage, the military strengths of the
two countries found a certain strategic balance in the Western Pacific along the lines of
Matteo Dian, “The Pivot to Asia, Air-Sea Battle and Contested Commons in the Asia Pacific Region,”
The Pacific Review 28, no. 2 (2015): 243.
458
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China’s border and territorial seas. Since the beginning of the new century, however, the
original strategic balance has been broken, with China’s strengthening, both economically
and militarily, and its accelerated defense modernization. In the coming decade or two, if
there is no fundamental change in the current trend, the balance between their military
strengths and strategies may shift to the first island chain in the Western Pacific. By then,
China will have the strategic advantage in its near sea and the US will maintain its strategic
advantage and dominance in the vast sea, outside of the first island Chain. 459

In sum, China now possesses the largest navy and air force in Asia and this inevitably has
consequences for the United States’ command of the regional commons and presents
challenges for the maintenance of American full-spectrum dominance in the regional
domains. This change in the regional balance of power affords China the power to patrol
its near seas more robustly, and in the coming future, even beyond, with a truly global
Chinese military power lurking in the background as a credible scenario if current trends
continue.
Yet apart from the change in the balance of power, we also have to examine China’s
reputational capital. The next chapter will scrutinize the change in the balance of prestige.

Tuosheng Zhang, “The Shifting US-China Balance of Power in the Western Pacific: Getting the Transition
Right,” Global Asia 11, no. 1 (2016): 18–19.
459
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5. Fundamental Change in the Balance of Prestige
In this chapter, I will ascertain that the distribution of prestige was changing in China’s
favor until the Obama administration assumed power and launched the US pivot to Asia. I
treat the balance of prestige as an intersubjective ideational structure, and I will ascertain
that China’s reputation in the Asia-Pacific, and the world, grew at America’s expense. This
is particularly true concerning China’s economic prestige, whereas China’s military
reputation is more negative and ambiguous. But whereas China was viewed in a more
favorable light than the United States in the region, Japan and China’s views of each other
deteriorated as they struggled for regional leadership, which, together with concerns about
China’s military intentions, impeded regional integration. Even though China and Japan
did not buy into each other’s regional projects, the struggle for leadership was played out
in a multilateral context exclusive of the United States. When the Obama administration
assumed power, it felt that unless the United States acts to shape regional trends and revises
the regional economic order, China’s charm offensive would eventually bear fruit. This
aspect will be covered in chapter seven where I examine the status anxiety that the change
in the balance of power and the balance of prestige generated, but for now, let us
concentrate on the change in the distribution of prestige.
For long, China’s reputation has been tainted by threat discourses. In fact, the story
about China has been told in the West for centuries, a story recurrently plotted along murky
and adversarial lines. Napoleon’s famous warning, “Let China sleep, for when the Dragon
awakes, she will shake the world,” pointed towards a lurking threat. So did the cautioning
of a “Yellow Peril” by Emperor William of Germany, referring to a coming danger from
the East, which Greenberry Rubert later connected to the biblical revelation of the rising
“Kings of the East.”460 After the US-China rapprochement in the 1970s, the revolutionary
threat from the “red menace” gradually dwindled until it was supplanted by a transfigured
“China threat” thesis, which gained strength after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. With
China’s rapid economic development and military modernization, the adversarial logic
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now revolves around “capability-based” and “intention-focused” China threat
discourses.461
Chinese leaders are well aware of the damage that threat discourses cause; it stains
China’s image, tarnishes its reputation, and reduces its attraction as a partner and great
power. Chinese scholars and government officials have since the end of the 1990s begun
to recognize the importance of cultivating soft power. The concept of soft power have
gained prominence in Chinese academic journals and newspapers, and have been
discussed, elaborated and promoted by scholars, think-tank experts, and government
officials in seminars and conferences. Significantly, it is also a component of the Chinese
measure of comprehensive national power.462 A different, yet related concept is the longstanding Chinese notion of discourse power, which, according to Kejin Zhao has been the
fundamental principle of the CCP since its founding in 1921. Definitions of discourse
power by Chinese scholars differ, ranging from a “right to speak,” “soft power,” and
“diplomatic skill” or “strategic prestige” to more post-structuralist understandings of
discourse that “expresses power relationships” designed to maintain a dominant social
order through power facts, shared rules, and social practice.463 Yet in any case, whatever
definition one views as the most accurate one, it is safe to conclude that prestige or a benign
reputation is crucial for China to gain discourse power.
Both “soft power” and “discourse power” are concepts linked to China’s strategy to
change the balance of prestige, in terms of improving China’s image and reputation, with
the aim “to create a new political model, rather than just follow the established order.”464
It involves the launching of new diplomatic concepts and ideas (new security concept,
responsible power, good neighbor policy, peaceful development, harmonious world, etc.),
public diplomacy, active engagement in regional and international multilateral institutions,
magnanimous development assistance, economic cooperation, and the promotion of
China’s development experience as a successful example, without officially supporting the
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notion of Beijing Consensus to avoid direct ideological confrontation with the Western
world at large, and the United States in particular.
In a bid to increase its reputation China launched “China opportunity theory” and
“China contribution theory” as direct countermeasures to the “China threat theory” and
“China collapse theory.”

465

Yet the most important new concepts are “peaceful

development” and China’s “good neighbor policy.” Although “peaceful rise” was the first
concept to be coined, before it was supplanted by China’s official adoption of “peaceful
development” to avoid the connotation of an impending challenge imbued in the concept
of “rise,” the two concepts essentially envision the same thing. Developed by Zheng Bijan,
a top advisor that worked closely with the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao leadership, peaceful
development envisions a path to prominence that ostensibly differs from the trajectory of
rising powers in the past. As Hu Jintao stated:

It is only through the road of peaceful development that the progress of the human race and
the prosperity of a nation shall and can be achieved. History tells us that any attempt by a
country to realize its interests through the use or threat of force, or to place its interests
above those of other nations will get nowhere. Such attempts are against the tide of history
of human development and against the fundamental interests of people all over the
world.466

Chinese leaders ensure that it will adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence;
pursue an independent foreign policy of peace; follow the path of reform of opening to the
world; conduct economic and technological corporation and scientific and cultural
exchange; seek win-win cooperation; and promote world peace through its own
development. “China has never sought hegemony, and never will in the future,” as Chinese
leaders often reiterate to substantiate that China’s rise represents a radical departure from
the historical record. As Zheng Bijan argues, “In the past, the rise of a big power often
involved toppling the international order and a threat to peace. China breaks this rule.
While seeking a peaceful international environment to ensure our development, we are
safeguarding world peace through our own development.”467 While the message indeed is
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for the world to hear and for great powers to take notice of, it is particularly intended to
reach China’s Asian neighbors. The very reason why peaceful rise/peaceful development
“was proposed in the Hu Jintao era was in effect an intention to declare China’s expansion
of national power and its presumed forthcoming rise to global power status, and to gain
acceptance of this declaration from neighboring Asian countries.”468 This acceptance of
China specifically relates to the opportunities that China’s rise offers its neighbors. As
Zheng puts it:

Generally speaking, in the coming two or three decades, or in the early twenty-first century,
Asia will face a rare historical opportunity for peaceful rise, and China’s peaceful rise will
be a part of Asia’s peaceful rise. This not only means that China’s reform, opening up, and
rise are partly attributable to the experience and development of other Asian countries; it
also means that China, as an Asian country, will play a more active and useful role in the
development, prosperity, and stability of all the other Asian countries, and its neighbors in
particular.469

In other words, “China’s peaceful rise and the sustained, rapid, coordinated, and sound
growth of its economy will bring about tremendous historic opportunities, not threats, to
the Asia-Pacific region.”470 These economic opportunities is the lure, the tangible benefits
that should draw the region closer to China.
At the same time as the concept of peaceful development was disseminated, China
formally launched its “good neighbor policy.” At the 2003 ASEAN+3 summit, Wen Jiabao
pronounced China’s good neighbor policy, designed to create a “friendly neighborhood,
secure neighborhood, and prosperous neighborhood.” By enunciating the policy at the
summit level of the premier regional grouping, Chinese leaders sent “a strong signal to all
participants indicating that China is fully amendable to the ‘ASEAN Way’ of incremental
consensus-building and group decision-making.”471
Yet the conception of peaceful development and the formal articulation of China’s
good neighbor policy in 2003 was not the initiation of China’s work to strengthen its
prestige in the region, it was rather the product of diplomatic efforts that China had been
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468
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practicing since the 1980s, mostly on a bilateral basis,472 and multilateral efforts that started
to intensify in the second half of the 1990s, when China opened up to regional multilateral
cooperation. Those efforts now resulted in the creation of China’s official master slogan
and counterhegemonic alternative to the “China threat theory,” as well as its leading policy
concept designed to enhance the pursuit of regional cooperation. Before disseminating the
theory of peaceful development, China had already started to increase its standing in the
region through a series of honorable deeds and regional cooperation with the ASEAN that
improved its image as a benign and responsible great power.
A first crucial milestone for the change in the balance of prestige occurred during
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The United States’ haphazard response during the
AFC struck a severe blow to Washington’s prestige in the region. There was not only
serious “disagreement over the causes” of the crisis, but the initial American refusal to
contribute to Thailand’s rescue package made Asian leaders question the American
commitment to regional development.473 The conditionalities imposed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) on countries hit by the crisis further contributed to “politics of
resentment” throughout the region in which the outside forces of the US and IMF “became
the target of criticism and blame.”474 The view was that “Washington may have aggravated,
rather than ameliorated, the crisis.”475 At the same time, “China made a symbolic move”
by not devaluating its currency and publically coating itself in the benign veneer of a
responsible state “standing up for other Asian nations.” 476 As stated by Singaporean
diplomat Chan Hen Chee, Washington’s “response or failure to respond to the Asian
Financial Crisis in 1997 strengthened China’s standing in the region.”477 The same year
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ASEAN + 3 was created, an East Asian wide grouping including the ASEAN plus China,
Japan, and South Korea, and the first informal China-ASEAN summit was held.
Divisions regarding the proper pathway to implement the ambitious “Bogor Goals”
of region-wide liberalization also haunted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC). Depicted as civilizational divides, these competing “Anglo-Saxon” and “Asian”
paths to regional integration478 represented different normative and regulatory institutional
frameworks for regional economic integration. Many East Asian countries preferred a
“consensus-led, incrementalist, and voluntary approach” over the “reciprocity-based
negotiations and binding commitments” advocated by the United States.

479

This

“ideological clash” 480 and the Clinton administration’s unsuccessful attempt to alter
APEC’s mode of operation further tainted America’s prestige.
Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Bush administration started to push for
the inclusion of security issues as agenda items in APEC. Notwithstanding the American
success in including security issues into the APEC agenda, resulting in the 2003 “Bangkok
commitments,” the perception that the United States was preoccupied with security and the
War on Terror at the expense of economic matters was growing, and “many ASEAN
countries felt highly uneasy with broadening APEC’s focus.”481 Yet more significantly,
after 9/11, many viewed the United States as a power who neglected Asia and who
disappointed regional leaders when it did not send top ranking officials to regional
summits, which added to the picture of a disinterested and arrogant superpower.
“Washington completely forgot about Asia, and particularly East and South East Asia, as
it turned its attention to the Middle East. The failure to send top ranking officials to ASEAN
and APEC meetings is only the most visible manifestation of the policy of neglect and
purposelessness.”482 Many East Asian elites observed “with dismay the growing evidence
of American incompetence in handling various global and regional challenges,” and
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accordingly, “America’s standing” was seriously “damaged.”

483

Consequently,

“America’s zeitgeist had clearly shifted” due to Washington’s actions in the Middle East
and its handling of the global War on Terror, which intensified the “questioning of United
States global leadership.”484
Simultaneously, in stark contrast to the United States, China’s reputational capital
was increasing in the region. In 2002, at the sixth ASEAN + 3 summit in Cambodia, China
announced that it would deliver debt relief for the poorest members of the ASEAN
(Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam). The signing of the groundbreaking ChinaASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) the same year and China’s bestowment of an
“early harvest,” consisting of reduced or removed tariffs on around 600 agricultural
products for Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam without reciprocity before the
agreement came into force in 2010, was viewed as a benevolent deed. The joint ChinaASEAN Declaration on Conduct (DoC) in the South China Sea in 2002 and China’s
decision to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 as the first
non-ASEAN member to do so further improved its image in the region. China and ASEAN
were now ready to declare their “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.”485
In other words, in 2003, the stage was already set for China to unveil its master
concept of peaceful development, designed to put China’s rise in a unique and benign
context, and to launch its good neighbor policy, the logical appendix for friendly relations
and regional cooperation. China’s preference for coexistence converged with the
diplomatic approach of the ASEAN Way,486 and by following Deng Xiaoping’s proverb of
“setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development,” China managed to improve its
image and establish cooperative relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors through
benign deeds and a friendly bearing. In fact,
By engaging with multilateral organizations like the [ASEAN] and fostering more
interactions between foreign and Chinese officials, China can reduce fears of Beijing,
giving it time to gain influence without troubling other countries about its rise. By working
with multilateral organizations, Beijing also can signal to other countries that it can play
Kishore Mahbubani, “Wake Up, Washington,” 19.
Eric S. Edelman, “Understanding America’s Contested Primacy” (Washington DC: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), ix.
485
Chien-peng Chung, China’s Multilateral Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, 73-75, 79-81
486
Liselotte Odgaard, China and Coexistence: Beijing’s National Security Strategy for the Twenty-First
Century (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), p. 95.
483
484

138

by international rules and be a responsible power. It cannot hurt that as the United States
became less interested in multilateralism, China’s participation in multilateral
organizations made Beijing look more cooperative by comparison. 487

In the mid-2000s, China and ASEAN had initiated cooperation in 48 functional
mechanisms and Japan and ASEAN cooperated in 33 functional mechanisms, whereas the
cooperation between the United States and ASEAN merely spanned seven mechanisms.
Not only had China initiated more projects with the ASEAN than Japan and the United
States, they had also been initiated during a much shorter time span.488 And according to
interviews with ASEAN diplomats conducted by Joshua Kurlantzick, China’s approach to
international diplomacy was seen as beneficial because Beijing “would not interfere or
meddle.” Thus, “foreign nations could benefit because China would not make demands
upon others nations’ sovereignty, economic models, governance or political cultures.”489
In Southeast Asia, Chinese diplomats also have deep local knowledge; they visit more
frequently, and engaged higher-level diplomats than the United States at the time. China
also displayed willingness to be a “proactive mediator,” as demonstrated in its mediation
between Cambodia and Thailand, and the fact that the Six-Party Talks could not have
happened without China’s active support further testifies to its diplomatic strength. In
relation to the latter, “Asian news outlets…typically portrayed China as a rational actor
mediating between two angry, unbalanced nations led by madmen – North Korea and the
United States.”490
As David Shambaugh pointed out in 2005, Beijing’s diplomacy was “earning praise
around the region” and “most nations” saw “China as a good neighbor, a constructive
partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power.” 491 Across the region
“elites and populaces in most nations see China as a constructive actor – and, potentially,
as the preeminent power.”492 China’s good neighbor policy concurred with the “relative
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inattention” given to the region by the United States during the Bush administration,493 and
Beijing’s improved image and reputation happened as the United States experienced a
sharp decline in its soft power. As Joshua Kurlantzick makes clear,

This decline began in the Clinton 1990s and has spiraled further downward in the Bush
2000s, as cuts in American public diplomacy, scandals in American corporations, new
restrictions on entering the United States, misguided trade policies, a retreat from
multilateral institutions, and human rights abuses in Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, and other
places have combined to undermine the allure of America’s ideas, values, and models.494

Apart from the fruits that China’s effective regional engagement bore, China’s successful
economic development was also contributing to its increasingly positive reputation. Albeit
inadvertent, another significant milestone was reached when Joshua Cooper Ramo coined
the concept of the Beijing Consensus in 2004. In Ramo’s famous article that disseminated
the concept to a global audience, he argued:

The Beijing Consensus offers hope for the world. After the collapse of the Washington
Consensus, the breakdown of WTO talks, the implosion of Argentina’s economy, much of
the world was uncertain what a new paradigm for development ought to look like. [The
Beijing Consensus is] appealing to nations that have ambitions for development and
security but have seen hundreds of years of failure of development models that rely too
much on developed nations for assistance. 495

Even though China did not officially endorse the Beijing Consensus by name in order to
avoid an open ideological clash at an inopportune time, China still proclaims that
developing countries can learn from its development experience and offers assistance to
countries in desperate need of economic development. Across Southeast Asia, China’s
economic model was viewed as attractive; from Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand to
Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. 496 It testifies to what Ramos called “the intellectual
charisma” of China’s economic development model.497 As Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho
Jeong point out:
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[The] dissemination of the Beijing Consensus bestows upon ‘Chinese-style socialism’
greater international recognition, not only as an economic development model but also as
a new model of political system and social structure. With the Beijing Consensus, China
can finally rid itself of its stigma as a non-democratic state and a human rights violator –
as argued by the Western world – and can now assume a leading role vis-à-vis the US
within international society by recommending various development policies to Third
World countries.498

In 2005, Joseph Nye acknowledged that, “in terms of political values” the Beijing
consensus “has become more popular than the previously dominant ‘Washington
consensus.’”499 A similar argument was made by Clyde Prestowitz in 2007, “today, it is
China whose soft power is waxing while America’s wanes. Everywhere one goes, one finds
that people admire China and want to know what is happening in China. They may fear the
US, but they admire it less. It is the China model that now has appeal.”500 This view could
only be reinforced in 2008, when two occurrences at opposite ends of the globe seemed to
unfold in emblematic nearness. With the “triumphant” Beijing Olympics freshly stored in
the global cortex, the crash of the Lehman Brothers and the 2008 Financial Crisis
intensified the juxtapositions of a “strengthened China” and a “battered West.”501
As China increased its reputational capital and the Beijing Consensus gained
worldwide appeal, perhaps the most vivid sign of America’s declining reputation came in
2009 when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the elections in Japan and Yukio
Hatoyama was selected Prime Minister. Before Hatoyama assumed his position, he
published an op-ed in the New York Times titled “A New Path for Japan” in which he
delivered a perforating attack on the United States’ image and moral standing. Hatoyama
argued that US-style capitalism did not care about human dignity, that it was “void of
morals or moderation.” After spending several paragraphs debunking immoral US-led
market fundamentalism and universal globalism, Hatoyama announced, “I also feel that as
a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis the era of US-led globalism is
coming to an end and that we are moving toward an era of multipolarity.” 502 That
Washington’s staunchest ally in the region publically delegitimized the United States and
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its economic model in front of a global audience undoubtedly testifies to America’s
tarnished prestige in the region as the Obama administration entered office.
The above narrative of a change in the balance of prestige gains further support
from primary data on global attitudes found in international public opinion surveys. This
is further evidence for the fact that during the Bush administration the United States’
reputational capital plummeted, whereas China’s prestige markedly increased.
To begin with, in a 2003 poll conducted by Pew Research Center it is concluded
that the initiation of the second Iraq war “significantly weakened global public support for
the pillars of the post-World War II era – the UN and the North Atlantic alliance.”503 In
2005, the Pew Research Center conducted a poll on the views of America’s role in the
world, and the results indicate a strong decline in US prestige. The attitudes about US sole
superpower status and the emergence of a peer competitor or a group of countries rivalling
the United States are striking. “Majorities in every other country surveyed, aside from the
US, favor another country challenging America’s global military supremacy.” In Asia,
support for a military power rivalling the United States ranges from 73% in Pakistan and
Lebanon and 74% in China to 79% in Indonesia and more than 80% in India. 504
Significantly, in Asia and the Middle East, substantial majorities in Pakistan, Indonesia,
Turkey, and Jordan “favor the rise of China as a military equal to America.” Concerning
the question whether China’s rise is an opportunity that benefits their country, publics in
Asia “are uniformly more positive” than compared to the rest of the world. For instance,
by a margin of 53% to 36%, Indians see benefits to themselves in China’s economic
emergence. Pakistan and Indonesia approve by still wider margins of 68%-to-10% and
70%-to-23%, respectively.”505
In the 2007 poll on how the world sees China, Pew Research Center unequivocally
concluded: “China’s fans are most prevalent” in Asia and Africa. In Malaysia, Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, majorities of the surveyed, reaching 83%, 65%, 79%, and 74%
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respectively, held favorable views of China. In Indonesia, where a majority favored the
rise of China as a peer competitor in 2005, a plurality of 43% now viewed China’s
expanding military power in a negative light. Even so, 66% of Indonesians polled still
viewed China’s growing economy favorably. A general sentiment also shared by Indians.
In Malaysia and Pakistan 57%, and in Bangladesh 51%, viewed “China’s stronger military
is good for their country.”506
However, Japan and South Korea are notable exceptions, where substantial
majorities worried about both China’s expanding economic power and its military power.
In general, the sentiment about China’s military power was more negative, whereas
China’s rapidly expanding economy did not arouse the same concerns. “In 33 of 46
countries, including China itself, China’s growing economy is viewed as a good thing by
majorities or pluralities.” However, “in 32 of 46 countries surveyed, China’s increasing
military muscle is viewed with alarm.”507
In the 2005 BBC World Service Poll, conducted by the international polling firm
GlobeScan and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at University of
Maryland, China was viewed in a favorable light in many Asian countries. In India (66%),
Philippines (70%), Indonesia (68%), and Australia (56%) majorities viewed China in a
positive light. However, views about China in South Korea and Japan were divided. In
South Korea 49% viewed China in a positive light, whereas 47% held negative views, and
in Japan 25% viewed China favorably, whereas 22% viewed it negatively, and 53% took
no position.508 Even so, Steven Kull, the director of PIPA, was astonished. “It is quite
remarkable that with its growing economic power China is viewed as so benign, especially
by its Asian neighbors that it could threaten or seek to dominate. However, this cordial
view from around the world does appear to depend on China restraining itself from seeking
to convert its burgeoning economic power into a threatening military presence.” 509
Similarly, Doug Miller, the President of GlobeScan, stated, “China clearly has the respect
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of the world because of its exceptional economic achievements, and most people seem to
hope for its continued economic success. However, with military approaches generally
unsupported in today’s world, citizens worldwide are hoping China will pursue a soft
power route to world influence.”510
Hence, these positive views of China came with an important caveat, namely that
it hinges upon its economic power, and that it could change if it becomes more militaristic.
This insight connects to evidence from another poll by PIPA and GlobeScan, which
demonstrated that in sixteen countries, most viewed a future trajectory where China is
“significantly more powerful economically” as something positive, whereas in seventeen
countries, most viewed a future scenario where China is “significantly more powerful
militarily” as something negative.511 Nevertheless, “China is viewed much more positively
than two other major powers, the US and Russia, which are viewed quite negatively.”512
In a 2005 poll by the Australian think-tank Lowy Institute, China’s good name,
with respect to Australia, is confirmed. Whereas 69% of the polled Australians had positive
feelings for China, only 58% had positive feelings for the United States. According to
Lowy Institute, “Australians feel most positive about the countries with which we have
longstanding, deep and stable relationships,” which makes the comparatively bad number
for the United States even more astonishing given the long and intimate US-Australia
relationship. 513 When asked about external threats, the surveyed Australians ranked
China’s growing power as the least among threats, while the threat from US foreign
policies worried Australians considerably more. Concerning the question of free trade
agreements, Australians were more positive about signing a free trade agreement with
China (51% thought it would be good, 20% thought it would be bad), while expressing
ambivalences towards a trade deal with the United States (34 % thought it would be good,
32% thought it would be bad).514
510

Ibid.
PIPA & GlobeScan, “In 20 of 23 Countries Polled Citizens Want Europe to Be More Influential Than
US,” 2005, available at http://worldpublicopinion.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/LeadWorld_Apr05
_rpt.pdf, accessed November 12, 2016.
512
PIPA & GlobeScan, “22-Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries Including Its
Asian Neighbors,” emphasis added.
513
Ivan Cook, “Australians Speak 2005: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” The Lowy Institute, 2005,
available
at
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/pubfiles/Australians_Speak_2005_1.pdf,
accessed November 16, 2016.
514
Ibid.
511

144

In various local polls, we find similar evidence. In a 2006 poll conducted in
Thailand, 83% of the participants had a favorable view of China, and more than 70% of
the Thai viewed China as their closest friend.515 Moreover, despite the ambivalent survey
data cited above, South Korean polls conducted in 2006 indicate that majorities viewed
China as the most significant country for South Korea’s foreign policy.516 Robert Sutter,
although being skeptical of China’s challenge to the United States in the region, claims
that, “[t]he greatest gains in Chinese regional influence have been registered in South
Korea and in Southeast Asia. Elite and popular opinion in these countries has shown strong
pro-China tendencies, and some government leaders have reflected this as well.”517
In essence, during the Bush administration, East Asia experienced “strong elite and
popular opinion moving in anti-American direction,” 518 and the survey data clearly
indicates that China, conversely, had boosted its prestige considerably worldwide although
notable reservations about China’s military power were present. With the significant
exception of Japan, and perhaps South Korea, China had a good reputation in Asia, and it
was enjoying the highest standing among the great powers. In fact, Beijing had managed
to change “its image across much of the globe, from threat to opportunity, from danger to
benefactor”519 – at America’s expense. In 2009, Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen
John Stedman argued that the belief that the United States is “a vital provider of
international order…has vanished. Fewer people around the world accept or trust
American power – or regard it as legitimate.”520
While America’s standing in Asia and in the world had been seriously damaged,
China, on the other hand, had “risen as a potential competitor to the United States in the
Asian region.”521 As China steadily climbed the power and prestige hierarchies, it sought
to institutionalize leadership status within a regional institutional context exclusive of the
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United States. However, Japan’s refusal to accept Chinese leadership prevented the
realization of this goal. Even so, status disavowal and systemic unfavorability in the
evolving regional order raised obstacles for US status maintenance. In the following
section, I will account for these institutional barriers.
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6. Institutional Barriers: US Status Disavowal and Systemic
Unfavorability in the Evolving Regional Order of the AsiaPacific
At the end of the Cold War, Asia-Pacific states started to explore alternative regional
pathways. The initial search for regionalism brought fourth two dissimilar conceptions of
regional cooperation that, however, shared a common denominator – the exclusion of the
United States. When Australia first launched the idea of the APEC in 1989 it did not include
the US, but represented an extended Asia-Pacific vision of economic regionalism, which,
nevertheless, was rectified after harsh American reactions. As Amy Searight points out,
“US officials at the State Department…were incensed that Australia had failed to consult
with them and had omitted the United States and Canada from its proposal. Secretary of
State James Baker made clear that the United States expected to be included in any Pacific
grouping.”522 However, the APEC initiative was countered by Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal for the Japan-led East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC).
When South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok put forward the idea that South Korea
might support Mahathir’s proposal “out of Asian solidarity,” James Baker, yet again, made
the American position vividly clear: “it was Americans, not Malaysians, who had shed
their blood for Korea forty years before.”523 The United States, as envisioned by Baker’s
famous expression, was determined “to check any move by the East Asians” that would
draw “a line down the middle of the Pacific” and exclude the United States from the
region.524
In contrast to the conventional wisdom of a unipolar moment with solid confidence
in America’s dominant position, perceptions of relative decline and anxieties about United
States’ future in East Asia were prevailing among US officials against the backdrop of
Japan’s rise and the “Asian renaissance.” According to Kai He, this sentiment lasted until
1997 when the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) struck the region and the United States
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stopped worrying about its place in East Asia. As the economic turmoil spread across the
region, perceptions of longlasting US hegemony gained ground instead.525
In 1997, in the midst of the AFC, and faced with the United States’ lukewarm
response to the crisis, Japan launched the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), an
organization Japan deliberately envisioned without the United States to “promote solutions
to regional financial issues by Asian leaders themselves without US pressure.”526 The plan,
however, quickly succumbed to opposition from the US and the IMF and stood without
Chinese support. Even so, the United States did not manage to stop or showed no interest
in halting the creation of the ASEAN + 3 that was established the same year and excluded
the United States. As the opinion that “APEC is not Asian enough” resonated “on the
Western side of the Pacific,”527 the ASEAN + 3 was seen as a “unique regional platform”
for East Asian countries “to engage and cooperate through dialogue and joint activities.”528
In 2001, the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), consisting of renowned
intellectuals from the APT countries, submitted its report Towards an East Asian
Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress to the APT Summit in Brunei in
2001. The report stated:

The Vision Group envisions East Asia moving from a region of nations to a bona fide
regional community with shared challenges, common aspirations, and a parallel destiny.
The economic field, including trade, investment, and finance, is expected to serve as the
catalyst in the comprehensive community-building process.529

Among the many reasons behind the need for “a united voice to advance the region’s
common interests,” we find the challenges and opportunities

of “growing
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interdependence,” the need to ameliorate “rivalries and competition,” “geographical
proximity,” “common historical experiences and similar cultural norms and values.” Apart
from these liberal, realist, and constructivist logics used to substantiate the basis for an East
Asian Community, The Vision Group also notices the “trend towards regional trading
blocs,” which adds the geoeconomic dimension.530
Subsequently, the East Asian Study Group (EASG), composed of government
officials from the APT countries, submitted its final report to the ASEAN + 3 Summit in
Cambodia in 2002, in which it assessed the recommendations of the EAVG and the
viability of turning the ASEAN + 3 into an East Asian Summit (EAS). The final report of
the EASG stated that “East Asian cooperation is inevitable and necessary,” that “deeper
integration of an East Asian community is beneficial and desirable,” and that the “EAS is
a desirable long-term objective, but it must be part of an evolutionary process that builds
on the substantive comfort levels of the existing ASEAN+3 framework.”531 The EASG
also recommended 26 concrete measures to be implemented in order to push regional
cooperation to the next level.
Even though the political EASG seemed to endorse the recommendations of the
intellectual EAVG, a struggle for leadership and disputes over membership were raging in
the background between China and Japan. China preferred the ASEAN + 3 and the vision
of basing an East Asian Community on that same grouping. At the China-ASEAN Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting in June 2004, the joint statement declared, “[b]oth sides agreed that an
East Asian Community is a long-term objective for East Asian co-operation to be
developed through the existing ASEAN Plus Three Mechanism.”532 Japan, on the other
side, wanted members outside of the ASEAN + 3 to be able to participate in East Asian
Summit, in particular India, Australia, and New Zealand, but also opened the door for the
United States. For this reason, the ASEAN + 3 never developed into the EAS; instead, the
EAS was created in 2005 as a separate forum, which at first expanded into an ASEAN Plus
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Six mechanism, including India, Australia, and New Zealand, and later allowed extraregional countries, like the United States, to join. As stated by Shintaro Hamanaka:

After the inclusion of non-APT countries in the EAS was decided, China started to assert
that the APT Summit, not the EAS, should be the basis of a future East Asian Community.
Japan conversely insisted that the EAS should play an important role with regard to the
establishment of an East Asian Community. 533

However, one can question how successful Japan really was, as not only China but also
ASEAN regards the ASEAN + 3 as the “main vehicle towards the long-term goal of
building an East Asian Community.”534 In relation to this premier grouping, the United
States is an outsider; it is excluded from the grouping that the countries in the region
themselves views as the most important regional platform or secondary institution, with
the notable exception of Japan. What we observe is regional contestation over membership
and leadership status in a regional diplomatic secondary institution, ranging from closed
regional secondary institutions more akin to a regional block encompassing East Asia, or
ASEAN+6 by extension, to open institutions like the EAS, including the United States and
other extra regional states. This struggle in relation to the shape of the regional diplomatic
order cannot be properly understood without the positional status dimension.
As trade between the East Asian countries steadily increased, this struggle also
started to involve contestation in relation to the regional regulation of the market. Bilateral
free trade agreements (FTAs) started to proliferate in the region in the beginning of the
new millennium against the backdrop of competitive pressures from FTA’s in other parts
of the world and protracted WTO negotiations.535 The signing of CAFTA between China
and ASEAN spurred a series of ASEAN + 1 FTA’s, notably with Japan, Korea, India,
Australian and New Zealand. The number of trade agreements in the region grew rapidly
and increased from only three in 2000 to over 50 in 2011. Yet by 2006, the United States
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had only concluded one single bilateral FTA in East Asia – with Singapore. This can be
compared to China, which had concluded ten FTA’s and had six under negotiation, and
Japan, which had concluded eleven and had 5 under negotiation as of February 2010 – a
reflection of the competitive relationship between the two economic hubs of East Asia.536
The crisscrossing trade agreements gave rise to a regional institutional order with a
peculiar “noodle bowl” character of multiple rules of origin (ROO) and other
discriminatory trade rules (see Figure 6). This puts outsiders at a disadvantage and
increases transaction costs for enterprises.537 In fact, “[t]he regional focus of trade has been
accentuated by both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade that selectively limit trade
openness, either amongst countries or in specific commodity categories…making global
trade not-so free after all.”538 Notwithstanding the position of the US market as the most
important end location for goods produced and assembled in East Asia, the United States
faced increasing institutional restrictions in the region. East Asia is not unique in terms of
non-tariff barriers, and the United States itself is one of the most protectionist economies
in the world.539 Nevertheless, the fragmented institutional character of the regional order
in fact marginalizes the United States and put American business at a disadvantage.
The dominant “soft mercantilist” or “neomercantilist” principles that characterize
the development strategies of East Asian nations differ from the neoliberal economic
values advocated by the United States. In fact, the United States “struggle with” everything
from non-tariff barriers, capital controls, and cultural discrimination “from most of its
Asian trading partners.”540 The East Asian approach to regional economic integration and
trade liberalization also favors an incrementalist approach that takes different levels of
development and variegated development paths into consideration, which stand at odds
with the “reciprocity-based negotiations and binding commitments” favored by the
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Washington.541 In other words, the systemic unfavorability of the East Asian economic
order prevented US status maintenance.

Figure 6. The East Asian Noodle Bowl Structure

Source: Richard E. Baldwin, “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian
Regionalism,” Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration (Asian Development
Bank, February 2007), 5.
Note: The figure shows FTAs signed or under negotiation in East Asia as of January 2006.

At the ASEAN + 3 Summit in Laos in November 2004, China proposed the creation of an
East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) composed of the ASEAN + 3 countries, whereas
Japan, at the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ meeting in Bangkok in 2006, proposed the
creation of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) based on the
ASEAN + 6 countries. This competitive dynamic to move beyond the bilateral and
minilateral focus in order to create a region-wide FTA can be contrasted to the US proposal
for a Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), launched at the APEC Summit in Vietnam
541
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in November 2006, which includes all APEC countries. The EAVG had earlier articulated
that “[t]he economic field…is expected to serve as the catalyst in the comprehensive
community-building process,”542 and now both China and Japan launched proposals that
connected the long-term goal of community-building to economic arrangements that
uphold the exclusion of the United States, thus formalizing proposals for a true regional
bloc. In this way, the developments in the region further connects neo-mercantilism to “the
pursuit of ‘regionness,’” which in essence “can be seen as transcending the nation-state
logic in arguing for a segmented world system, consisting of self-sufficient blocs.” 543
However, lingering concerns about China’s military role and the struggle for leadership
and economic influence between China and Japan prevented deeper institutionalization of
the regional cooperation process and proved to be an obstacle for the regional community
building.544 As Chien-peng Chung makes clear,

Indeed, the rise of new economic and financial cooperative mechanisms would be an
important step forward for an Asian regional integration project, but this could not have
been done without China’s enthusiastic embrace of, and desire to set the pace for, the
institutionalization of regional multilateralism. Nonetheless, even if China becomes the
primus inter pares of the East Asian-Western Pacific region, regional order is hitched to a
China-Japan relationship that is, if not friendly, at least workable, for which China would
have to convince everyone that its rise is peaceful, and Japan would have to be more
independent of the USA in its strategic calculations. 545

When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the 2009 elections in Japan and Yukio
Hatoyama became Prime Minister, a political environment conducive for a more benign
China-Japan relationship seemed to be emerging. Hatoyama wanted a more independent
and closer relationship with China, he announced his firm support for the idea of an East
Asian Community based on the principle of fraternity, and viewed East Asia as Japan’s
“basic sphere of being.” He further advocated a common East Asian currency and argued
that only regional integration could solve the historical and cultural animosities of the
region and used the European Union as the analogous example. Hatoyama embodied the
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“growing pan-Asian consciousness”546 that had started to develop in the region. However,
the Obama administration had already taken decisive steps towards preventing this
development and ensuring its inclusion and regional leadership in the new world center.
Even though opinions differ, and it would certainly be too much to say that the Obama
administration singlehandedly orchestrated Hatoyama’s fast removal from office and thus
downplay the domestic Japanese context, foreign policy elites and US officials launched a
massive discursive attack against Hatoyama that indeed played a part in his downfall.547
In relation to the evolving regional order, the United States faced status disavowal
and systemic unfavorability. In this way, America’s sole superpower status was not
matched with a corresponding leadership role in the most dynamic region of the world. At
the height of unipolarity, the Clinton administration could afford to give up on APEC, and
the Bush administration could focus singlehandedly on the War on Terror, as no other
pressing challenges could be perceived. This is further reflected by the direction that
America’s trade strategy of “competitive liberalization” took under the Bush
administration when bilateral FTAs with countries like Jordan and Columbia were
considered strategic, and the East Asian region was de facto neglected and dropped from
Washington’s “strategic radar.” 548 More fundamentally, as Vinod Aggarwal accurately
points out, the US policy of “competitive liberalization,” with its focus on bilateral and
minilateral FTAs, had undermined American leadership. 549 The US proposal for the
FTAAP that emerged as a response to the competitive pressure from the EAFTA and the
CEPEA proposals was all but naïve given the “institutional weakness” of APEC.550 The
United States was, in effect, “not seen as a natural member of East Asian regionalism” and
“viewed as an outsider” in the region;551 it was excluded from the ASEAN + 3, the main
secondary institution of the region; and, institutionally, trade barriers put American
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businesses at a disadvantage while China and Japan launched proposals for regional
economic integration exclusive of the United States.
Although concerns about China’s military intentions and the leadership struggle
between China and Japan effectively prevented the formation of a regional bloc, the 2008
Financial Crisis triggered perceptions of relative decline and generated status anxiety in
the United States, and the contradiction between US sole superpower status and the absence
of regional leadership in the new world center became causally salient. This status anxiety
particularly related to the possibility of being excluded or “locked out” from the evolving
Asia-Pacific region unless the United States acted decisively to change its trajectory.
Simply put, the United States needed to check China’s rise and revise the regional
institutional environment in order to maintain status.
In the following chapter, I will ascertain how US relative decline generated status
anxiety and how it caused the Obama administration to revise the regional order to maintain
US sole superpower status.
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7. Status Anxiety
In this chapter, I will ascertain how the change in the distribution of power and prestige
generated perceptions of relative decline and status anxiety among US officials in the
Obama administration and think-tank experts. They essentially viewed Asia-Pacific as the
new “world center” and China’s rise as the greatest geo-strategic challenge. These
perceptions and anxieties became especially prominent with the 2008 Financial Crisis and
stand in relation to the possibility of being “locked out” from the evolving Asia-Pacific
region. China’s rise and its influence within regional institutions exclusive of the United
States needed to be checked and the regional order needed to be revised in order to secure
membership, leadership status, and favorable rules in the new world center. In this chapter,
I will also demonstrate how the perceptions and anxieties differ in the economic and
security domains of the regional order.

7.1 Status Anxiety in Relation to the Regional Economic Order
The 2008 US National Intelligence Council (NIC) report Global Trends 2025: A
Transformed World plainly states that, “the transfer of global wealth and economic power
now under way – roughly from West to East – is without precedent in modern history.”552
Before launching the subsequent study Global Trends 2030, the NIC commissioned an
academic review of the previous reports. One of the reviewers’ key findings was that past
studies “correctly foresaw the direction” of the ongoing redistribution of power, but
emphasized that “China’s power has consistently increased faster than expected,” pointing
to the fact that the reports “tend toward underestimation of the rates of change.”553 It is clear
that America’s principal office for strategic intelligence gathering perceived a historically
unprecedented structural change.
Core representatives of the Obama administration shared this perception. In
November 10, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in her famous “America’s Pacific
Century” speech at the East-West Center in Honolulu, stated that the Asia-Pacific is “the
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world’s strategic and economic center of gravity”:
So many global trends point to Asia. It is home to nearly half the world’s population,
it boasts several of the largest and fastest-growing economies and some of the world’s
busiest ports and shipping lanes… It is becoming increasingly clear that in the
21st century, the world’s strategic and economic center of gravity will be the Asia
Pacific, from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas.554

Senior Director for Asian affairs in the National Security Council Jeffrey Bader echoed this
perception: “With wealth, power, and influence gradually shifting from Europe toward Asia
in the past several decades, the region has emerged as the world’s center of gravity for
economic, political, and security decisions in the twenty-first century.” 555 Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell reverberated the same
message: “there is a recognition that the lion’s share of the history of the 21st century will
indeed be written in the Asia-Pacific region.”556
President Barack Obama made similar acknowledgments. In his well-known speech
to the Australian parliament, Obama stated that Asia-Pacific is “the world’s fastestgrowing region…home to more than half the global economy,” and he declared, “here,
we see the future.” Given that Asia-Pacific is viewed as the new world center, Obama
stated that the region “will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by
conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress.”557 In the State of Union
address in January 2011, Obama referred to the heightened economic competition
generated by the emergence of China and India, and plainly stated: “Yes, the world has
changed.”558
At the center of this fundamental structural change, China unambiguously stands
out. In an interview with the famous talk-show host Charlie Rose, Obama made a blunt
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statement about China, saying that the country has “achieved such rapid growth” and “have
grown so fast” that it is “almost on steroids.”559 In Jeffrey Bader’s insightful biographical
account of his time in the National Security Council, he acknowledges the extent and
significance of China’s rise. “China’s spectacular growth…and its thorough integration
into the economies of the region through a web of trade and investment had permanently
altered the geopolitical landscape.”560 In addition, the Director of the National Economic
Council Larry Summers affirms that we are observing “Asia’s China-led renaissance.”561
In essence, the Obama administration unequivocally perceived the ongoing fundamental
structural change in the international system. The shift in the world center from the EuropeAtlantic to the Asia-Pacific and the rise of China was clearly acknowledged.
The Obama administration also acknowledged the change in the distribution of
prestige. Jeffrey Bader makes it known that at the height of the 2008 Financial Crisis,
“America’s economic strength, the central reason for its global prestige and influence,
seemed to be dissolving.” 562 Bader also acknowledged that the War on Terror and the
quagmires produced by US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in the most
negative attitudes towards the US “in modern history.”563 Or as Andrew Kohut argued in
the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, it “is not just a rift with our European allies
or hatred of America in the Middle East. It is a global slide, and positive views of the US
have declined in other regions of the world, particularly in Latin America and Asia.”564 In
2008, Kurt Campbell, widely credited for being the key architect behind the US pivot to
Asia, argued that worries about the United States “becoming a peripheral player on key
strategic issues in the Asia-Pacific” were prevalent. Campbell outlined a “daunting array
of challenges” for the next president – the first among those: “reversing the decline in
America’s global standing.”565
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The 2008 Financial Crisis “put the final nail in the perceptual coffin of the postCold War interregnum”566 and it “dramatically intensiﬁed” perceptions of US decline.567
Instead of physical fear, this change triggered status anxiety. The anxiety about the
possibility of downward mobility, leadership disavowal, and exclusion from the AsiaPacific region unless the United States acts to maintain its preeminent position. What
emerged was “a new conventional wisdom that foresees continued decline of the United
States, an end to the unipolar world order that marked the post-Cold War world.”568 In
Barack Obama’s 2009 inaugural address, he summarized the American anxiety of looming
downward mobility:

That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. Our nation is at war against a
far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our economy is badly weakened, a
consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure
to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age. Homes have been lost, jobs
shed, businesses shuttered. Our health care is too costly, our schools fail too many – and
each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries
and threaten our planet. These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics. Less
measurable, but no less profound, is a sapping of confidence across our land; a nagging
fear that America's decline is inevitable, that the next generation must lower its sights. 569

The US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner similarly underlined that the 2008
Financial Crisis was “a moment of maximum challenge for our economy and our
country.”570
Obama made several references and comparisons that point to status anxiety and the
worry that the United States is about to fall to a lower rung. In Obama’s 2010 State of
Union address, Obama strongly accentuated that America’s status was at stake: “I do not
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accept second place for the United States of America.” 571 In the 2011 State of Union
address, Obama put a strong emphasis on trade and referred to the competitive pressures
emanating from various countries in the world, yet the weight of the message was placed
on the challenge coming from China. Obama stated that it is China that now is “home to
the world’s largest private solar research facility, and the world’s fastest computer;” it is
China that now “is building faster trains and newer airports.” Obama lamented that “[o]ur
infrastructure used to be the best, but our lead has slipped,” and “when our own engineers
graded our nation’s infrastructure, they gave us a ‘D.’”572 Obama’s strategic plan for High
Speed Rail is permeated with anxiety about the fact that the US lags behind.573
The anxiety particularly related to the potential effects US decline in power and
prestige would have in Asia. In Hillary Clinton’s “America’s Pacific Century” speech she
did not only refer to the Asia-Pacific as the “world’s strategic and economic center of
gravity,” but also addressed the anxieties wrought by America’s “serious economic
challenges.” She acknowledged the “understandable” calls to “scale back,” but assured that
America must fight the international paralysis suggested by anxiety; it must refrain from
the temptation of isolationism. Clinton made clear that, “Asia stands out as a region where
opportunities abound,” and “what will happen in Asia in the years ahead will have an
enormous impact on our nation’s future.” For that reason, “we cannot afford to sit on the
sidelines and leave it to others to determine our future.”574 In connection to a discussion
about the global recovery, US Senior Official for APEC Kurt Tong highlights the economic
consequences of standing outside the regional integration process: “America risks
becoming disadvantaged economically if we do not participate constructively in the
process of economic integration that is already underway in the region.” 575 Similarly, the
USTR under the first term of the Obama administration, Ron Kirk, highlighted that “the
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number of trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific that exclude the United States has
proliferated, shutting American business and workers out of valuable opportunities.”576
In a 2013 Chatham House article, when outlining the context that faced the Obama
administration as it launched the US pivot, Campbell points out that the economic turmoil
following the 2008 Financial Crisis “raised profound questions about the long-term
viability of the US economic model and the international liberal order the United States
has championed since the Second World War, particularly when juxtaposed with the
perceived success of China’s economy.” The narrative at the time, both at home and in the
Asia-Pacific, “was one of American lack of strategic focus and decline.”577 In an interview
with the Japanese daily newspaper The Asahi Shimbun, Campbell reiterated, “I think it
would be fair to say that in 2009, there were really grave anxieties about an American
decline.”578
Not only did top US officials of the Obama administration perceive the United
States to be in relative decline in terms of both power and prestige, they also viewed it as
a zero-sum game in relation to China and worried about what positional effects it would
produce in Asia-Pacific. Experts from the US foreign policy think-tank complex in
Washington also resonated this anxiety, and raised concerns about the unfavorable regional
order that was developing in East Asia and the negative consequences it would have for
America’s status unless the Obama administration acts to restore its leading position. This
status anxiety encompassed the entire American political spectrum – from left- to rightleaning think tanks.
In a special report by the Council of Foreign Relations, Evan Feigenbaum and
Robert Manning cautioned that America’s sole reliance on the traditional hub-and-spokes
“is unsustainable” and warned that the United States might face future exclusion from the
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regional architecture, which would affect US interests and influence, “unless it acts to
shape multilateral trends in Asia.”579 They argued:

[S]ome multilateral institutions that exclude the United States have become the locus of
economic and financial trends that will increasingly disadvantage US firms and work
against US objectives. Certain preferential trade agreements and financial arrangements,
as well as regionally based regulations and standards, threaten American interests. And
some of the new institutions created without US involvement, notably ASEAN Plus
Three, hold the potential to marginalize the United States in Asia over time. 580

Alexander Foxley, in a report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
resounds this message, and argues that the fact that “ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6
exclude…the United States” represents a “strategic dilemma” since Washington would like
to “prevent an Asia-only bloc from emerging.”581 Likewise, Claude Barfield and Philip
Levy from the American Enterprise Institute paraphrased former Singaporean Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew and stated that the implications of “a narrower, more exclusive
vision of regionalism, limited to Asian nations” are clear: “unless the United States
becomes more engaged in Asia, through reassuming leadership, the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC) will inexorably emerge as the regional hegemon.” 582 Fred Bergsten and
Jeffrey Schott from Peterson Institute for International Economics issued a similar counsel:

Simply put, key Asian countries have prioritized economic integration within East Asia
rather than within the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum. Within the next few years, it is likely that the East Asian
countries will deepen their economic ties and conclude both a regional trade agreement and
a monetary agreement. In addition, Japan has initiated the East Asian Summits, and a new
East Asian architecture is in the process of formulation. These countries are well on the
way toward creating an Asian bloc, a development that could ‘draw a line down the Pacific’
by discriminating against US exporters and investors and by excluding the United States
from important regional economic and security forums.583
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The assessments are straightforward, unambiguous, and clear. They point to the
exclusionary tendencies of the East Asian regional order, which threaten US status and
influence unless the trajectory and the regional order is changed. Hence, in relation to the
regional economic order US perceptions of relative decline and status anxiety were
pervasive as Obama assumed power. And rightly so, for China’s rise, in pure material term,
challenges the structural leadership role of the United States; a regional integration process
exclusive of the United States challenges Washington’s entrepreneurial leadership role;
and as China’s development experience is gaining attraction as an alternative model,
whatever the nature of this model,584 China equally challenges US intellectual leadership
role.
Yet did US status anxiety only pertain to the economic domain of the regional
order? Indeed, the United States still perceives itself to be an unrivalled global military
power, yet military status anxiety were present nonetheless, albeit in a less pervasive way.
This anxiety does not concern an impending challenge to US global military dominance,
but implicates a challenge to US regional superiority perceived to be presently unfolding.
In particular, US anxiety very much connects to China’s capacity to challenge the United
States’ command of the commons. With this said, I will now examine the military status
anxiety of the Obama administration.

7.2 Status Anxiety in Relation to the Regional Security Order
The Obama administration perceived no fundamental change in the military balance of
power; it perceived the United States to be an unrivalled global military power.
Nevertheless, US status anxiety is observed in relation to the regional security order and
particularly revolves around two core aspects: global access and command of the commons
in light of China’s asymmetric A2/AD capabilities, and an impending Chinese hegemonic
challenge.
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In the beginning of his presidency, Barack Obama, somehow reluctantly,
proclaimed that the United States, “whether we like it or not,” continues to be “a dominant
military superpower.”585 In the 2011 State of Union address, Obama stated, “No single wall
separates East and West. No one rival superpower is aligned against us.” 586 In 2015, in
front of the world leaders in the United Nations General Assembly, Obama confidently
declared, “I lead the strongest military that the world has ever known.” 587 Something he
reiterated with even greater buoyancy a year later in his last State of Union address:
Let me tell you something. The United States of America is the most powerful nation on
Earth. Period. Period. It’s not even close. It’s not even close. It’s not even close. We
spend more on our military than the next eight nations combined. Our troops are the
finest fighting force in the history of the world. No nation attacks us directly, or our
allies, because they know that’s the path to ruin. Surveys show our standing around the
world is higher than when I was elected to this office, and when it comes to every important
international issue, people of the world do not look to Beijing or Moscow to lead – they
call us.588

Obama downplayed the challenges coming from antagonistic great powers or rival
superpowers by stating that in the contemporary world the threat does not primarily come
from “evil empires,” but from “failing states.” 589
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Obama
administration, shares this appraisal of US military power. In his assessment of the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review, Dempsey outlined his perception of America’s military
position:

I believe that in 2020, we will still be the most powerful military in the world. More than
1 million men and women under arms – present in more than 130 countries and at sea –
will still possess capabilities in every domain that overmatches potential adversaries.
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Enjoying alliances with a majority of the most powerful states, we will be the only nation
able to globally project massive military power.590

He continued by outlining the unique global managerial responsibilities that come with this
this sole superpower status: “Our forces will also have considerable responsibilities. They
must protect allies, be globally present to deter conflict, protect the global commons, and
keep war far from our shores and our citizens. These obligations are unique to the United
States military.” 591 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter shares the assessment, despite
emphasizing the “historic change” of Asia-Pacific, which he attributes to rising countries
and economic miracles. In the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue Carter stated:

The Defense Department maintains its world-leading capabilities because the United
States has made incomparable investments in it over decades. As a result, it will take
decades or more for anyone to build the kind of military capability the United States
possesses. This strength is not simply about dollar figures. We harness those dollars to
America’s innovative and technological culture to develop revolutionary
technologies. And that military edge is strengthened and honed in unrivaled and hardearned operational experience over the past 15 years. No other military possesses this kind
of skill and agility backed by this much experience.592

This perspective is widely shared among US officials, scholars, and think-tank experts –
US military power is unrivalled in the world, and the balance of military power has not yet
undergone fundamental structural change. Hence, militarily, the world is unipolar still. Yet
even the most vocal academic proponents of the longevity of American military unipolarity
argue that China is the only country with the raw potential to become a true peer.593 In fact,
the Obama administration perceived the security environment to be changing. Albeit not
undergoing fundamental structural change, they perceived an ongoing regional change,
and that change concerns China’s steadfast military expansion and modernization – a
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change that is perceived to have regional consequences, causing status anxiety despite
United States’ preeminent global position. China’s emergence as a regional military power
that challenges American access and command of the commons in the world’s economic
and strategic center of gravity is what make up American status anxiety in relation to the
regional security order. This is particularly perceived to be the case in the Western Pacific,
resulting from the lateral pressure of China’s military expansion and modernization,
coupled with uncertainty about China’s intentions and lingering hegemonic ambitions.
To be clear, already under the Bush administration the regional balance of power
in East Asia called the attention of the United States. Aside from the initial focus on China
as a “peer competitor,” which was scaled down as the Middle East and the War on Terror
started to occupy American decision makers,594 the Bush administration still perceived the
regional balance of power in East Asia to be changing. As laid out in the 2006 QDR,

Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily
with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time off
set traditional US military advantages absent US counter strategies…The pace and scope
of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk. China is likely
to continue making large investments in high-end, asymmetric military
capabilities…These capabilities, the vast distances of the Asian theater, China’s
continental depth, and the challenge of en route and in-theater U.S. basing place a premium
on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas. 595

Yet with United States’ extensive military campaigns in the Middle East, the concern about
the China’s impending challenge was not placed on the top of the American utility calculus,
nor was America’s supreme military position in the Asia-Pacific yet perceived to be
seriously challenged by the rise of China. The challenge from China was at the time rather
a potential, impending challenge cautioned by the Bush administration. However, during
the Obama administration heightened concerns about China’s challenge to the established
regional security order and United States’ preeminent position are observable.
The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy released by the Department of
Defense in 2015, claims that the United States “has played a vital role in undergirding
regional peace, stability and security” for 70 years, yet the policy document simultaneously
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cautions that “this task is becoming more challenging.” 596 The “changing” regional
security environment is partly explained as arising from “rapid economic and military
modernization, combined with growing resource demands,” which “has exacerbated the
potential for conflict over long-standing territorial disputes.”597 These concerns highlight
specific forms of status anxiety.
Apart from maritime and territorial disputes another pressing issue for the United
States is the “unprecedented rise” in unsafe air and maritime maneuvers carried out by the
PLA, which often targets the US and “threatens the US objectives of safeguarding the
freedom of the seas and promoting adherence to international law and standards.”598 The
Chinese military maneuvers in air and maritime spaces testify to the lateral pressure from
China’s military expansion that challenge the dominant status of the United States in the
Western Pacific. They do not threaten the freedom of the seas; rather, they threaten the
United States’ safeguarding of the freedom of the seas. It is an issue about who is going to
do the safeguarding of the commons in the Western Pacific. To be clear, and this is widely
acknowledged, both the United States and China share a fundamental interest in keeping
the seas open and safe. China’s status as the world’s biggest trading nation necessitates an
active safeguarding of the uninhibited flow of goods. What is at stake is the authoritative
interpretation of international law, and whom that is going to provide this authoritative
interpretation. The United States and China diverge on what should be permitted in the
territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), specifically in relation to innocent
passage and prior approval. In fact, many Southeast Asian and South Asian states share
China’s position, but while those countries issue diplomatic protests when the US navy
operates in their waters without consent, China is the only country that “has operationally
challenged US warships on multiple occasions.”599 As long as China continues to expand
and challenge the American presence in the Western Pacific, the United States must engage
in practices of boundary-maintenance [read: Freedom of Navigation Operations
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(FONOPS)] with the proviso that Washington maintains its desire for preeminence in the
Western Pacific.
China has indeed long been involved in setting standards, as evidenced by the
signing of the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) and the ongoing negotiations for a Code of
Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea together with the ASEAN. The United States
reiterates that it supports these initiatives, but the fact is that China wants the setting of
these standards to be a regional issue. On those occasions when China and the United States
do agree, such as in the signing of two Memoranda of Understanding on Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) in November 2014 that now includes new annexes on air-toair safety and crisis communications, and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
(CUES), then it is of practical concern designed to manage so that strategic rivalry does not
spin out of control, yet not about resolving the underlying positional competition for status
and influence.
In relation to China’s increasing presence in the Western Pacific, the most pressing
issue concerns China’s A2/AD capabilities. As Van Jackson notes, “[b]y any meaningful
measure of capability, the United States has long maintained military superiority in Asia,
but the US defense community has begun raising concerns about China’s rapid militarytechnical advances and its asymmetric strategy explicitly designed to nullify the traditional
advantages of the US military.” 600 China’s A2/AD capabilities is the most significant
“strategic challenge” the US military is facing.601 The status anxiety that it generates is
amply present in the core policy documents of the US Department of Defense, and concerns
the future of the US military in the Western Pacific.
In the 2014 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, the US Department of Defense
conceives of the Asia-Pacific region as “a contested A2/AD environment.”602 In the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance, the A2/AD challenge is further highlighted, and China,
together with Iran, are singled out as the main perpetrators behind a strategy that seeks to
restrict “access and freedom to operate” by using asymmetric A2/AD capabilities.603 In the
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2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the same anxiety is reiterated, and China is sometimes
called out by name, and sometimes not. Even so, it is evident who is hiding behind the
notion of “increasingly capable and economically strong potential adversaries” when the
following is highlighted:

Our technological superiority has allowed largely unfettered access to project power where
needed. However, this superiority is being challenged by increasingly capable and
economically strong potential adversaries that are likely developing and fielding counters to
some or all of the key technologies on which the United States has come to rely. 604

This anxiety does not concern an impending challenge to US global primacy, but a
challenge to US regional superiority perceived to be presently unfolding. In particular, the
anxiety very much connects to China’s capacity to challenge United States’ command of
the commons.605 As US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert put it in
front of the Senate Arms Services Committee in April 2014, “I’m very concerned” about
“our ability to project power in an area against an advanced adversary [China] with those
advanced capabilities…We’re slipping behind.” 606 Or as spelled out by former US
ambassador Chas Freeman, with a long experience of working with US-China issues both
inside and outside government,

China is modernizing its military at a peculiar moment of history. The United States
inherited worldwide military superiority from the collapse of its Soviet rival. Without much
discussion, it has embraced the neo-conservative agenda of sustaining this superiority at
all costs. But rising Chinese defense capabilities erode American supremacy. China’s new
anti-carrier weapons endanger U.S. force projection capabilities in the Western Pacific; its
anti-satellite programs imperil U.S. global surveillance and communication capabilities; its
growing operations in cyberspace menace U.S. government operations and the economy
of the American homeland alike. These are serious challenges not just to American
hegemony but to core U.S. interests. 607
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The concern about Chinese military expansion and modernization, especially in terms of
sophisticated A2/AD technology capable of restring US access to, and dominance of, the
commons within the First Island chain, is connected to another issue that evoke great
anxieties, namely China’s potential regional hegemonic ambitions. This issue evokes great
concerns among conservative US politicians and experts on the right flank of the thinkthank strategic complex as well as a few representatives of the Obama administration, who
have made a few, occasional comments about China’s hegemonic intentions.
Perhaps former Republican Senator, Tea Party activist, and President of the think
tank The Heritage Foundation, James Warren DeMint, is the best example of the
conservative position. DeMint argues that “it’s fair to say that China is seeking a form of
dominance, at least, or hegemony in the Western Pacific and that this impulse is expressing
itself through a series of actions in the East and South China Seas.” He adds that “the
balance of power in the region is shifting toward China…it’s shifting because of their
comprehensive, concerted, and purposeful effort in building up their military…They are
becoming, if they’re not already, a peer competitor of the U.S. in the Western Pacific.”608
Even though voices like these are not officially sanctioned pronouncements that emanated
from the US government, similar concerns have been uttered by core representatives of the
Obama administration despite the official position not to single out China as a “peer
competitor” with hegemonic ambitions.
When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made his last trip to Asia, he stated that
he believes China’s long-term goal is to push the United States out of the first island chain
to the second island chain, and even farther beyond. 609 The head of the US Pacific
Command Admiral Harry Harris represents another such a voice. Harris stated that China
is “clearly militarizing the South China Sea” and “changing…the operational landscape.”
In order to prove his point, he added, “You’d have to believe in a flat Earth to think
otherwise.” Apart from this illustrative metaphor, Harris was more concrete when he voiced
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his concerns about China’s intentions: “I believe China seeks hegemony in East Asia.”610
These perceptions indicate anxieties about the future US military status in the Western
Pacific.
However, aside from these outlier statements about China’s hegemonic intentions,
views that were more moderate characterized the articulations of the core representatives
of the Obama administration who instead echoed concerns about the ambiguity of China’s
military intentions and development trajectory. Although Obama, Kerry, Donilon, Bader,
Panetta, and other key officials in the Obama administration repeatedly insisted that they
adopted a “welcoming approach” to China – that the United States “welcomes the rise of a
prosperous, peaceful and stable China” 611 – greater transparency concerning China’s
intentions and its military modernization is nonetheless an enduring caveat embedded into
this welcoming approach. For instance, as stated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance,
signed by both Barack Obama and Leon Panetta:
Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect
the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong
stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral
relationship. However, the growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by
greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region.612

This specifically concerns the Western Pacific, where strategic mistrust is increasing as
China expands its presence and is able to project power in the South and East China Seas
and the Taiwan Strait. Tom Donilon urges the United States and China to set up “open and
reliable channels to address perceptions and tensions about our respective activities in
the short-term and about our long-term presence and posture in the Western Pacific.” 613
The short-term presence largely concerns conflict control, the avoidance of military
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collusions through increased communication to prevent disastrous unintended
consequences arising from unplanned military encounters; the long-term presence,
however, concerns China’s potential hegemonic intentions, and they cannot be solved by
establishing new communication channels. Hence, as long as China’s military presence
in its immediate neighborhood is increasing these anxieties will not be relaxed, they will
rather continue to grow. With this expansion comes a growing practical capability to
exercise the regional rights and responsibilities associated with true great power status,
and it enables China’s longstanding demand for “discourse power” or a “right to speak”
to be articulated with greater muscle in relation to the regional security order. Since China
is rising in relative terms, the advent of a new regional balance of power can only mean
retrenchment for US forces in the Western Pacific, unless Washington struggles to
maintain its dominant status and revises its design of the regional security order.
Ultimately, sequestration or the automatically triggered all-round budget cuts put
in place by the 2011 Budget Control Act adds the last component of US status anxiety and
demonstrates the concrete material effects US relative decline has on defense spending. In
the 2014 QDR, Martin Dempsey argues that the reduced defense budget affects United
States’ ability to meet its unique military obligations.614 Reduced defense spending “would
undermine a core competitive advantage for the United States, decreasing our ability to
engage globally, project power, deter conflict, and decisively win against potential
adversaries.” 615 Hence, faced with these fiscal constraints, a rebalance of the military
budget is necessary. As Dempsey puts it:

The core theme for the FY 2014 QDR from my point of view is one of rebalance. Because
of geo-political change, frequent evolution in the way wars are fought, improving
capabilities of our potential adversaries, and reduced resources as a result of the national
imperative of deficit reduction, we will need to rebalance in many areas. 616

Apart from making defense spending more effective and lean, the United States needs to
prioritize in times of fiscal strain. Tellingly, Dempsey argues that the United States is safe,
that the overseas basing is secure, and that the United States still possess unique power
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projection capabilities, yet he points to East Asia as the place where America’s position
will be challenged.617 Thus, a military strategy that shifts its focus to East Asia where the
greatest challenge is located is necessary. As spelled out in the 2012 Strategic Defense
Guidance, “while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will
of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”618 One can question how long US
military dominance can be sustained when the very viability of a military insurance policy
is challenged by budgetary constraints that reduce the coverage of the insurance. It is in
times like these when the relatively declining sole superpower must prioritize and make
tough decisions, and the key decision was to rebalance to the region where the greatest
challenger is arising – that is, the Asia-Pacific.
In this way, US status anxiety in relation to the regional security order particularly
relates to global access and command of the commons in light of China’s asymmetric
A2/AD capabilities, coupled with an impending hegemonic challenge from China that
threatens the United States’ dominant position in the Western Pacific, and so in times of
sequestration. US status anxiety revealed the future possibility and the necessity to act; it
revealed the possibility of downward mobility and the challenge to US dominant status and
leadership, and it revealed the necessity to act in order to prevent the materialization of this
very possibility. The following chapter will outline how US status anxiety determined the
grand strategic priority of the Obama administration.

7.3 Status Anxiety Reveals the Possibility and the Necessity to Act
The Obama administration’s concern about China and the Asia-Pacific was not about fear
and physical insecurity. As Martin Dempsey makes clear, the overseas basing is secure and
“the homeland is safe,”619 and as spelled out in the RAND report Choices for America in
a Turbulent World: Strategic Rethink, the United States faces no existential threat. 620
Instead, perceptions of relative decline generated status anxiety, anxieties about the future
of US status, leadership, and influence in the Asia-Pacific. Yet status anxiety does not
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paralyze, but becomes a “ministering spirit” that reveals the choice and leads the United
States to act. It reveals the necessity of a status-maintenance strategy.
In the midst of the financial crisis, Charles Krauthammer published a widely
acclaimed article where he outlined the state of the US national sentiment in this historic
moment. Once more, Krauthammer argued, are “[t]he weathervanes of conventional
wisdom…engaged in another round of angst about America in decline. New theories, old
slogans: Imperial overstretch. The Asian awakening. The post-American world. Inexorable
forces beyond our control bringing the inevitable humbling of the world hegemon.” He
continued by arguing, “just as the rise of China is a straight-line projection of current
economic trends, American decline is a straight-line projection of the fearful, pessimistic
mood of a country war-weary and in the grip of a severe recession.” 621 Although
Krauthammer launched a polemic against the resurrection of the conventional wisdom of
the declinists, specifically by claiming that “decline is a choice,” he nonetheless captures a
mood that was imperative for the reassessment of US grand strategic priorities. Yet properly
understood, it is anxiety that reveals the choice.622
US foreign policy elites had long been aware of Asia’s growing strength. In 2004,
James Hoge Jr. argued that,
The transfer of power from West to East is gathering pace and soon will dramatically
change the context for dealing with international challenges – as well as the challenges
themselves. Many in the West are already aware of Asia’s growing strength. This
awareness, however, has not yet been translated into preparedness.623

The reason this awareness had not developed into preparedness is simply that the change in
the distribution of power and prestige was not profound enough; that the Bush
administration was occupied with interventions in the Middle East and the global War on
Terror only served to reinforce the inattentiveness. Yet with the Obama administration, the
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time had come to “redeem US foreign policy” and restore Washington’s leadership.624 The
American status anxiety that was triggered by the efficient cause of the 2008 Financial
Crisis finally revealed the ramifications of the material obstacle course and the declining
reputational capital facing the United States in the Asia-Pacific. The 2008 Financial Crisis
was a moment that “tested” the United States and forced it to “answer history’s call,” as
Obama put it. 625 It awoke Washington’s strategic choice – the choice of whether
Washington should “abdicate or retain its dominance;” 626 whether Washington should
retrench or “restore confidence in America’s economic leadership around the world.”627 As
stated by Eric Edelman, “the possibility of avoiding multipolarity or non-polarity clearly
exists. It requires resolve to maintain the United States’ role as the ‘indispensable nation’
and a strategy for doing so.” 628 Burdened by possibility, the possibility of downward
mobility and the challenge to an Americancentric liberal world order, status anxiety
revealed the necessity to pivot to Asia.
In 2005, renowned scholar official Joseph Nye, who has an extensive curriculum
vitae covering academia, think-tanks, NGOs, and government, argued, “it is clear that the
rise of China’s soft power – at America’s expense – is an issue that needs to be urgently
addressed…It is time for the US to pay more attention to the balance of soft power in
Asia.” 629 In 2008, Kurt Campbell made clear that “China’s ‘charm offensive’ in the
region…should serve as a guide to American decision makers that if we don’t reenergize
our diplomatic efforts in the region, we will lose out.”630 The implications of this zero-sum
logic is spelled out: “Power will continue to shift in Asia, but a shift in the balance of
influence could challenge the stability of the liberal and democratic system that took root
under U.S. protection and engagement in the aftermath of World War II.”631 In other words,
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in Asia, the American-led world order is at stake. In fact, emerging multipolarity and
relative decline gives rise to strong structural pressures – the new world center, the region
of the most powerful rising challenger, becomes the target of the sole superpower bent on
maintaining dominance.
The United States needed to act, act to maintain its dominant status by securing
leadership in the Asia-Pacific. In his celebrated speech to the Australian parliament,
Obama declared what we can term America’s “three leaderships”: security leadership,
economic leadership, and moral leadership. 632 In his remarks at the Swearing-in
Ceremony as Secretary of State, John Kerry affirmed that, now “is not a time for America
to retreat,” now “is a time for us to continue to lead.”633 Similarly, and despite the fact that
Jeffrey Bader argues that Obama and his foreign policy team dealt with Asia in a
“resolutely pragmatic” and “nonideological” manner (without the split between
neoconservatives and traditional realists that haunted the Bush administration), Bader
nonetheless described his Asia advisory team as consisting of individuals who “all…were
by conviction internationalists who believed in American global leadership.”634 Likewise,
in an interview in The Asahi Shimbun, Kurt Campbell lays out the unambiguous purpose
of the US pivot: “to sustain American leadership in Asia.” The significant and explicitly
spelled out caveat is that China should accept this leadership.635
The higher-order end of status maintenance thus centers the rationaldecisionmaking process on finding the best practical means for this desired end. For
America to lead in a global order, it must revise the regional order. The logic-of-position
(power) and the logic-of-interpretation (prestige) of the regional order and the status
anxiety that the perceptions of relative decline generated clearly informed the
decisionmaking process of the Obama administration.
Tom Donilon discloses that a grand strategic reassessment took place among US
officials in the Obama administration directly after Barack Obama was elected, and even
before he was inaugurated:
Barack Obama, “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament”
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[F]rom the outset – even before the President took office – he directed those of us
on his national security team to engage in a strategic assessment, a truly global
examination of our presence and priorities. We asked what the US footprint and
face to the world was and what it ought to be. We set out to identify the key national
security interests that we needed to pursue. We looked around the world and asked:
where are we over-weighted? Where are we underweighted? 636

This led to “the President’s judgment that we were over-weighted in some areas and
regions, including our military actions in the Middle East. At the same time, we were
underweighted in other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, we believed this was
our key geographic imbalance.” 637 Kurt Campbell makes a similar description:

From the beginning of the administration, there were clear indicators that we did, in fact,
want to step up our game in the Asia-Pacific region. In my first conversations with
Secretary Clinton and, in fact, in the White House, that was the going-in proposition, that
we needed to do more.638

Jeffrey Bader reveals that, “the major geostrategic challenge” that confronted the Obama
administration “was how to react to the dramatic rise of China.”639 It was the shift in the
“world’s center of gravity” to the Asia-Pacific and “China’s rise” that “led the Obama
foreign policy team to several fundamental strategic judgements about the Asia-Pacific
region, the actors in it, and the American interests there.”640 In his speech to the Australian
parliament, Obama argued that we are living in “times of great change and uncertainty”641
– times of fundamental structural change and uncertainty about the future rank of the
United States. Hence, as Obama made clear, it was “of necessity” that the United States
“rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific.”642
With the Obama administration’s aim of maintaining US sole superpower status,
global leadership, and an Americancentric liberal world order, whatever China does, it will
be a competitor that must be stopped. With the change in the balance of power and the
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balance of prestige, and the status anxiety this generated, by necessity, the United States
needed to act to preserve its dominant position in the world’s strategic and economic center
of gravity. In order to do so, the United States needed to revise the regional order and make
it more amenable for the realization of this goal – revise to maintain.
I have now ascertained the two causal factors (change in the balance of power and
change in the balance of prestige) and demonstrated how they induced perceptions of
relative decline and status anxiety, which led the Obama administration to reorient its grand
strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. I will now analyze the Obama administration’s
revisionist projects for the regional order – the transformational revisionist project of the
TPP and the reformist revisionist project of America’s Principled Security Network.
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8. The US Pivot to Asia: The Obama Administration’s Grand
Strategic Reorientation to Maintain US Sole Superpower
Status, American Leadership, and a Liberal World Order
In a series of high-profile diplomatic performances, the Obama administration declared
that it would end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and reorient America’s grand
strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. The strategy was explicitly intended to check China’s
rise and to strengthen “America’s presence and influence in Asia.”643 As Barack Obama
assumed power, the new administration took immediate steps to pivot to Asia.
According to Jeffrey Bader,

[Tom] Donilon and Denis McDonough, chief of staff of the National Security Council
(NSC), called for early steps to demonstrate this new approach. Although the State
Department’s assistant secretary of state designate for East Asian and Pacific affairs,
Kurt Campbell, was not confirmed by the senate until June [2009], he strongly
supported an early trip to Asia by Secretary Hillary Clinton to demonstrate Asia’s
centrality to US interests.644

Clinton’s trip to Asia in February 2009 hit all symbolic records. It was the first time an
American Secretary of State selected Asia, not Europe, as the first official overseas
destination since Dean Rusk’s visit in 1961, and the first time a Secretary of State
visited the ASEAN Secretariat. On top of that, Clinton announced that the US would
assign an ambassador to ASEAN based in Jakarta. In her second trip to the continent
just a few months later Clinton firmly declared that “United States is back”645 and went
on to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which paved the way
for membership in the East Asian Summit. The stage was set for Obama to present
himself as “America’s first Pacific President” and declare the United States’ identity as
an “Asia-Pacific nation” in his visit to Japan in November 2009.646
Two years later, in October 2011, Clinton published her famous “America’s
Pacific Century” article in Foreign Policy where she articulated Washington’s regional
vision and declared that the 21st century will be “America’s Pacific Century,” thus
appropriating the meaning of the “Pacific Century” or the “Asian Century” – originally
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a slogan denoting Asia’s economic renaissance. 647 A month later, she reiterated the
same message in her remarks at the East-West Center in Hawaii and revealed the
intentions behind the carefully orchestrated diplomatic moves of the Obama
administration: “This region is known as the Asia-Pacific, but sometimes the second
word gets less attention than the first. And the Obama Administration has taken many
steps to right that balance.” 648 There should therefore “be no doubt,” as Obama
declared, “In the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all
in.”649
The scope of the region, and America’s place in the region, had long been
contested (as demonstrated in chapter six). The representational force of the diplomatic
performances of the Obama administration was now clearly directed towards
broadening the insider-outsider logic of the region and demarcating a space for its
liberal internationalist project. The Obama administration was actively engaged in
“locking down” the meaning of the region and relegitimizing America’s place in it. At
the core of the revisionist project, we find the necessity to reinvent the geographical
scope of the region from East Asia to the Asia-Pacific (economically) and the IndoPacific (militarily), and ensure that the secondary institutions of the regional order not
only include the United States, but that the United States will occupy the leadership
position. Through personal anecdotes and experiences that turn the Asian-Pacific space
into places with emotional attachments linked to service and sacrifice, American
officials were reminding the regional audience that the United States is and has always
been a “Pacific Nation” and a “Pacific Power,” essential for upholding peace and
prosperity.650 In the words of Tom Donilon: “We are a resident Pacific power, resilient
and indispensable.”651
In Barack Obama’s speech to the Australian parliament, a two-year long buildup of consistent “forward-deployed” diplomacy reached its crescendo. Obama elevated
the Asia-Pacific to the strategic center stage, determining the fate of humankind. It is
in Asia-Pacific it will be determined if the “century ahead will be marked by conflict
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or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress;” it is here that the United States
must restore unambiguity and put history on a progressive American liberal trajectory:
The currents of history may ebb and flow, but over time they move – decidedly,
decisively – in a single direction. History is on the side of the free – free societies, free
governments, free economies, free people. And the future belongs to those who stand
firm for those ideals, in this region and around the world….This is the future we seek
in the Asia-Pacific – security, prosperity and dignity for all. That’s what we stand
for. That’s who we are. That’s the future we will pursue, in partnership with allies and
friends, and with every element of American power.652

The Obama administration decisively turned the Asia-Pacific into a site of contestation,
part of a struggle between two alternative futures and regional orders. It dismantled the
weight of the material forces of history and asserted that the future will follow an
idealist trajectory. In other words, it countered the attraction of China’s economic rise
and made it clear that East Asia’s economic resilience rests on feeble foundations unless
the countries in the region adopt a broader Asia-Pacific outlook and stand on a firm
liberal foundation. In the same vein as the Bush administration, the democratic
leadership of Barack Obama believed that the United States is on “the right side of
history.”653 That the United States was in the middle of an economic crisis did not alter
the resolve. Although Obama acknowledged that “our nation is at a moment of
transition” and that “we face an inflection point,” he stressed that “in a changing world
that demands our leadership, the United States of America will remain the greatest force
for freedom and security that the world has ever known.”654
The action that the Obama administration was forced to undertake in this
formative moment revolved around the two core components of the US pivot to Asia –
the military and the economy components – that will guarantee peace and prosperity.
The military component revolves around traditional geopolitics, and arguably ensures
peace and stability; the economic component revolves around geoeconomics, and
arguably ensures prosperity and progress. These two dimensions were in turn part of an
American commitment to advancing its values in the region, 655 which exemplified a
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successful “bipartisan consensus” of the US Asia policy that the foreign policy team
and the Asia team of the National Security Council “tried hard to build” by basing it on
common “American principles.”656 It represents a view of progress and modernization
“based in the necessity of American world leadership.”657 To ensure global leadership,
the United States needed to revise the regional order of the new world center. This
status-driven logic serves as the core impetus behind the Obama administration’s pivot
to Asia and its associated revisionist projects intended to make both the regional
economic order and the regional security order more amenable to the maintenance of
America’s sole superpower status.
I will now demonstrate the transformational revisionist characteristics of the
TPP and then turn to the reformist revisionist project of America’s Principled Security
Network. Both projects were pushed by the Obama administration to maintain US sole
superpower status and global leadership.

8.1 The Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Transformational Revisionist
Project
The TPP was a transformational revisionist project since it aimed at changing the two
core dimensions of the regional economic order – the regional status order and the
regional institutional order. In this way, the TPP represents change of secondary
institutions since it was designed to replace the existing regional institutions that
regulated the market. With the TPP, the Obama administration intended to maintain
global leadership by setting the basis for regional leadership and implement new rules
for the regional economic order, which thus entails both positional and institutional
change of the regional status quo – revise to maintain. Yet the TPP also involves
contestation in the primary institution of the market since it also involved a struggle
to define the very limits and intrusiveness of trade liberalization. By extension, this
also has consequences for the primary institution of sovereignty since it involves the
question if the market, through international legislation, should be permitted to
overpower the sovereign authority of the state.
Under the Obama administration, the United States engaged in a productive
revisionist process to change the “noodle bowl” structure of the regional trade
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landscape and combat the threat of exclusion from future regional trade agreements,
as evidenced by the EAFTA and the CEPEA proposals. The Obama administration
was declaring and relegitimizing its leadership status and the need for an Asia-Pacific
wide regional trade agreement simultaneously as it was delegitimizing East Asian
trade practices and excluding China from its revisionist project for the regional
economic order. Even if the Obama administration was open to include China in the
future, it needed to set the rules of the game first so that if China eventually enters it
entails accepting a subordinate position and a ready-made rule set that would shape
China’s behavior.
The Obama administration interpreted the regional status quo according to a
certain logic of inappropriateness; the norms of the ASEAN way or the values of neomercantilism should not guide the pace and mold the normative structure of regional
economic integration, nor should East Asia or the broader Asia-Pacific define the scope
of regional economic cooperation. The regional economic status quo is not only seen
as highly inappropriate from a rhetorical, ethical, and liberal capitalist perspective,
according to which the slow-moving, incremental transformation of regional economies
are seen as signs of illiberal illwillingness and inefficient ways of conducting economic
life, but also, and even more so, from a US leadership perspective, according to which
the exclusionary scope poses a serious threat to the regional, and by extension global,
leadership of the United States. The optimal choice to maximize status and influence
was positional appropriation through exclusionary social closure – ensuring leadership
status and maximizing influence through the creation of a new exclusionary trade
grouping. In this way, the United States would coopt Japan and gain greater ability than
China to influence the rules of the regional economic game.
Even though anxieties about US leadership and impending exclusion were
present during the Bush administration among “many American policymakers,
businessmen, and commentators,”658 the USTR Robert Zoellick argued that the United
States “is not worried about exclusion.”659 However, the 2008 Financial Crisis forced a
rapid perceptual change. In fact, the financial crisis came to dominate the last days of
the Bush administration. The crisis “was not merely a challenge localized to the US
economy or the welfare of US workers and shareholders. It was intrinsically global and
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linked to US prestige and authority abroad.”660 In September 2008, as perceptions of
relative decline were raging in the midst of the crisis, then USTR Susan Schwab
referred directly to the unfolding economic turmoil when she announced the launching
of what was then called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Agreement between the
United States and the P4 countries (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei).
She pointed out that the “uncertain times we are experiencing” offer “an opportunity”
to “strengthen the United States.”661 The decision, according to Schwab herself, was
largely motivated by the anxiety of being “locked out” from the region by multilateral
processes exclusive of the United States.662
The subsequent launching of the TPP negotiations in 2010 by the Obama
administration was the intentional grand strategic move to stand up for America’s goal
of maintaining global preeminence and economic leadership in the world’s most
significant region, so at a time when the balance of power and the balance of prestige
were working against the United States. The American position in the East Asian
economic order had been undercut for some time, yet the tension only became salient
with the critical juncture of the financial crisis when the change in the balance of power
and the balance of prestige and the relocation of the world center to East Asia became
fully perceptible. Only then did the contradiction between America’s sole superpower
status and the absence of economic leadership in the world’s most significant strategic
space become perceptible. The economic path the region had embarked on was not
favorable; regional path dependency would lead to a dead end for US preeminence
unless the course was changed. Therefore, the institutional barriers of the regional
economic order had to be dismantled. As Ron Kirk, the first USTR of the Obama
administration, highlighted in front of the audience at the Washington International
Trade Association, “we are not just here to talk about the status quo,” a status quo “that
exclude the United States,” rather, they were gathered to talk about the new, and indeed
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revisionist, “model for the future” – the TPP. 663 Through the TPP, the Obama
administration aimed at creating the scope for an Asia-Pacific regional trade agreement
that would ensure US leadership and change the outdated economic rules of the game.
Hillary Clinton stressed that “one of the most important tasks of American
statecraft over the next decades will be to lock in a substantially increased investment
– diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in this region.” 664 Jeffrey Bader
bluntly underscored that the intention behind joining the East Asian Summit (EAS) was
to “[beat] back proposals for regional integration that would have excluded the United
States” and to set “the basis for US leadership in the new emerging regional architecture
of the Asia-Pacific region.”665 Likewise, Kurt Campbell argued that, “in opting out of
forums like the EAS, America perpetuates its own marginalization and gets partners
comfortable working without Washington. If not properly balanced, this could portend
serious challenges for future American influence in the region.”666 However, the TPP
is of far greater importance in the struggle for leadership as there is nothing that
guarantees that the EAS does not become watered-down regional forum that loses its
relevance subsequent to US efforts to control its trajectory. The crux of the matter is
that political boundaries lose significance once economic barriers are dismantled.
Without permeation of economic forces, the EAS becomes an empty castle with little
worth, which is why the pivot will be “on the rocks” if the TPP fails667 – it would leave,
as Larry Summers plainly states, “the grand strategy of rebalancing US foreign policy
toward Asia with no meaningful nonmilitary component.”668 Hence, the rebalancing
strategy to Asia “cannot be based on political and military initiatives alone,” it must “be
backed by rejuvenated American leadership in trade and investment.”669

Ron Kirk, “Remarks by Ambassador Ron Kirk at the Washington International Trade Association”
Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” emphasis added.
665
Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 144.
666
Kurt Campbell, Nirav Patel, and Vikram Singh, “The Power of Balance: America in iAsia,” 18.
667
Richard McGregor and Geoff Dyer, “Trade Backlash Leaves US “pivot” to Asia on the Rocks,”
Financial Times, January 31, 2014.
668
Larry Summers, “Rescuing the Free-Trade Deals”
669
Mireya Solís and Justin Vaïsse, “Free Trade Game Changer,” Memorandum to the President, January
17, 2013, accessed February 9, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/free-tradegame-changer.
185
663
664

8.1.1 Transformation of the Regional Economic Order: Necessary to
Maintain Global Leadership and an Americancentric Liberal World Order
Leadership status and political influence, in terms of the power to steer “the direction
of Asia-Pacific regionalism,”670 was the dominant motivation behind the TPP. In the
USTR website about the TPP, the reader is informed that if the TPP is not passed and
the rules not changed, the status quo will be “undermining US leadership in Asia,”
which is a prerequisite for “global leadership.” And so, “the strategic stakes extend
beyond the Asia-Pacific,” since “[f]undamentally, TPP presents a choice between two
futures.” 671 Along these lines, the famous statement by former Prime Minister of
Singapore Lee Kuan Yew exactly captures the logic of the TPP:

The 21st century will be a contest for supremacy in the Pacific, because that is where
the growth will be. That is where the bulk of the economic strength of the globe will
come from. If the U.S. does not hold its ground in the Pacific, it cannot be a world
leader. America’s core interest requires that it remains the superior power in the
Pacific. To give up this position would diminish America’s role throughout the world.
Obama unequivocally shares the same perception: “The world has changed,” and “[t]he
rules are changing with it.” Obama points to efforts by China and other regional
groupings that exclude the United States as the main challenge to American global
leadership, before he declares, “Instead, America should write the rules. America
should call the shots. Other countries should play by the rules that America and our
partners set, and not the other way around.” However, “none of this will happen if the
TPP does not become a reality.”672 Obama’s message was resonated by John Kerry in
a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in September 2016. “If we reject TPP,” Kerry
argued, “we take a giant step…away from our leadership in the Asia Pacific,” and he
continued by paraphrasing a message underwritten by several US generals, admirals,
and secretaries of defense, saying, “America’s prestige, influence, and leadership are
on the line.”673 This puts the discrepancy between the goal of status maintenance and
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the exclusionary regional status quo, in times of relative decline, at the very fore of
strategic rivalry. Without the TPP, the regional order as it stands will continue to
disavow the United States regional leadership and its systemic unfavorability will
endure – all to the detriment of US sole superpower status, global leadership, and an
Americancentric liberal world order.
In light of sluggish WTO negotiations and the impasse of the Doha
Development Round, the TPP was seen as the only game in town that could sustain
American global leadership. By attaining regional economic leadership in the new
world center the United States would ensure global economic leadership and revitalize
the Americancentric liberal world order by expanding a new, revisionist model of farreaching regulation of economic practices. The US would then bind the East Asian
states to a new set of rules that would maintain America’s position atop global and panregional value chains, sustain US “network centrality,” and “block mercantilist
temptations for a ‘closed regionalism.’” 674 Consequently, as the United States “lock
in” the region to an American-led liberal order and appropriate the positional good of
regional leadership, China is simultaneously “locked out.” Yet as much as the TPP was
about keeping China out and preventing it from taking part in writing the rules, it was
about keeping Japan in. For without Japan’s participation in the TPP, as Kurt Campbell
plainly stated, the US-Japan relationship “is going to wither,”675 and the fight for the
liberal cause would be seriously weakened. In this way, the TPP “solidifies
relationships with our allies and firmly establishes the United States as a leader in the
Pacific.”676
The relaunching of trade negotiations under the TPP is then not merely a move
on the chessboard; its intention is to transform the scope, the regional status order, and
the rules of the game so as to change the very premise of how the game is played and
who that is allowed to participate in the game. The institutional reality of the noodle
bowl structure should then be dismantled in favor of a regional trade agreement that
spans both sides of the Pacific, and the institutional visions of the EAFTA and CEPEA
proposals should be firmly contested. With Japan on board the TPP, a very significant
step was taken towards this direction, a step that was rightly labelled a “game
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changer”677 given that it is the most advanced economy in the region and effectively
serves as America’s Trojan horse in the fight against an exclusive East Asian bloc.678
Simply put, the Obama administration did not want a world of regions with coexisting,
yet variegated forms of capitalist arrangements, but a world order where the TPP (and
TTIP) should set the new liberal global standard of civilization.
This new standard of civilization would counter state capitalism and update
America’s “Open Door” policy679 by truly kicking in the door and target behind-theborder regulatory barriers. Despite East Asia’s impressive economic development,
“higher standards” and new rules for the “twenty-first century” are necessary to
generate “not just more growth, but better growth.”680 The East Asian neo-mercantilist
state of economic affairs is outdated and necessitates a new standard; a standard “where
every nation plays by the rules; where workers’ rights are respected, and our businesses
can compete on a level playing field; where the intellectual property and new
technologies that fuel innovation are protected; and where currencies are market driven
so no nation has an unfair advantage.”681 Barack Obama’s message is clear: “[Y]ou
have to meet higher standards. If you don’t, you’re out.”682 It is understood that China
is the principle target of such discourse, as it connects to rhetorical commonplaces and
reiterated allegations of intellectual property theft, currency manipulations, and unfair
competition from state-sponsored capitalism. It delegitimizes China’s leadership
ambitions and tarnishes its prestige.
The temporal classification scheme embedded in the TPP – where “higher,”
“twenty-first century” rules and standards are pitted against outdated “lower,”
“twentieth-century” modes of economic regulation – is “not innocent, but
hierarchical.”683 It distances countries that do not “buy into” the new arrangement and
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situates them at inferior evolutionary economic stages. This form of exclusionary social
attribution is an example of “spatiotemporal distancing,” 684 or how geostrategic
discourses are infused with exclusionary notions of space and time. Although though
this form of distancing is not as radical or racist as the “boundaries of humanity” and
“degrees of humanity” schemes of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, 685 the
notions of a “high standard,” “twenty-first century” trade agreement build on August
Compte’s conception of knowledge as progressing through historical stages, thus
excluding those that are temporally backward because they adherence to “low quality,”
“twentieth century” trade rules. This social attribution delegitimizes East Asian trade
practices, adds another layer to the struggle for prestige, and builds America’s
reputational capital by portraying the United States as the most advanced, sophisticated,
and innovative trading nation in the world. The TPP thus represents “an enticement
strategy,”686 as it is expected that “America’s best resource” – its market –687 holds such
great attraction that it will lure countries to bind themselves to a pervasive Americanled liberal economic order.
The transformational revisionist project of the TPP was negotiated as a single
undertaking, covered twenty non-tariff trade issues, and represented a much more
intrusive institutional framework than the current WTO rules. These “WTO-plus” trade
rules “cover all aspects of commercial relations” between member countries.688 Even
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though the legal text includes features that preserve “the right of governments to
regulate in the public interest” and “the use of transitional measures,”689 the TPP is
meant to “tolerate no exclusions” and aims at “regulatory coherence” across the AsiaPacific. It is designed “to deliver full liberalization” by, for instance, “systematically
targeting non-tariff barriers,” “discriminatory state capitalism” and provisions that
“curb the spread of indigenous innovation requirements” used in government
procurement policy in China and other states in the region. 690 The Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is meant to provide protection for investors from actions by
foreign governments such as right to transfer capital, freedom from discrimination,
protection against uncompensated expropriation of property, and protection against
denial of justice. However, in view of UN’s independent expert on the promotion of a
democratic and equitable international order Alfred de Zayas, the ISDS system is
“fundamentally imbalanced” and tilted against states “since investors can sue
governments whereas governments cannot sue investors before these ad hoc
tribunals.” 691 Despite consent from participating nations, this in effect represents a
contestation in the primary institution of sovereignty where neoliberal principles
override the sovereign authority of the state.
It could further be argued that the TPP consists of “fair weather principles” that
work well for advanced economies ready to face extensive competition after having
developed through mercantilist means, but effectively “kicks away the ladder” for less
developed economies that started their development trajectory at a later stage.692 The
revisionist challenge from the TPP spurred ASEAN to launch the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in order to take the next step on the
endogenous pathway towards regional economic integration already staked out within
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the region. The RCEP only covers six non-tariff WTO-plus issues in comparison to the
TPP’s twenty. In this way, the RCEP is more or less WTO consistent and does not stray
much from global trade rules. The principles of the “ASEAN way” also guide the
regional integration process and take different levels of development among its
members into consideration, in line with the regional status quo. For instance, it
includes India that starts out with very low commitments, while Japan makes
comprehensive undertakings, yet with special exemptions. Thus, while the TPP is a
“rule-making, cutting-edge mechanism” that is “deep but narrow” (due to the
dominance of the US and Japan), the RCEP is more of a “market expansion
mechanism” that is “shallow but wide” (owing to the fact that China, India, and
Indonesia are all participating), which does “not make the 21st century model
feasible.”693
In sum, the TPP was designed to change the scope, the rules of the game and
the normative underpinnings of the regional economic order; to counter the emerging
economic centrality of China; and to put the material forces of history under American
institutional subduance so as to steer economic development, ensure American
leadership, and maintain US sole superpower status. The TPP warned those that neither
adjust to US rules and standards nor embraced US values that they would be “locked
out” from an Americancentric liberal world order. However, with the election of
Donald Trump and his swift withdrawal from the TPP, the United States took a giant
step back from global leadership. In the conclusion, I will discuss this aspect, but for
now, let us turn to the Obama administration’s project for the regional security order.

Takashi Terada, “TPP and RCEP: Competing or Complementary Models of Economic Integration?’”
Public Seminar, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, (February 11, 2014),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/02/11-asia-pacific-economic-integration, accessed
July 6, 2014.
191
693

8.2 America’s Principled Security Network as a Reformist Revisionist
Project
In this section, I will outline the reformist revisionist characteristics of the Obama
administration’s project to change the regional security order. I make use of Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter’s term “Asia-Pacific’s Principled Security Network” to
designate this project, but I add a slight modification. I label it “America’s Principled
Security Network” since it is a matter of a project pushed by the Obama administration
to reform the regional security order with the intention of making it more amenable to
the preservation of US dominance – revise to maintain.
The Obama administration’s reform of the regional security order consists of
two main components. First, it involves an alteration of the alliance with Japan that
moves from an asymmetric patron-client relationship to a more symmetric and equal
alliance that elevates Japan’s security role. Second, it involves changes that move
beyond the bilateral hub-and-spokes alliance system and cover bilateral partnerships,
trilateral security practices, and multilateral engagement short of binding alliance
commitments. Through these new security practices, the Obama administration aimed
at building collective capacity and enabling concerted action.
In line with the 2x2 table I developed in chapter two (see Table 4), the revisionist
project is mainly reformist. Logically, the United States cannot be revisionist in relation
to the positional status dimension of the regional security order since it wants to
maintain its place atop the military hierarchy that it already occupies. The objective of
status maintenance unequivocally means preservation of the positional status-quo. Even
so, the United States can rearrange and actively promote change in the hierarchical
positioning of subordinate states or grant them greater security roles, which is exactly
what the change of the US-Japan alliance implies. This modifies the positional
dimension, but it does not change the status quo of the US position in the Asia-Pacific.
It rather represents a change in the secondary institution of the hub-and-spokes system
that reduces the asymmetric component with respect to Japan. In terms of the Obama
administration’s aim to move beyond the established hub-and-spokes system –
bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally – these reforms represent change of secondary
institutions in that they represent new security practices that develop parallel to the old
hub-and-spokes alliance system. In this way, the reformist revisionist project highlight
the innovative changes the Obama administration implemented in order to “stay
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ahead”694 in times of relative decline and sequestration. I will now outline the previous
status quo before I analyze the reformist project of the Obama administration.
Since the Second World War, the United States has been at the pinnacle of the
regional security order of the Asia-Pacific. It has dominated the region through a
bilateral alliance system – the hub-and-spokes system – that encompasses Japan, South
Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand.695 When this system was established,
it was underpinned by marked power asymmetries that emerged after the Second World
War, and was designed to function as a bulwark against communism and as mechanism
to exert control over rogue allies. 696 More specifically, the hub-and-spokes system
consists of four central pillars: bilateral alliances, strongly asymmetrical patron-client
defense ties, absence of a NATO-like multilateral security system, and special
precedence to Japan 697 (see Figure 7). This system equips the United States, the
centrally positioned actor, with unique strategic flexibility, leverage, and capacity to act
through dense and exclusive ties with the members of the network. In fact, alliance
exclusivity is the core feature of the hub-and-spokes system, which allows the United
States to tailor specific security commitments with various security dependent client
states that among themselves have no independent security relationships.
This strictly bilateral and asymmetrical security system is sometimes accused of
stunting the development of greater regional multilateral institutions as well as East
Asian regionalism. 698 If we recall former Secretary of State James Baker’s harsh
reactions against its Asia-Pacific allies when they flirted with ideas of closed
regionalism, such claims are not too farfetched, even though other political, economic
and cultural factors also play a part. Nevertheless, up until the end of the Cold War, the
hub-and-spokes security system served its purposes well. But as times have changed,
criticism have been voiced, and proposals for other forms of military engagement,699
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even an Asia-Pacific NATO-type organization,700 have been suggested, stressing the
unfavorability of the bilateral hub-and-spokes system.

Figure 7. The US Bilateral Hub-and-Spokes System
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Since the mid-1990s, a number of ASEAN-centered multilateral initiatives have
been initiated. Apart from the ones discussed in chapter six, the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 with the objective “to foster constructive dialogue
and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and
to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”701 ARF includes major players like the United
States, Russia, and the European Union as well as all states from the wider Indo-AsiaPacific region, including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Similar to APEC, the ARF
has been divided between Asians and “Anglo-Americans,” where the former prefers a
gradual, non-binding, consultative approach and the latter favors a more practical
problem solving approach.702 In 2006, the first ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
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(ADMM) was held in Kuala Lumpur, set to “promote mutual trust and confidence
through greater understanding of defense and security challenges as well as
enhancement of transparency and openness.” 703 Four years later, in 2010, the first
ADMM-Plus was convened in Hanoi, Vietnam, a platform for ASEAN and its eight
Dialogue Partners – China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, the United
States, and Australia – set “to strengthen security and defense cooperation for peace,
stability, and development in the region.”704
As outlined in chapters four and five, China’s rapid increase in power and
reputation generated anxieties about the evolving regional trend towards greater
multilateralization, encompassing institutions both inclusive and exclusive of the United
States. As Obama assumed power, leading officials and think-thank experts argued that
America’s reliance on the hub-and-spokes system is unsustainable and that Washington
must start to shape the trends of the evolving regional order to avoid exclusion. Even
though this problem certainly is less pronounced in the regional security order, in
relation to which Washington did not fear exclusion, times of relative decline and
sequestration still necessitated the Obama administration to tie regional states to its
agenda in new ways – into a security network steered by Washington’s logic to ensure
its predominant status.
After the Cold War, the United States maintained that the bilateral security
system in the Asia-Pacific should not be changed. It is argued that the administrations
of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton paid lip service to security multilateralism as a
complement to the existing hub-and-spokes alliance system, and displayed disinterest
to issues of regional architecture, relating to what Victor Cha terms “an ‘if it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it’ mentality.” 705 After 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror, the Bush
administration, however, demanded active participation and involvement of all its AsiaPacific allies in the global spanning “coalition of the willing” set to combat terrorism.
In addition to this ad hoc security construct, William Tow and Amitav Acharya point
out that the Bush administration started to engage with states outside the bounds of the
hub-and-spokes system, as illustrated by US-India and US-Singapore security
cooperation as well as the initiation of the trilateral strategic dialogue between the
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United States, Japan, and Australia and the Six-Party Talks. As Tow and Acharya
accurately point out, for the Bush administration, “integrating bilateralism and
multilateralism really means sustaining American power and influence…It does not
mean relinquishing the United States’ dominant strategic position in the Asia–Pacific
by acquiescing to power sharing arrangements with China or other regional actors.”706
Yet, as Victor Cha argues, the course of action of the Bush administration deviated only
marginally from previous US policy in the Asia-Pacific.707 In fact, it was not until the
Obama administration that a straightforward and unambiguous official critique of the
hub-and-spokes system was articulated and that an intentional reformist project for the
regional security order was implemented.

8.2.1 Reformation of the Hub-and-Spokes System: Necessary to Maintain
Sole Superpower Status in Times of Relative Decline
In four key policy documents – Defense Strategic Guidance, National Security
Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy –
the United States outlines its military strategy. Aside from their meticulous review and
all-encompassing scope, one central teleological theme unites them all – status
maintenance. In his forewords to the 2015 National Security Strategy, Barack Obama
lays out the teleological essence of US grand strategy: “Strong and sustained American
leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security
and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is
never whether America should lead, but how we lead.” 708 Similarly, the Defense
Strategic Guidance underlines that “United States will continue to lead global efforts
with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both
by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining
relevant and interoperable military capabilities.” 709 The 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review states that the Department of Defense “rebalances toward greater emphasis on
fullspectrum operations,” and thus “maintaining superior power projection capabilities
will continue to be central to the credibility of our Nation’s overall security strategy.”710
In the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, the objective is “to advance US military
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dominance in the 21st century and ensure the United States can deter adversaries and
prevail in conflict, including maritime Asia.” 711 What emerges from these strategic
policy documents is straightforward and clear: America’s central goal is status
maintenance.
Yet faced with relative decline and sequestration, US status-maintenance was
predicated on the need to reform the regional security order. As stated by Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta at the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, the “new fiscal reality has
given us an opportunity to design a new defence strategy for the 21st century that both
confronts the threats that we face and maintains the strongest military in the world.”712
To this end, Panetta outlined a defense strategy consisting of four principles: a rulesbased international order, expanding partnerships and strengthening allies, maintaining
an enduring presence, and investments in force projection. Since the military budget is
shrinking, the United States “will of necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific
region” – the new world center.713 In Obama’s much-debated speech at the US Military
Academy in West Point in 2014, while clearly affirming America’s objective of status
maintenance, Obama emphasized the necessity of changing how America’s military
power is used, 714 which connects to worries of what will happen with America’s
dominant position when faced with a declining military budget. What this means for
the regional security order is revealed in a 2015 policy statement released by the
White House that lays out the reformist revisionist project that the Obama
administration pursued:
We are moving beyond the ‘hub and spokes’ model of the past, toward a more
networked architecture of cooperation among our allies and partners – including
through expanded trilateral cooperation frameworks – built on shared values and
interests.715
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Yet apart from moving beyond and reforming the hub-and-spokes system in order to
“stay ahead” as the regional security environment undergoes change, 716 the United
States must buttress its position. I will now outline this positional reinforcement before
I continue to ascertain the reformist components of the Obama administration’s project
for the regional security order.
The strategic concept Air-Sea Battle, now integrated into the Joint Concept for
Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), and other “innovative ideas
and capabilities” known as Pentagon’s “third offset,” are designed “to advance US
military dominance in 21st century”717 through unrivaled technological sophistication
that maintains the competitive edge in light of China’s military modernization and
A2/AD capabilities. In relation to the militarization of the Asia-Pacific, the US is
actively reinforcing its preeminent position and global managerial role. As stated by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey:

Our technological superiority has allowed largely unfettered access to project power
where needed. However, this superiority is being challenged by increasingly capable
and economically strong potential adversaries that are likely developing and fielding
counters to some or all of the key technologies on which the United States has come
to rely. To maintain superiority, it will be necessary for the military to develop new
capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures to continue to be effective. 718

Consequently, the United States is changing it deployment structure in the Asia-Pacific.
It will move from a 50/50 to a 60/40 ratio of Pacific to Atlantic US navy units by 2020.
It will also deploy the most advanced type of US navy assets to the Pacific, including
Nimitz-class and Ford-class aircraft carriers, Aegis missile defense-equipped vessels,
Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers, Virginia-class attack submarines, littoral combat
ships, amphibious assault ships, as well as F–22 and F–35 fighters, B–2 and B-52
strategic bombers, P–8 and E-2D patrol aircrafts, and the MQ-4C unmanned aircraft
system. The United States will also strengthen its military presence on the island of
Guam, which include three Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles, a fourth attack
submarine, continuous rotational deployment of bombers as well as sustaining rotations
of fighter aircrafts and the placement of a THAAD missile defense system. Apart from
the above, the redeployment of 5000 US Marines to Guam will be carried out to decrease
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the American presence on Okinawa and is set to begin in 2020. The United States also
deploys a THAAD battery in South Korea, and assigns a second Amphibious Ready
Group to the region, consisting of three ships and 2500 marines, and is estimated to be
based in Japan by 2019.719 These sophisticated, high-end, newest class capabilities are
not aimed at combating meagre pirates, but testify to how the US seeks to maintain its
dominant status in the region, notwithstanding cuts in the defense budget.
Apart from buttressing the US position, reforms of the social-systemic structure
of the US-led regional security order are necessary. The Obama administration and the
Abe administration in Japan took decisive steps to reduce the traditional US-Japan
patron-client relationship and situate Japan as a more equal partner of the United States,
which further implies that Japan moves ever closer to becoming a “normal state.” In
fact, the desire to “normalize” Japan’s foreign and security policies and to create a more
equal alliance in which Japan performs a less subservient role has been a longstanding
concern among Japanese politicians and decision makers.720 Since Japan already enjoys
a special status in the US-led alliance system, the change involves an elevation of the
security role associated with this status.
Japan’s “pacifist” constitution, as reflected in Article 9, rejects war and prohibits
the formation of an army. For instance, during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Japan referred
to the peaceful principle of its constitution when it refused to put troops on the ground,
and instead committed to “checkbook diplomacy” by contributing 13 billion US dollars
to ﬁnance the military operations and agreed to send minesweepers as part of an UNsponsored peacekeeping force.721 Even though Japan enhanced its defense cooperation
with the United States in 1990s to include “contingencies surrounding Japan,” 722 it
maintained its “restraint about defense procurements,” and has, in fact, “been hesitant
about transforming the US-Japan alliance into a more symmetrical one whereby the
latter would exercise the right of collective self-defense.”723 Japan’s involvement in the
Bush administration’s War on Terror included sending Japan Self-Defense Forces
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(JSDF) to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, which, however, did not represent a radical
deviation from Japan’s security path. Even so, Christopher Hughes argued that Japan’s
involvement in the War on Terror would probably set a precedent for a more expanded
regional and global security role in the future.724
Shinzo Abe’s first term as prime minister of Japan (2006-2007) seemed to mark
the establishment of a more active military role, which was epitomized by Abe’s
proposal for a quadrilateral initiative or an “arc of freedom and prosperity”
encompassing Japan, Australia, India, and the United States, with ambitions to form a
democratic coalition that would span the entire Asia-Pacific. Notwithstanding the
proposal of what looked like an Asian NATO, Japan remained in the confines of what
has been termed “reluctant realism.”725 As Abe resigned after just a year in office due
to health issues, and “despite the discussion among some Japanese commentators about
a ‘China threat’, the government’s view [was] that the People’s Republic [did] not pose
a threat to Japan – at least for the moment.”726 However, similar to Christopher Hughes
prediction, Mike Mochizuki argued that, “there is a high probability” that the United
States and Japan will “recalibrate their policy toward China in similar directions and in
similar increments in response to Chinese capabilities and behavior.” 727 As Abe
reassumed office in September 2012, the estimate proved accurate and the stage was set
for the United States and Japan to implement groundbreaking changes that would
greatly reduce their patron-client relationship and enable Japan’s global security role –
the cornerstone in the Obama administration’s reformist project for the regional security
order.
Three months after his return to power, Abe resurrected the idea of a democratic
coalition. In a famous op-ed titled “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Abe warned,
“the South China Sea seems set to become a ‘Lake Beijing’” and accused China of
conducting “daily exercises in coercion around the Senkaku Islands in the East China
Sea.”728 Against this backdrop, Abe’s intention was clear:
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Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from
peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Developments
affecting each are more closely connected than ever. Japan, as one of the oldest seafaring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role in preserving the common good
in both regions.729

Faced with US relative decline (Japan’s main security guarantor) and China’s rise
(Japan’s main regional rival), at the same times as Washington implements
sequestration, the systemic imperatives called for the elevation of Japan’s security role.
As Abe’s senior national security advisor Yosuke Isozaki put it: “Truth be told, the U.S.
can no longer afford to play the world’s policeman…This is no longer an era when Japan
is permitted to do nothing and count on America to protect us for free. It’s become
extremely important we do our own share alongside the U.S.”730 Already in 2007 Abe
believed a reinterpretation of the constitution was necessary, since it contains
“provisions in the constitution that no longer suit the times” – times in which “the
security environment surrounding Japan and the entire world has undergone major
change.”731 If that was true then, it is even more pressing now, given “the increasingly
severe security environment surrounding Japan,” which, according to Abe, makes it
“necessary to reconstruct the legal basis for security so that Japan can take appropriate
responses to these changes.”732 With the reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution in
2014, the legal basis for the elevation of Japan’s security role was set, which now
permits the JSDF to,
1. Protect US navy vessels attacked by a third party near Japanese waters even
previous to an attack on Japan
2. Stop and inspect ships suspected of transporting weapons for use by third party
attacking US warships
3. Intercept ballistic missiles ﬁred over Japanese territory aimed at US territory at
the request of Washington
4. Provide military support for peacekeeping forces under attack
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5. Join in UN minesweeping operations to secure sea lines in the Persian Gulf.733
In the 2015 revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, the elevation
of Japan’s security role was set in stone. The guidelines put emphasis on increasing
synergy across the two governments’ national security policies and the “global” nature
of the US-Japan alliance. The United States and Japan will strengthen operational
coordination, information sharing, and common situational awareness. Gone is the hold
patron-client relationship, as both will “take a leading role in cooperation with partners
to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific region and beyond.”734 The common areas for cooperation in regional and
international activities include maritime security, military exercises, ISR-activities,
peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, partner capacity building, logistic
support, and noncombatant evacuation operations. The United States and Japan will also
jointly “promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense
cooperation,” strengthen institutions and ground their cooperation on “international law
and standards.”735
US Secretary of State John Kerry said in the joint press conference of the USJapan “2-plus-2” meeting on April 27, 2015, that the revised guidelines represent “an
historic transition” that “mark the establishment of Japan’s capacity to defend not just
its own territory but also the United States and other partners as needed.”736 According
to Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, the new guidelines allow the United States and
Japan to cooperate in new domains, and “in new ways, both regionally and globally,”
and they will “contribute even more proactively to ensuring peace, stability and
prosperity of not only Japan but the Asia-Pacific region and the international
community.”737 In this way, the new guidelines is a testament to how Japan’s revised
interpretation of its constitution and its policy of proactive contribution to peace
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converge with the US military rebalancing strategy. 738 Surely, as John Kerry declared,
“the United States could ask for no better friend or ally than Japan.”739
The foundation of the regional security order is no longer based on a US-Japan
patron-client relationship, rather, the defense relationship between the United States
and Japan now more resembles a traditional alliance with mutual security commitments
between two great powers, which effectively moves Japan closer to becoming a
“normal state.” For now, the removal of Japan’s constitutional constraints is a product
of interpretation, but perhaps in the future, it will move from constitutional
reinterpretation to constitutional revision. Once completed, the post-1945 security
order, which is based on a hierarchical system of patron-client relationships, will evolve
into a regional security order more akin to traditional great power alliances, through
which the United States as the sole superpower can continue to divide-and-rule the
Asia-Pacific and contain China’s emergence as a regional hegemon. Japan’s crucial
position in the Obama administration’s broader reformist project, especially its position
in the trilateral security institutions, further testifies to Japan’s centrality in maintaining
US dominance.
Yet in times of relative decline and a diminishing defense budget, the reform of
the US-Japan relationship is not sufficient, and thus the United States must revise the
social-systemic structure of regional security order in ways that further break with the
bilateral hub-and-spokes system. This constitutes the second component of the Obama
administration’s reformist project for the regional security order.
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who in his remarks at the 2016 IISS
Shangri-La Dialogue underscored the necessity of building a new security
architecture consisting of not only bilateral relationships, but also trilateral and
multilateral ones, illustrates the reformist project for the regional security order. In
arguing for what he termed a new “Principled Security Network,” Carter compares
security to oxygen, stating that, “[f]or many years, the United States – along with its
allies and partners – helped provide oxygen,” yet “by networking regional security
together, we can all contribute more, and in different ways.” Thus, “[i]n the years
ahead…providing the region’s oxygen will more and more become a networked
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effort…all of us will provide that oxygen.”740 Hence, more nations need to carry the
burden, while being steered by the logic of the predominant power – the United States.
Although Carter emphasized America’s “welcoming approach” to China and
the “inclusive” nature of the Principled Security Network, a systemic structure
purportedly not targeting anyone, he nonetheless singled out China. He mentioned that
there are great regional anxieties about China’s actions and warned that, “at a time when
the entire region is coming together and networking,” China is ostensibly isolating
itself, and if it continues with its actions, “China could end up erecting a Great Wall of
self-isolation.”741 In fact, the Principled Security Network represents a new, broader
and deeper reformist way of dealing with the challenge coming from China. That Carter
in his speech mentions the long list of the world’s finest, most sophisticated and lethal
military capabilities that will be deployed in the Asia-Pacific testifies to the fact that
the means America provides to this new security system are not merely intended for
humanitarian assistance and anti-piracy operations. Primarily, these means are directed
towards a certain end – to keep regional challengers literally at bay (read China). In
times of relative decline and sequestration, this task cannot be handled by a bilateral
security system alone; hence, the ways of security system need to be reformed to
maintain US military dominance.
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey makes clear, “With
our ‘ends’ fixed and our ‘means’ declining, it is therefore imperative that we
innovate…the ‘ways.’”742 By taking active steps to reform the security order, the US
hopes to convince regional countries that it is still the principal organizer of the regional
security order and indispensable for upholding of peace, prosperity and stability in the
Asia-Pacific. Apart from the elevation of Japan’s security role, which serve as the hardcore realist foundation of the US-led security order, the reformist project also involves
new bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security practices that serve as necessary
complements to this foundation.
Bilaterally, the strategy consists of courting countries termed new partners. The
United States seeks to expand military ties and develop new security practices short of
binding alliance commitments with countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
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Vietnam, India, and New Zealand. New and expanded exercises have been conducted
with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam that all include operations in the South China
Sea.743 For instance, Washington have established new and groundbreaking military
ties with Vietnam. The US-Vietnam Naval Engagement Activity (NEA) has deepened
and grown “more complex” during the Obama administration, and has moved from port
visits to “multi-day bilateral engagement ashore and at sea,” and has included
participation by a littoral combat ship for the first time.744 In 2016, the United States
sent a guided missile destroyer to Vietnam and the two countries conducted search and
rescue scenarios and communication exercises. The US also made a symbolic port call
in Cam Ranh Bay for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War.745 Significantly,
the same year Washington lifted the 50-year long ban on the sale of military equipment
to Vietnam.746
Trilaterally, the United States has considerably expanded this mode of security
cooperation under the Obama administration. Whereas the existing US-Australia-Japan
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue has been deepened, the Obama administration launched
the US-Japan-India Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue, and initiated the US-Japan-South
Korea Trilateral Meetings at the Vice Minister and Deputy-level. The US-Japan-India
trilateral relationship is of special importance and forms a key element of the reformist
revisionist change of the regional security order, facilitated by two parallel and
converging developments in the US relationship with Japan and India.
While there is a convergence between Japan’s revised interpretation of its
constitution and the Obama administration’s reform of the regional security order, there
is likewise a convergence between India’s “Act East” policy and Washington’s grand
strategic reorientation. The Obama administration viewed India as “an important
element of the Rebalance” and “welcomes India’s positive role in ensuring a stable,
peaceful, and prosperous region.”747 The Vision Statement for the US-India Strategic
Partnership that was released as US President Obama and Indian Prime Minister
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Narendra Modi conducted their first bilateral summit on September 29, 2014 equally
emphasized the regional and global nature of their partnership. On this day, the United
States and India “committed to a new mantra for the relationship,” namely “Chalein
Saath Saath: Forward Together We Go,” and India underscored that the United States
is “a principal partner in the realization of India’s rise as a responsible influential world
power.”748 The US-India strategic partnership was dubbed “transformative” in that it
“will be a model for the rest of the world,” and is seen “indispensable” for the “peace,
prosperity and stability” of the greater Indo-Pacific region. The vision statement also
highlighted that the US-Indian strategic partnership rests on shared democratic values
and supports “an open and inclusive rules-based global order.”749 Four months later, in
January 2015, the United States and India released the Joint Strategic Vision for the
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region where the two countries affirmed “the
importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and
overflight throughout the region;” called for dispute resolution in accordance with
UNCLOS; declared their intention to “work together to promote shared values;” and
affirmed that they will strengthen regional dialogues, trilateral consultation, and seek
“additional multilateral opportunities for engagement.”750
The grand strategic convergence between the United States, Japan, and India set
the basis for trilateral axis that covers security practices short of binding commitments
and serves to uphold the US-led regional security order. Washington recognized the
elevation of Japan’s security role associated with its special status, and India, who long
has harbored great power ambitions, is recognized by the United States as a world
power. In this way, the US-Japan-India trilateral relationship is beginning “to provide
real, practical security cooperation that spans the entire region from the Indian Ocean
to the Western Pacific.”751 A new type of security system that complements the bilateral
hub-and-spokes system – trilateral and less asymmetric (see Figure 8) – is thus very
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much in the making, one that effectively enlarges the scope of the region – from the
Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific.
Yet whereas the China factor and the intensifying security competition in the
East China Sea, however theorized, is ubiquitous in explaining Japan’s desire to expand
its regional presence and play a greater military role,752 India’s role is more ambiguous.
At the same time as India is a member of the SCO and closely cooperates with China
in the BRICS and the AIIB, it also desires America’s warm embrace and an elevated
role in a US-led regional security order. If India is pursuing a sophisticated hedging
strategy, then Japan, on the other side, is unambiguously siding with the United States.
Japan also figures in all US trilateral relationships, which testifies to its special status
and its increasing regional and global military role, crucial to the reinforcement of US
dominance (see Figure 9).

Figure 8. The US-Japan-India Trilateral Relationship
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Figure 9. US-Japan Trilateral Relationships
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Moreover, since the three countries officially and rhetorically base their
relationship on shared values and adherence to a rules-based international order, there
is real opportunity for resurrecting the old quadrilateral initiative that included
Australia, especially so when India, Japan, and Australia already meet trilaterally.
When the head of the US Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris visited India in
March 2016, he flaunted exactly this idea: “One idea to consider is initiating a
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between India-Japan-Australia and the United States.
Adding the US into this dialogue can amplify the message that we are united behind
the international rules-based order that has kept the peace and is essential to all of us.”753
If this becomes the case, a crucial first step towards a NATO-like system would have
been taken. Even if this does not materialize, the four countries are already advocating
a “rules-based international order” that echoes a values-based strategic approach to the
regional security order, which in fact goes against the ASEAN diplomatic norms of
noninterference, quiet diplomacy, and non-involvement of third parties in dispute
resolution.754 That great powers tend to ignore international legal verdicts 755 does not
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matter, since it goes without saying that a rules- and values-based approach to the
regional security order targets the 250-pound Panda in the room.
Even without a NATO-like multilateral security system in Asia, significant
steps towards concerted action have been taken nonetheless, as exemplified by how
trilateral military exercises aim at improving interoperability. The US-Japan-South
Korea trilateral ballistic missile warning exercise is aimed at developing a coordinated
approach to the North Korean nuclear threat. 756 The US-Japan-Australia trilateral
passing exercise (PASSEX), which involves ship maneuvers and helicopter cross deck
landings, is “designed to increase maritime interoperability and deepen mutual
understanding.” 757 In relation to the US-Japan-India trilateral relationship, Japan
became a permanent member of the US-India Malabar exercise in 2015, which has
expanded its scope and complexity, and consists of “complex, high-end warfighting
exercises conducted to advance multinational maritime relationships and mutual
security issues.”758 In 2016, the Malibar exercise involved military training both at sea
and ashore and consisted of professional exchanges on carrier strike group operations;
surface and anti-submarine warfare, helicopter operations, maritime patrol and
reconnaissance operations; visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations; and antipiracy operations. The Malibar exercise was “designed to advance participating
nations’ military-to-military coordination and capacity to plan and execute tactical
operations in a multinational environment,”759 and as such, the “members of the IndoAsia-Pacific nations utilize their maritime forces as natural partners, and continue to
strengthen relationships.”760 Through these trilateral exercises, concrete steps are taken
towards the development of a more coordinated approach to defense cooperation that
enables concerted action towards traditional security ends, and which represents a clear
departure from the bilateral hub-and-spokes system.
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Multilaterally, the Obama administration further expanded US engagement.
Apart from expanded bilateral allied exercises, such as the Key Resolve/Foal Eagle
exercise with South Korea that now includes anti-submarine warfare, and which has its
parallel in the US-Japan Shim Kame exercise designed to counter diesel submarines,
the Obama administration was “increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication” of
regional military exercises, with a particular focus on “developing new exercises with
Southeast Asian partners.”761
During the Obama administration, the United States conducted “the largest and
most sophisticated” Balikatan exercise ever together with the Philippines and Australia,
and with Japan as an observer.762 In the 2014 Pacific Partnership, an annual US-led
humanitarian and civic assistance exercise in Southeast Asia, a Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force (JMSDF) ship served as the primary mission platform, marking the first
time the Pacific Partnership was led from a partner nation’s ship. In 2015, Japan joined
the US and the Philippines in another humanitarian drill in Subic Bay, which Rear
Admiral Charles Williams, commander of the US Seventh Fleet, viewed as part of a
changing trend: “You are seeing in exercises…a shift from strictly bilateral engagement
to multilateral, which is why you see the Japanese here today.”763 A further aim is to
expand joint patrolling. As Admiral Harry Harris declares, “I welcome Japan’s potential
of patrolling in the South China Sea, just as I welcome India’s and I welcome all of
your navies’ abilities to patrol there…I support the right of every country to patrol in
the South China Sea because the South China Sea at large does not belong to any
country.” 764 Even though Japan has yet to join the US Freedom of Navigation
Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea, Harris declaration is a further testimony
to US acceptance of Japan’s elevated security role and its desire for a more proactive
Japanese military posture.
The Obama administration also developed “new presence models,”765 in terms
of which the use of rotational deployments is a crucial development. The port of Darwin
in Australia is set to open up for rotation of US Marines, estimated to reach a total
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number of 2,500 by 2020. Singapore has welcomed rotational deployment of Littoral
Combat Ships and P–8 reconnaissance aircrafts, and discussions about stationing four
additional ships in the near future is currently ongoing. In this way, Singapore has
turned into a vital maintenance and resupply hub for the US navy. The US and the
Philippines have also signed and approved the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA), which grants access to four airfields as well as a land base. This
“will provide the first persistent US naval presence in Southeast Asia in more than 20
years.”766
The Obama administration also expanded its multilateral engagement through
innovative approaches to military exercises, necessary in times of fiscal constraints. In
2014, the Pentagon introduced the “Pacific Pathways” operational concept. According
to Robert Brown, commanding general of US Army Pacific, the Pacific Pathways is
“the biggest innovation…in training and exercises in 35 years.” 767 By employing a
single unit on what is termed a “training pathway,” it conducts a three to four months
mission in which it engages in series of consecutive bilateral and multilateral military
exercises around the region. In this way, according to Brown, the United States can
provide “more faces in more places without more bases.”768
Since 2014, through the Pacific Pathways, the United States has engaged Japan,
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Vietnam.
In 2016, for instance, the Pacific Pathways involved the 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat
Team for a deployment spanning three months through which it participated in the
Cobra Gold exercises in Thailand, the Foal Eagle exercise in South Korea, and the
Balikatan exercise in the Philippines. This was followed by a second three-months
deployment, where the 2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team participate in the Hanuman
Guardian exercise in Thailand, the Salaknib drills in the Philippines, the Keris Strike in
Malaysia as well as the Garuda Shield in Indonesia. This, in turn, was followed by a
third deployment that participated in the Tiger Balm drills in Singapore, the Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in Hawaii, the Arctic Anvil in Alaska, and the Orient Shield
in Japan. According to US Army Pacific spokesperson Rumi Nielson-Green, “the
linking of exercises allows the Army to practice at a tactical, operational and strategic
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level.”769 David Johnson at the Washington think-tank Center for Advanced Defense
Studies argues that the Pacific Pathways, as paraphrased, “sends clear signals that
America’s rebalance of forces to the region is real and affecting operational thinking”
as well as it “demonstrates multilateral capacity” that “may deter potential regional
aggressors,” yet it does so in a soft way by incorporating long-held exercises.770 In
times of sequestration, the Pacific Pathways provides a groundbreaking way for the
United States to maintain its preeminent status and expand its military presence in the
region.
Other naval interactions of importance in Southeast Asia are the Southeast Asia
Cooperation and Training (SEACAT), the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT), and the Cobra Cold military exercises.771 The Cobra Gold military exercises
has grown to become the largest multinational drill in Asia. The main participants in
the exercise are the United States, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Singapore. In total 27 countries participated in 2016, with many nations performing
minor auxiliary roles or holding observation status. However, during the Obama
administration the United States scaled down its involvement in the Cobra Cold
exercises in a symbolic gesture against the military rule of the Thai junta, declaring that
Thailand needs to restore democracy for the US-Thai defense relationship to return to
normality. Yet the United States’ relationship with Vietnam lacks this principled
approach. Washington expanded its defense relations with Vietnam despite insisting
earlier that this would be conditioned on improvements in Vietnam’s human rights
record. What is evidenced here is that the United States uses carrots and sticks
strategically despite its hypocritical glare – it tries to punish Thailand, which has
improved relations with China following the coup d'état; and it rewards Vietnam for
standing up against China in the South China Sea. This, again, suggests that the US
rebalancing strategy is targeted against China.
In May 2015, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
announced the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). The purpose is “more
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than simply providing money or hardware, the United States is helping these five
countries connect with each other and develop a networked approach to regional
challenges.”772 More specifically, the United States seeks to “expand regional maritime
domain awareness capabilities;” develop “a regional common operating picture;” and
invest in “necessary infrastructure, logistics support, and operational procedures to
enable more effective maritime response operations.”773 Initially the MSI involves a
five-year American commitment of 425 million US dollars, which might seem pale, yet
it forms a significant part of a greater whole that indicates the intention of the United
States build collective capacity. Another significant development is the establishment
of the Singapore Maritime Information-Sharing Working Group. According to the US
Department of Defense, it is “an ideal platform to share best practices and lessons
learned from recent regional maritime activities and explore options for increased
information sharing across partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region.” The plan is to
expand this bilateral initiative and “include other regional partners to participate in this
community of interests.” Besides, the United States also wants Singapore’s Information
Fusion Center (IFC) to turn into a regional interagency information-sharing hub.774 This
would lay crucial building blocks for the establishment of a regional intelligence
architecture.
A key objective is to improve interoperability – bilaterally, trilaterally, and
multilaterally – which, as defined by NATO, is “the ability to operate in synergy in the
execution of assigned tasks.”775 The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy upholds
the following:

We are working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian
Ocean to build their maritime capacity. We are building greater interoperability,
updating our combined exercises, developing more integrated operations, and
cooperatively developing partner maritime domain awareness and maritime security
capabilities, which will ensure a strong collective capacity to employ our maritime
capabilities most effectively.776
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The US Department of Defense is “pursuing a robust slate of training exercises and
engagements with our allies and partners that will allow us to explore new areas of
practical bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation, [and] build the
necessary interoperability to execute multilateral operations.” 777 In other words, the
Obama administration took concrete steps towards a more coordinated regional security
order.
Certainly, joint military operations often involve anti-piracy missions,
humanitarian drills, and disaster relief, yet other high-end, sophisticated warfighting
exercises make it clear that the purpose is not merely to develop humanitarian or antipiracy capacity. The aim is to maintain America’s dominant status and regional access;
to preserve the command of the commons through a more coordinated and integrated
regional defense system. The improvement of interoperability and the establishment of
common operational procedures enable concerted action and allow for pooling of
resources, functional division of tasks, and information sharing. Hence, it is clear that
the Obama administration intended to move beyond the bilateral hub-and-spokes
alliance system and develop a coordinated approach towards both nontraditional and
traditional security ends. In this reformed security order, the elevation of Japan’s
security role is crucial since it plays a central part of the trilateral relationships and the
expanded multilateral operations.
However, we should not discount growing US-China cooperation. Since 2009,
the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) at the most senior levels has
been an important bilateral mechanism between the two governments. However, in the
2015 Annual Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission it states that the S&ED “yield limited results.” Whereas the report
acknowledged “some progress on environmental and financial issues,” it indicated that
the S&ED had “reached an impasse in addressing fundamental strategic and economic
issues.” 778 In 2016, conversely, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang
declared that the S&ED delivered 120 outcomes in the strategic track, and over 60
outcomes in the economic track. 779 Out of these achievements, we find a shared
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commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a global climate
agreement, improving global nuclear security, cyber security, addressing global
humanitarian needs and augmenting disaster response capacity, strengthening global
health security, cooperation on food security and sustainable development.780 Even so,
these achievements and outcomes do not resolve the positional competition for
leadership and the increasing strategic rivalry. As stated by one Chinese international
relations scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS):

Each year there is a list of all the results the dialogue has produced. More than hundreds
of achievements... The S&ED is a comprehensive mechanism to cooperate, negotiate,
and even to quarrel. Some of the achievements are significant, but the majority are not.
Can you imagine that the US and China can attain hundreds of significant
achievements every year? The problem is that the S&ED cannot resolve the
fundamental tension in the relationship.781

RIMPAC is another example of where the United States is engaging China in a
multilateral context. In 2014, China was invited to participate in the world’s largest
multilateral maritime warfare exercise for the first time, and was invited again in 2016.
“Even though it is a good chance for the Chinese navy and other countries to know and
understand each other, it is more a symbol of cooperation than anything else.” 782 As
stated by a Chinese Professor from Beijing, “RIMPAC is not so important in the context
of increasing rivalry in the Western Pacific and the strategic military build-up. Five
years ago, we never talked about arms races, space warfare, cyberspace, etc., but now
everyone talks about the increasing strategic rivalry. I do not think RIMPAC can
mitigate this.”783
The US Department of Defense states that the US-China security cooperation
covers three pillars: dialogue aimed at developing common views on the security
environment and its related challenges; capacity development for security cooperation
in areas of shared interests; and activities to improve operational safety.784 The problem
is that the views of the United States and China in relation to the Asia-Pacific security
environment diverge, and whereas the United States and China can cooperate in areas
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where they share interests, such as the Iranian nuclear issue, antipiracy operations in
the Gulf of Aden, climate change, etc., the Asia-Pacific is the decisive “testing ground”
for US-China relations.785 Activities to improve operational safety, such as the CUES,
is of practical concern and keeps strategic rivalry under control, but it does not resolve
the underlying positional competition for influence. Beijing’s message to the United
States is that it must genuinely respect and accommodate China’s core interests and
major concerns in the region. In this way, there is perhaps increasing global
cooperation, yet increasing regional competition. The crux of the matter is that the
United States is bent on maintaining its dominant status, and as long as it maintains this
goal, containment in some form is inevitable. As described by Michael Armacost and
Stapleton Roy:
A declared objective is to dissuade others from becoming ‘peer competitors.’ If we
retain this goal, then China’s rise, or for that matter the rise of any other major Asian
power, will be seen at some point as a threat to the United States, regardless of that
country’s conduct. Sooner or later a ‘containment’ effort will be required. 786

The US Principled Security Network de facto expands the encirclement of China;
hence, it is appropriate to term the US rebalancing strategy a “soft” containment
strategy, despite growing US-China security cooperation. Since the new revised
regional security order is intended to check China’s rise, the contradiction will only
increase and positional competition intensify as structural change ensues. It is in these
muddy waters that the Chinese perception of the rebalancing as a containment strategy
finds its breeding ground. A gun is always a gun, and as long as there is no true
friendship between the United States and China,787 the minimal requirement for enmity
cannot be discounted, and it can thus be reasonably argued that American cannons
indeed are directed against China. While the containment meme continues to have
strong reverberations as a social fact among Chinese citizens, intellectuals and political
elites, the institutional fact is that the US military – US military forces, US bases, US
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allies and partners – indeed encircle China, and now in new and updated ways –
bilaterally, trilaterally, multilaterally, and with Japan free to roam the seas – even
though they serve the lofty ideal of regional peace and stability.
Both China and the United States share a fundamental interest in maintaining
regional peace and stability, open seas and freedom of navigation, indispensable for
both nations’ prosperity and development – yet their strategic divergence is positional.
Whereas the United States is pursuing a reformist revisionist project that remodels the
regional security order to maintain US sole superpower status and global leadership,
China seeks a transformational revisionist project with the aim of embarking on “a new
path for Asian security” – a regional Asian security order devoid of alliances, where
China would be the first among equals equipped with a leading role commensurate with
its great power status. Hence, the positional competition involves a struggle for
alternative regional orders. But before I turn to China’s projects to change the regional
order, I will ascertain Chinese perceptions of US relative decline and China’s ensuing
status expectations.
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9. From Status Expectations to Status Frustration
In this chapter, I will examine Chinese perceptions of China’s rise and the relative
decline of the United States, outline China’s status expectations, and demonstrate how
the Chinese leadership perceived the US pivot as a status challenge.

9.1 Perceptions of China’s Rise and the Relative Decline of the United
States
The Chinese political and intellectual elite have long debated and evaluated US relative
decline. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, experts
carried out rigorous analyses of the emerging international order and China’s position
within it. In particular, Germany and Japan were perceived as US competitors in the
economic domain, especially in the area of high technology. Yet more significantly,
“[s]ome Chinese experts began to predict the emergence of a post-Cold War multipolar
world order, a greater balance among major powers, resistance toward ‘Western values’
and an increased emphasis worldwide on economic and diplomatic approaches as
opposed to military might.” However, these assessments “proved overly optimistic,”
which led Beijing to conclude that, “the United States would maintain its status as ‘sole
superpower’ for the next 15 to 20 years, if not longer.”788
Nevertheless, the CCP have long viewed the emergence of multipolarity as an
inevitable trend, and US relative decline as unescapable. To gauge this trend, Chinese
experts have developed a rigorous measurement of comprehensive national power
(CNP) that includes a wide variety of factors, both hard and soft power indicators.
Although their predictions vary, Chinese experts predict a long-term scenario “in which
the United States will decline economically, socially, militarily, and internationally to
become one of five ‘poles’” in a multipolar world structure - “[n]othing can save the
United States from this fate.”789 Although the CCP and Chinese experts acknowledged
that, after the Cold War, the world is inevitably moving towards multipolarization, the
consensus at the time was that fundamental structural change had not yet occurred –
“yes, but not just yet.”
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China’s impressive economic development is often represented as a “rise,” but
China rather views its development experience as a “return.” As Yan Xuetong makes
clear, “the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather
than as obtaining something new.”790 Over the long haul, China’s development curve
takes the shape of an upright U; from making up a third of the world’s total
manufacturing base in 1750, China declined because of Western European
industrialization and imperialism, and is now embarking on a path towards completing
the U curve. Hu Angang estimates that the complete restoration of China’s former
strength will be accomplished by 2050. Yet by 2020, Angang claims that China is
already set to become a superpower – “politically, militarily, and in terms of science
and technology.” From the perspective of a “return,” China “goes back to normal” and
reclaims its formers position atop the global hierarchy, and the ascendancy of the
Western world looks more like a historic aberration that temporarily displaced the
traditional world center of gravity, symbolized by a development curve taking the form
of an inverted U.791
Relatedly, the debate about US relative decline resurfaced once more against
the background of the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 2008 Financial
Crisis. Still, experts that have surveyed the intellectual debates following the crisis
argue that there is no scholarly consensus concerning the emergence of multipolarity
and the end of US dominance.792 Notwithstanding this scholarly ambiguity, Chinese
officials in fact started to perceive a more rapid change in the balance of power in
China’s favor after the 2008 Financial Crisis, especially so as China was weathering
the international economic turmoil with great success. This assessment can be found in
China’s 2008 Defense White Paper, where it states that, “[e]conomic globalization and
world multipolarization are gaining momentum.”793 Likewise, Michael Yahuda argues

Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,” 34.
Angang Hu, China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
2011), 9-11; see also Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon, “Singularity or Aberration? A Response to
Buzan and Lawson,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2013): 637–39; Angus Maddison, The
World Economy: Volume 1: A Millenial Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2006).
792
Lyle J. Goldstein, “Does China Think America Is in Decline?,” The National Interest (January 28,
2016),
available
at
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/does-china-think-america-decline15042?page=2&utm_content=buffer24748&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_cam
paign=buffer, accessed June 11, 2016; Bonnie S. Glaser and Lyle Morris, “Chinese Perceptions of US
Decline and Power.”
793
State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” White Papers of the Government (Beijing, China,
January 20, 2009), available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm,
accessed September 21, 2016, emphasis added.
219
790
791

that “decisive” structural change was “noted at the Party’s Central Work Conference
on Foreign Affairs” in 2009.794 Even though the full text of Hu Jintao’s speech at the
conference is not publically available, Hu reportedly asserted that, “the prospect of
global multipolarization has become clearer.”795 China’s 2011 Peaceful Development
white paper echoes a similar assessment:

The global trend towards multipolarity is irresistible. The emerging economies,
regional groups and Asian and other regions are becoming stronger, and various nonstate actors are growing fast, which, taking advantage of economic globalization and
the information age, expand their influence and have become an important force in
various countries and in the international arena….The world today is moving towards
multipolarity and economic globalization is gaining momentum.796

Suisheng Zhao argues that the “narrowing” of the “power gap” and China’s successful
“weathering the 2009 global ﬁnancial crisis” lead the Chinese leadership to “see a shift
in the world balance of power in China’s favor.”797 While Chinese officials started to
perceive fundamental structural change and US relative economic decline at the time of
the 2008 Financial Crisis, “key Chinese sources, including analyses by military experts,
did not forecast any diminution of America’s military advantage.” 798 However, the
view is that “the [military] rise of China will help restore a balance of power in the
Asia-Pacific region and reduce the dangers embedded in the domination of just one
power.”799 With China’s military modernization and expansion in the Western Pacific,
this is exactly what is presently occurring.
In 2009, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences released its yellow book on
the world economy and the international situation in which it assessed China’s
comprehensive national power. It ranked China number seven in the power hierarchy,
which owes to the gauge’s wide-ranging indicators. Apart from population, territory
and natural resources, economy, and military and science, the utilized indicators also
included sustainability, social development, domestic politics, and security. Hence, the
ranking blurs China’s economic prowess. Even so, upon the release of the Yellow Book,
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China Daily reported that, “2009 marked a year for a changing international power
balance, with increased influence for newcomers to the global stage,” a year in which
“China experienced a steady lift of its influence both in regional and international
realms.”800 Since then, however, no major new assessment of China’s comprehensive
national power has been undertaken to measure China’s present power status. 801
Nevertheless, in a Brookings Institution report on US-China strategic distrust,
renowned Peking University Professor and advisor to the Chinese government Wang
Jisi makes it clear that “many Chinese officials believe that their nation has ascended
to be a first-class power in the world and should be treated as such.”802 The fact is that
“the popular sensibility, even among the intellectual class, is that the gap has narrowed
dramatically, and momentum is all in China’s favour.”803
With the Chinese leadership transition and Xi Jinping in power, China’s
perception of ongoing fundamental change in the international system remains strong.
In Xi’s first state visit to Russia, he described his view of the world:

It is a world where emerging markets and developing countries in large numbers have
embarked on the track of fast development. Billions of people are moving towards
modernization at an accelerating pace. Multiple growth engines have emerged in
regions across the world. And the international balance of power continues to evolve
in a direction favorable for peace and development. 804

Similarly, at the Central Conference on Foreign Affairs, Xi Jinping articulated the “five
unchangeables” – multipolarity, economic globalization, peace and development,
reform of the international system, prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific:

While being mindful of the complexity of the evolving international architecture, we
should recognize that the growing trend toward a multi-polar world will not change.
While being fully aware that the global economic adjustment will not be smooth
sailing, we need to recognize that economic globalization will not stop. While being
fully alert to the grave nature of international tensions and struggle, we need to
recognize that peace and development, the underlying trend of our times, will remain
unchanged. While being keenly aware of the protracted nature of contest over the
international order, we need to recognize that the direction of reform of the
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international system will remain unchanged. While fully recognizing the uncertainty
in China’s neighboring environment, we should realize that the general trend of
prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific region will not change.805

The Chinese leadership unequivocally perceive these trends to be moving in a favorable
direction, showcasing a confident view of China’s development trajectory and with it,
the expectation for reform of the international system and further positional gains.
However, the very concept of the “new model of great power relations” presents the
greatest evidence for China’s perception of fundamental structural change. In essence,
the new model of great power relations is the clearest sign that China sees itself as a
first-class power and the United States, in particular, should respect it as such.
When Xi Jinping visited the United States as Vice President in February 2012,
he called for the creation of “a new type of relationship between major countries in the
21st century.” In May 2012, at the fourth S&ED, both Hu Jintao and Dai Bingguo
reiterated Xi’s call and made historic references to power shifts, in particular by
debunking “the traditional belief that big powers are bound to enter into confrontation
and conflicts” and urging the United States and China to learn from past “tragic lessons”
by building a “new type of great power relationship.”806 These historic analogies were
repeated by Xi Jinping in Seattle in September 2015, when Xi stated that “[t]here is no
such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. But should major countries
time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such
traps for themselves.”807 Here Xi is merely debunking the view that tragic major wars
are inevitability by highlighting human agency and miscalculation; he does not deny,
however, the structural environment of two competing major powers, whose struggle
for status and influence sets the background for the historic reference point. The “new
model of major power relations” is in effect a recognition of the new structural reality
in place; that while the United States is the sole superpower, China is indeed the premier
great power. As stated by Wang Yi, the new model of great power relations “is a logical
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development, because it accords with…the trend of our times.” 808 Hence, while the
Chinese consensus about multipolarization in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War
was “yes, but not just yet,” after the 2008 Financial Crisis the consensus was “yes, this
time it’s real,” to paraphrase Christopher Layne.809
The change in the balance of power also figures as the material “backdrop” for
China’s concept of “a new type of international relations.” As Wang Yi puts it:

As the trend toward a multipolar world, wider application of information technology,
economic globalization and cultural diversity gains momentum, the international
community is entering a crucial phase where changes are taking place in the world's
landscape and systems. ‘Where are international relations heading,’ this question of
our times thus cries out louder for an answer. Against such a backdrop, the CPC
Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as its General Secretary has put forth, in
a timely fashion, the important thinking of building a new type of international
relations.810

Here Wang Yi clearly spells out China’s perception of a change in the international
environment, a change that has entered a historic moment that calls for a new type of
international relations or a reform of the international order that considers these
changes. These perceptions are further revealed in China’s White Paper on Asia-Pacific
Security in relation to the regional context:
The Asia-Pacific region covers a vast area with numerous countries and 60 percent of
the world's population. Its economic and trade volumes take up nearly 60 percent and
half of the world's total, respectively. It has an important strategic position in the
world. In recent years, the development of the Asia-Pacific region has increasingly
caught people's attention. It has become the most dynamic region with the strongest
potential in the world. All parties are attaching greater importance to and investing
more in this region. With the profound adjustment of the pattern of international
relations, the regional situation of the Asia-Pacific area is also undergoing profound
changes.811

Furthermore, at the China Development Forum at Diaoyutai Sate Guesthouse in March
2016, in a dialogue between Dai Bingguo and Henry Kissinger on the new model of
major-country relations, Dai accentuated that nuclear weapon induced stability and
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mutual assured destruction characterize the US-China relationship.812 Hence, as USChina relations transpires in the context of nuclear deterrence that mitigate security
concerns, the struggle for status and influence becomes the main driving force of USChina competition as the international system undergoes fundamental change. With
China’s rise, and especially so after the critical juncture of the 2008 Financial Crisis,
its status expectations and desire for political influence increased.

9.2 China’s Status Expectations
In many ways, the domestic Chinese sentiment is optimistic and confident. In a poll by
Pew Research Center in 2005, 50% of Chinese believed that they had made personal
progress over the last five years, which was the top result among the surveyed countries.
When asked about their position on a “ladder of life” – where 0 represents the worst
possible life and 10 the best possible life – the majority of the Chinese in the poll still
view themselves as being placed on the middle steps of the ladder. However, when
asked where they would see themselves in five years from the time of the survey, 69%
believed they would have reached a high position on the ladder, indicating a score
between 7-10, and a striking 75% considered themselves to be optimists in contrast to
pessimists, leading Pew Research Center to conclude that “China emerges as the world
leader in hope for the future on a composite index of optimism.” 813 This is not
significantly different from India’s position, but stands in marked contrast to the United
States. Moreover, 72 % were satisfied with national conditions, topping the list of the
countries in the survey.814
In another poll by Pew Research Center in 2008, when rating China’s
performance, a staggering 86% were satisfied with the country’s direction and 82%
viewed the economy as good, which represents an increase with 38% and 30%
respectively since 2002. Again, this places Chinese optimism at the top of the global
ranking.815 Moreover,
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The Chinese generally have a positive view of their country’s role in world affairs.
They see their country as well-liked abroad and believe China considers the interests
of others in making decisions about foreign policy. They also see their country on the
rise – most think China will ultimately supplant the United States as the world’s
leading superpower.816

Even though these self-perceptions do not always correspond with how other countries
view China, it still indicates widespread confidence in China’s future trajectory and the
expectation that China will eventually surpass the United States.
Yet this perspective coexists with the view that China’s rise will not come
without struggle. For instance, in a 2009 Lowy Institute poll,817 Chinese participants
were asked to consider what issues and what countries they think pose the greatest
threat to China’s security. Environmental issues and water and food shortages were two
top issues viewed as threatening to China’s security, but when asked about which
countries that threaten China, the United States and Japan were singled out as the
foremost threats. 34% viewed the United States as the “greatest threat” and 45% viewed
it as the “greatest or the second-greatest threat”; whereas 14% viewed Japan as the
“greatest threat” and 36% viewed it as the “greatest or the second-greatest threat.” The
top reason why the United States was considered a threat was in fact related to status
issues, namely that the United States “might seem to restrain China’s growing influence
in the world.” Thirty-three percent somewhat agreed, and forty-four percent strongly
agreed with this. Even though concerns about US support for separatist elements in
China (30% somewhat agreed, 46% strongly agreed) or the US siding with Taiwan in
a cross-strait dispute (30% somewhat agreed, 43% strongly agreed) were as prevalent,
it indicates a domestic belief that the United States will try block or prevent China’s
rise. Significantly, the lowest level of agreement found in relation to potential US
threats was the proposition that “the values it holds and promotes could undermine
China’s standing in the world,” which can be seen in relation the United States’
declining reputational capital. In this way, the Chinese people view China’s rise as
“constrained by the United States.”
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This relates to the constant sense of
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dissatisfaction in China with the country’s international status. As Yan Xuetong points
out:
First, the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather
than as obtaining something new. This psychological feeling results in the Chinese
being continuously dissatisfied with their economic achievements until China resumes
its superpower status. Second, the Chinese consider the rise of China as a restoration
of fairness rather than as gaining advantages over others. With this concept, the
Chinese people take the rise of their nation for granted. They never concern themselves
with the question of why China should be more advanced than other nations, but rather
frequently ask themselves the question of why China is not the number one nation in
the world.819

Even though the Chinese might be continuously dissatisfied until China attains
superpower status, which in itself is evidence for a revisionist sentiment, they still take
China’s rise for granted. China is preordained to restore its past glory or as Yan puts it,
China’s rise “is granted by nature.” 820 Therefore, as China increases its power and
prestige and its comprehensive national power grows, it expects to be treated with
greater respect and demands that its rise translates into greater “discourse power” or a
“right to speak,”821 specifically concerning its core interests and major concerns. As
China continues to rise, its confidence and expectations for greater status in the
international order grow. This expectation is crystalized in China’s peaceful
development theory, which, in effect, reflects “a desire to search for a new foreign
policy facilitating China’s emergence as a global power.”822 As China determinately
pushes a strategy designed to reveal its benevolent face, these status expectations
increase even further as all that hard labor to debunk the China threat theory and
convince the world of its benign intentions is expected to pay off.
With the 2008 Financial Crisis and the United States bogged down in the
economic turmoil, China’s confidence was boosted. It took pride in its state-directed
development model, while throwing trenchant critique against the United States – the
most notable example being when former Premier Wen Jiabao blamed the American
economic system for the financial crisis at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos.
While the notion of Beijing Consensus is not an officially promoted Chinese model or
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counterhegemonic alternative to the Washington Consensus,823 China is not short of
representatives that claim developing countries can learn from China successful
development experience. Justin Yifu Lin, a renowned Peking University Professor and
advisor to the Chinese government who was Chief Economist to the World Bank in
2008-2012, is perhaps the best example of a person who has been advocating this
idea.824 As Lin assumed his position in the World Bank, he seized the opportunity to
spread China’s voice tirelessly as the financial contagion spread was throughout the
globe.
Apart from the confidence generated by China’s successful handling of the 2008
Financial Crisis, the crisis also engendered status expectations among the Chinese
political and intellectual elite in terms of appeals to change the established international
order to make it more representative. For instance, Fu Mengzi, vice-president of the
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations argued:

The impact of the financial crisis on global politics, economy, security, and social
aspects is perhaps greater than that of any previous crisis, war or disaster since the end
of the Cold War. Such has been the impact that world leaders could be forced to build
a new world order that conforms to the changed political and economic situation and
takes into consideration the importance of emerging economies. 825

We find similar evidence for rising expectations among Chinese officials. At a press
conference adjacent to the 2009 G20 Summit in London, Chinese Ambassador Fu Ying
made a revealing statement while commenting on the changes and expectations
associated with the financial crisis:

Never before has China been given the chance of revolution of the international
economic and financial order to express its just demand and raise its proper concern,
win more representation and greater say for the emerging countries including itself
and adapt the changing order and reform in the interests of developing countries like
itself. We should, therefore, see, value and take this chance to uphold and assert justice
for the shared interests of people in China and across the world.826
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Moreover,

The world is undergoing a crisis, the size of which was only seen once in the past one
hundred years. It is also embracing an opportunity for international cooperation unseen
in history. With unprecedented challenges ahead of us, the world should demonstrate
unprecedented solidarity, courage and confidence, to respond to global challenges
through global cooperation, to cultivate a stable, mature, equal and cooperative model
of country-country relationship, and to facilitate reform in the concept, structure and
model of international governance. China is fully prepared and ready to join hands
with the rest of the world.827

At the G20 Summit, China heralded the expectation for “substantive progress in the
reform of global financial institutions” and a “raise” in “the representation and say of
emerging markets and developing countries.” 828 A similar sentiment is echoed in
China’s 2011 Peaceful Development white paper, where “a growing call for change in
the international system” is noted against the backdrop of “historical challenges.”829
Relatedly, Bonnie Glaser and Benjamin Dooley argue that CCP’s Central Work
Conference on Foreign Affairs in 2009, “signal[ed] an intention to use China’s
economic weight, financial resources and growing geopolitical influence to expand its
say in designing any future international and economic system.”830
Noticeable evidence for China’s status expectations can also be drawn from the
BRIC-summit declarations. As the shockwaves of the financial crisis was sweeping
over the world, the BRIC-countries convened for the first time, and in their joint
statement following the first summit in June 2009 in Russia, they connected their plea
for greater positions to changes in the balance of power: “We are committed to advance
the reform of international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the world
economy. The emerging and developing economies must have greater voice and
representation in international financial institutions.”831 In the second summit in April
2010 in Brasilia, the message is even more straightforward:
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We share the perception that the world is undergoing major and swift changes that
highlight the need for corresponding transformations in global governance in all
relevant areas. We underline our support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic
world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation,
coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States.832

Moreover,
The IMF and the World Bank urgently need to address their legitimacy deficits.
Reforming these institutions’ governance structures requires first and foremost a
substantial shift in voting power in favor of emerging market economies and
developing countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with their
relative weight in the world economy.833

The emergence of status expectations following the financial crisis is supported by
interviews I conducted with International Relations scholars and think-thank experts
from several universities and institutes in Beijing and Shanghai in July 2016. For
instance, a Beijing-based Chinese Professor and International Relations expert argued
that, “following the financial crisis, Chinese scholars and leaders expected China to be
awarded a greater international role.” 834 Similarly, a Shanghai-based International
Relations expert and think-tank expert argued, “the financial crisis really gave birth to
a feeling that the balance of power had changed significantly, and that the time for
reform of the international system had come.”835
Cary Huang’s assessment of Xi Jinping’s “new diplomacy” aptly summarizes
the discussion:
It’s driven by the belief that the global order is in the midst of a historic change that
might end the US domination of global affairs of the last few decades, leading to one
shared by the West and East. This change has created an opportunity or even necessity
for China to take the lead, the belief goes, and helps explain why Xi is more active and
assertive than his predecessors in foreign policy and diplomacy. 836

This new activism and the effective abandonment of China’s long-cherished grand
strategy of “keeping a low profile” is a consequence of fundamental change in the
international system. However, while China was gaining status globally through greater
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representation and voice in both the WTO and the G20, the US pivot to Asia clearly
demonstrated that the United States did not intend to give up its dominance of the
regional order.

9.3 Frustrating China’s Status Expectations
China’s status aspiration is to regain its lost preeminence. China’s self-conception,
embodied by the political elite, is that of being a returning power, not a rising one; a
country preordained to restore its past glory. Hence, China is pervaded by one
predominant state telos: to restore its former position atop the global hierarchy.837 In
view of this, the US pivot indicated a status threat to China’s long-standing aspiration
and restorationist ethos, and so at a critical juncture when China perceived that the time
had finally arrived for a genuine change of the international order. As Robert Ross
notes, the US pivot “sparked” China’s “combativeness,” “damaged its faith in
cooperation,” and made the Asia-Pacific “more tense and conflictprone.” 838 Or as
former Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei puts it: “In recent years,
geopolitical tensions between major powers have been rising, which is reflected in the
Ukraine crisis, Syrian conflict and the U.S. rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific.”839
Similarly, as Yan Xuetong debunks the American rhetoric saying the “US pivot is not
targeted at China,” he states that the US pivot “is making the rivalry between China and
the United States more intense,” and that “it is understandable for the Americans to
adopt that kind of policy, if they want to maintain solo superpower status in the
world.” 840 A Chinese International Relations expert at a Beijing think tank further
argues that, “the US pivot was the ‘tipping point’ for US-China relations” 841 – an
indication that the United States would prevent China’s positional ascendancy.
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The high-profile speeches, announcements, and diplomatic performances of the
Obama administration were seen as simulacra of a “Cold War mentality” still
dominating American strategic thinking. The Chinese political and intellectual elite
perceived the US pivot to be going against the prevailing trend of the times, and it was
widely viewed as an antagonistic move that stepped up military encirclement through
reinforcement and expansion of the US regional security system and economic
containment of China’s rise.842 In 2014, the assessment of the Chinese leadership about
US strategic intentions were summarized in a five-point consensus, the message is
clear; namely, the United States is seeking to contain China; to isolate China; to
diminish China; to sabotage China’s leadership; and to internally divide China.843 In
other words, the US pivot was experienced by the Chinese foreign policy elite as an
attempt to “lock out” China.” And rightly so, for through the TPP the Obama
administration sought to exclude China from its revisionist project for the regional
economic order, and through the reform of the US hub-and-spokes system the Obama
administration reinforced its position by enlarging the encirclement of China and
creating a new regional security system that moved beyond the traditional hub-andspokes structure. In this way, the Obama administration was erecting both positional
barriers and new rules that disavow China status and influence.
When China views the US pivot as going against the trend of times, it means
that when the world is moving towards multipolarization, the United States is seeking
to maintain preponderance; when the world is moving towards peace and development,
the United States revitalizes its Cold War mentality; and when China is expecting
greater status, the United States attempts to block its regional ascendancy. As stated by
Suisheng Zhao:
In Beijing’s view, deeply embedded in the rebalance is Washington’s profound
concern about China’s rise. Under this overarching theme, Beijing sees a
comprehensive policy by Washington to block China’s rise through strengthened
military alliances with Japan and other allies and partners, ‘sabotaging’ China’s ties
with ASEAN, and undercutting China’s effort to lead the regional economic
integration by pushing for a US-centered and China-free Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership.844
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This specifically relates to the regional order, since in relation to the global order China
has in fact been rewarded greater positions. It now holds considerable influence within
the WTO and is part of the premier status groupings within the organization. “We can
say that after 10 years of efforts, China’s important position in the WTO is widely
recognized and China has won the substantive right to speak in making international
trade rules.”845 Through the elevation of the G20 to the summit level, China has also
gained voice in what is now regarded as the premier forum on global financial issues.
In the IMF and the World Bank, even though the United States still holds veto power
over the most significant decisions, China has increased its position and is now the third
largest member country. IMF has also given the renminbi global reserve currency
status. Moreover, by being a permanent member of the UNSC and enjoying the rank of
second largest economy and third strongest military in the world, China is in many ways
a well-established great power on its way to superpower status, yet the feeling that
China’s status expectations have not been fully met still remains. As Lucian Pye
observes:
The economic successes of Deng’s reforms should have warmed up relations [with the
U.S.], making the Chinese more self-confident and at ease with the outside world, less
touchy about slights to their sovereignty or perceived meddling in their internal affairs.
However, this success has only generated greater tensions and frustrations. The Chinese
take seriously the forecast that they will soon have the world’s largest economy. They
therefore feel that they deserve recognition and respect as a superpower-in-waiting. It
is not enough that they are already a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council and one of the five nuclear powers. Somehow all of their accomplishments of
the last two decades have not produced as dramatic a change in their international status
as they had expected or believe is their due. 846

In particular, in one central capacity China does not possess a duly significant criterion
for true great power status – namely, regional leadership. With the US pivot to Asia,
the Obama administration demonstrated that it did not intend to grant China that
position.
Yan Xuetong neatly describes the sentiment felt by the Chinese: “China’s
economic status has risen, but the country has yet to garner commensurate respect from
the international community.”847 Wang Jisi makes a similar argument: “China deserves
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more respect as first-class power,” which means that the “the United States should take
China’s interests and aspirations more seriously than before, and should change its
international behavior.” 848 As Wang Yi made clear, the Asia-Pacific is the “testing
ground” for US-China relations and the “new model of great power relations,” and the
United States should genuinely respect and accommodate China’s core interests and
major concerns in the region. 849 However, the US pivot to Asia indicated the very
opposite; the Americancentric blueprint for the regional order signposted that China
would not be awarded the preeminent status it so desires and feels it deserves.
In March 2013, when Xi Jinping travelled to Russia in his first foreign visit as
president, he portrayed a world characterized by both growing interdependence and
rising struggle. Xi stressed that, “countries are linked with and dependent on one
another at a level never seen before,” yet he also depicted a world of struggle, “a world
where mankind is beset with numerous difficulties and challenges.” In this world of
teething troubles, Xi mentioned that the world is witnessing “rising hegemonism, power
politics and neo-interventionism.”850 As he continued his speech, Xi laid out a notion
of historical progress strikingly similar to, yet still strikingly opposed to, Barack
Obama’s famous speech to Australian parliament two years before:

We hope that the world will become a better place. We have every reason to
believe that it will. At the same time, we are soberly aware that while the future
is bright, the path leading to it can be tortuous… Yet as shown by humanity’s
progress, history always moves forward according to its own laws despite twists
and turns, and no force can hold back its rolling wheels. The tide of the world is
surging forward. Those who submit to it will prosper and those who resist it will
perish. Keeping up with the times, one cannot live in the 21st century while
thinking in the old fashion, lingering in the age of colonial expansion or with the
zero-sum mentality of the Cold War.851

Even though the trends of the time – the “five unchangeables” – define historical
progress and China’s strategic opportunity period, the US pivot to Asia accentuated the
importance of strategic choice in order to “maintain and make the best of the strategic
opportunities we now enjoy.”852 In this sense, although “some Chinese scholars say that
the rebalancing strategy narrowed China’s strategic space,” China’s strategic
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opportunity period “depends on how China makes use of its foreign policy…China can
still enjoy the opportunity period if it…counters the adverse changes in the region.”853
This echoes Xi Jinping’s argument that the “current circumstances” require China to
“be ever more active” and to “be bold in assuming responsibilities.”854 China should
enhance its pursuit of leadership, as a passive approach “would eventually back Beijing
in a corner.”855 By standing up for its status aspiration, China needed to “make friends”
and attract a significant circle of recognition. With Xi Jinping in the top position, China
started to “strive for achievement.”856
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10. Striving for Achievement: China’s Status Enhancement
Strategy and the Remaking of the Regional Order
Before I specify China’s goal of status enhancement, and how it seeks to revise the
regional order, we have to deflate the argument that great powers do not always try to
maximize status. Referring to China, Xiaoyu Pu and Randall Schweller argue that,
“rising powers do not always choose to maximize their international status. Determined
to sustain their growth trajectory, emerging powers tend to be inward-looking states,
reluctant to take on the burdens and responsibilities associated with a leading role on
the world stage.”857 This is true to a certain extent, yet it nonetheless misconceives an
important aspect of status enhancement, namely the acquiring of necessary status
attributes.
In the beginning of the 1980s, when China moved from “a militantly
reconstructionist to a reformist developmental regime” 858 under Deng Xiaoping, it
turned its full attention to economic development in order to rise in the economic power
hierarchy. Since the second half of the 1990s, China has intentionally engaged in a
strategy to counter the China threat theory and climb the prestige hierarchy, and since
the beginning of the 2000s, China has rapidly climbed the military power hierarchy. All
with the purpose of gaining greater status and influence. It is therefore not entirely
correct to claim that China, based on its earlier reluctance to assume a leading role, was
not engaging in status maximization. In fact, China’s relentless and unprecedented
focus on economic growth shows a consistent determination to enhance a core achieved
status variable – that of economic wealth – no matter the social and environmental costs.
China’s launching of new concepts, its good neighbor policy, and its vigorous courting
of regional institutions shows a consistent determination to enhance a core ascribed
status variable – that of reputation. The China-Japan struggle for regional economic
leadership played out in the 2000s was in fact a struggle for status and influence. In
relation to the definition of social mobility as the “improvement…of a given rank on
one or more status dimensions…within a given period of time,”859 China has, clearly
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and resolutely, enhanced its position, and so during a historically unprecedented time
span.
Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, China was, after all, the self-proclaimed leader
of the Third World. Deng Xiaoping’s realization, however, was that without a solid
economic base neither China’s rise nor true leadership would materialize, and China’s
economic “backwardness” would continue to “incur beatings by others.” In Deng
Xiaoping’s speech at the third plenary session of the central advisory commission of
the CCP in October 1984, the message is laid bare:
The real, permanent solution is to quadruple the GNP and develop the economy. Of
course, we shall still have to conduct education among the people; work among the
people can never be dispensed with. But economic development is the foundation, and
it will make that work easier. What will the political situation be like once we have
quadrupled the GNP? I am confident that there will be genuine stability and unity.
China will be truly powerful, exerting a much greater influence in the world. That is
why we have to work hard.860

Hence, according to Deng, it is for the purpose of stability and unity domestically, and
influence-maximization internationally, that China has to work hard. China’s
“unswerving goal” is “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”861 Deng’s power
maximization serves as a necessary means for China’s rejuvenation and the restoration
of its former glory atop the global hierarchy. The China 2020 Research Team,
spearheaded by Zhou Qiren of the National School of Development at Peking
University, lay down China’s status enhancement goal in plain and simple terms:
China’s objective is to overtake the United States to become number one. 862 Yan
Xuetong disseminates the same unequivocal message: “the political goal of China is to
regain the status it held as a world power in past.”863 Orville Schell and John Delury
elegantly summarize the argument:

Unlike democratic political reform in the West, which developed out of a belief in
certain universal values and human rights as derived from a “natural,” if not Godgiven, source, and so were to be espoused regardless of their efficacy, the dominant
tradition of reform in China evolved from a far more utilitarian source. Its primary
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focus was to return China to a position of strength, and any way that might help achieve
this goal was thus worth considering. What “liberté, egalité, fraternité” meant to the
French Revolution and to the making of modernity in West, “wealth, strength, and
honor” have meant to the forging of modern China. 864

The notion of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” has survived the times and
been invoked by every great modern Chinese leader, from Sun Yet-Sen and Chiang
Kai-Shek to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. 865 In other words, China does not
take American preponderance as inevitable, neither American leadership as natural.
The fact that the notion of rejuvenation has persisted throughout the course of different
historical periods, political leaders, regime types, and at various levels of power shows
that it is not epiphenomenal to material structures – it is rather a constant. In other
words, status-maximization is the enduring motivator of China’s grand strategy.
In the seminal anthology Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamic edited
by David Shambaugh, Chinese scholars Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping outline four
core pillars of China’s grand strategic orientation. The first pillar is China’s
restorationist ambition to become “a great power again.” Zhang and Tang claim that
Chinese leaders “have always believed that China rightly belongs to the ‘great power’
club.” This notion serves as the unshakable telos that guides China’s progress, as noted
above. The second pillar relates to China’s determined developmentalist agenda and
the realization that for its “Four Modernizations” project to bear fruit “China needs a
stable and peaceful environment.” The third core pillar is self-restraint and relates to
Deng’s cautioning “against actively seeking leadership in global or regional affairs and
shouldering responsibilities that China cannot bear.” The fourth, notwithstanding the
third, relates to the notion that took shape under Jiang Zemin, and in particular, after
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which stresses that in an interdependent world, China
needs to “shoulder certain burdens and responsibilities.” Hence the development of the
notion of China as a “responsible great power.” The four pillars relate to corresponding
practices: great power diplomacy oriented towards the United States, the strategy to
create friendly relationships with its neighbors, as well as the reluctance to pursue

864

Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power, 8, emphasis added.
Zheng Wang, “Not Rising, But Rejuvenating: The ‘Chinese Dream,’” The Diplomat, February 5,
2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/chinese-dream-draft/1/, accessed November 22, 2014.
237
865

multilateral leadership and the pronounced selectiveness in shouldering international
responsibility.866
While the first two pillars of China’s grand strategic orientation and
corresponding practice are relatively immutable, the last two are changeable. China is
no longer heeding Deng’s advice, but is actively seeking leadership; and the notion of
responsibility is being autonomously defined in relation to China’s rights as a great
power and its active promotion and shouldering of responsibility in a reformed
international order.
This then relates to the debate on whether China has abandoned Deng
Xiaoping’s famous grand strategic “laying low” dictum and his specific instruction “do
not seek leadership.”867 The China 2020 Research Team claims that given the changing
global context and the expansion of Chinese interests, “China will no longer be able to
continue with such a passive policy,” but argues that it remains the guiding principle
for Chinese foreign conduct.868 Yan Xuetong, on the other hand, argues that China has
abandoned the strategy of “keeping a low profile” (KLP) and now puts emphasis on the
strategy of “striving for achievement” (SFA).869 Yan’s argument is largely supported
by interviews I conducted with International Relations scholars and think-thank experts
in China in July 2016. For instance, one Chinese International Relations expert and
think-tank professional made use of an illustrative analogy to illustrate the point:
You can compare it to a bird in a cage. The cage is the principle of keeping a low
profile, and the bird is striving for achievement. Before, although the bird could not
flee from the cage, the cage could be enlarged or reduced. Today the cage does not
exist anymore, and the bird is free. Before, keeping a low profile was the grand
strategic position of China, but now keeping a low profile is only tactical, and striving
for achievement is at the core of China’s grand strategy. I think this is the mainstream
view by now.870
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At the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012,
the “two centennial goals” were set: by 2021, China is poised to become a moderately
prosperous society, and by 2049 a prosperous, strong, culturally advanced, harmonious,
democratic, and modern socialist country. Less than two weeks after Xi Jinping’s
assumption of power, he issued his first slogan – the China Dream. While visiting the
“The Road Toward Renewal” exhibition at the National Museum of China, Xi
professed, “to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for
the Chinese nation in modern history.”871
The China Dream has an implicit grand strategic element, which is not spelled
out directly in the official discourses. A Professor from Shanghai used an amusing
analogy to illustrate what is at stake: “Xi Jinping launched the China Dream when
China is number two in the world. Do you think when he wakes up from his dream that
he wants to be number three? Of course not, he wants to be number one.”872 Ye Zicheng
offers another illustrative account: “If China does not become a world power, the
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be incomplete. Only when it becomes a world
power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been
achieved.”873Another Professor from Beijing further laid bare the consequential zerosum logic: “Internationally, it means that China should eventually become a
superpower. China should have decisive influence in Asia and the Western Pacific at
American cost.”874 Simply put: “China’s quest to enhance its world leadership status
and America’s effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game.”875
The clearest empirical example of China’s grand strategy and its pursuance of
leadership in the regional economic order is the establishment of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB exemplifies an aspirational
revisionist project that satisfies China’s status ambitions. The importance of “making
friends” 876 and providing international public goods to gain leadership recognition
makes it faulty, however, to denote China as a “post-responsible power;”877 neither is
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China a “responsible stakeholder” that passively accepts the US characterization of
responsibility. What is at stake is a “clash of responsibilities,” as part of the struggle for
the positional good of regional leadership.

10.1 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as an
Aspirational Revisionist Project
Whereas the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) represents China’s first
contribution to the reform of global economic order, the AIIB represents China’s first
contribution to the reform of the regional economic order. For now, the AIIB is an
aspirational revisionist project that satisfies China’s leadership ambitions and
challenges the established status order by erecting a parallel China-led multilateral
development bank set to provide funding for regional public goods. In this way, the
AIIB represents change of secondary institution, which in fact was the only option that
could satisfy China’s desire for status. It is also an example of usurpationary social
closure in that the AIIB effectively disavows the United States and Japan leadership
positions. For the time being, this positional change does not represent a change of the
rules of game, as the Chinese leadership adamantly has branded the AIIB as building
on established practices and standards. But it represents a significant step of China’s
grand strategy intended to place “all under heaven”878 in a new Community of Common
Destiny, regional at first, and global well ahead, and as such, Chinese inspired rules and
values might gradually come to permeate China-led international organizations in the
future.
For long, China has voiced critique against the established global financial
institutions, most vividly evidenced in the BRICS summit declarations. 879 Although
China’s call for greater voice and representation in the Bretton Woods Institutions was
finally granted, it does not imply that the United States will give up its leading status
and veto power in these institutions. In contrast to the global reforms, the reform of the
regional financial order was even more sluggish. In the position paper by the Group of
77 and China on the reform of the international and financial economic system
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presented in a UNGA working group in May 2010, the underrepresentation of China
and other developing countries in Regional Development Banks (RDB’s) was
emphasized.880 China was dissatisfied with the slow pace of reform of the international
financial institutions since they do “not match its economic strength.” 881 As the
fundamental change in the international system became all the more evident, the AIIB
was established as “a response to dissatisfaction with the existing development
financing regime.”882
China faced status disavowal in terms of a positional ceiling to its status
enhancement in the Asian Development Bank (ADB), led by Japan and the United
States. The President of the ADB is by tradition Japanese, and in terms of subscribed
capital and voting power, Japan and the United States widely exceeds the influence of
China. They lead the organization and have no plans on giving up their positions to an
ascendant China. Whereas Japan and the United States account for 15.68% and 15.57%
of the subscribed capital and 12.84% and 12.75% of the voting rights respectively,
China merely accounts for 6.47% of the subscribed capital and 5.48% of the voting
rights (see Table 23).
In contrast to the metaphor of the “glass ceiling” used to describe the barriers to
social mobility women and minorities are facing in the domestic sphere, the ceiling that
prevents China’s status enhancement is better compared to a thick titanium wall
impossible to shatter since dominant states do rarely allow for free international
political competition within the organizations they control. This is evidenced by the
fact the ADB has not heeded the 2009 G20 declaration stating that the president of an
international institution should be appointed through an “open, transparent and meritbased process.”883 Instead, the head position of the ABD is still reserved for Japanese
candidates and the selection process is conducted in secrecy.
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Table 23. Distribution of Influence within the Asian Development Bank
Rank

Country

Subscribed Voting
capital

power

(% of

(% of

total)

total)

1

Japan

15.677

12.840

2

United States

15.567

12.752

3

China

6.473

5.477

4

India

6.359

5.386

5

Australia

5.812

4.948

6

Canada

5.254

4.502

7

Indonesia

5.131

4.404

8

South Korea

5.060

4.347

9

Germany

4.345

3.775

10

Malaysia

2.735

2.487

Status Disavowal:
Positional Ceiling

Source: Asian Development Bank, “Annual Report 2014” (Asian Development Bank, 2014), available
at https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/158032/oi-appendix1.pdf, accessed
August 12, 2016.

Moreover, in a study on donor influence in the ADB, Christopher Kilby finds
that humanitarian factors do not affect lending decisions; rather donor interests decide
the allocation of lending. More specifically, the American influence in the ADB is
generally directed toward deciding over issues of access (i.e. denying funding for
certain countries, such as China); whereas Japan has had greater say over the level of
lending. Kirby concludes that the merits of ADB is questionable on humanitarian and
economic grounds, instead the existence of the ADB is political in nature.884 In essence,
“institutions are fraught with tensions because they inevitably raise resource
considerations and invariably have distributional consequences. Any given set of rules
or expectations, formal or informal, that patterns action will have unequal implications
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for resource allocation.”885 Institutions are not mere neutral problem-solving arenas,
but configurations of privilege and sites of power and contestation. 886 Hence, within
the ADB the ceiling is unbreakable. For China, to enhance status and influence, the
only option is to erect a parallel structure.
As Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang assumed office, they quickly took the opportunity
to launch a new regional strategy. In Xi’s state visit to Indonesia in October 2, 2013, he
announced the establishment of the AIIB, a pledge reiterated by Li in his trip to South
East Asia a week after. In these trips, Xi and Li simultaneously unveiled the OBOR
initiative. The same month, in October 24-25, at the Conference on the Diplomatic
Work with Neighboring Countries, intended to “identify the strategic goals,
fundamental policies, and general diplomatic work with neighboring countries in the
coming 5 to 10 years,” Xi reiterated the pledges and expressed his desire of letting a
Community of Common Destiny take “deep root” in the neighboring countries.887 Xi
stressed that “China needs to make neighbouring countries more friendly, stay closer to
China, more recognizing and more supportive, and increase China’s affinity,
magnetism and influence.”888 Moreover, Xi urged to “speed up the implementation of
the free trade zone strategy, on the basis of neighboring countries, to build a new pattern
of regional economic integration.” 889 Xi declared that “[g]ood diplomacy with
neighboring countries is a requirement for realizing the Two Centenary Goals, and the
Chinese Dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”890
The Community of Common Destiny serves as the overarching vision of
regional togetherness, and the OBOR initiative of boosting regional and
intercontinental connectivity by reviving the ancient trade routes of the Silk Road,
introduces a new tangible dimension to China’s leadership aspirations. China’s desire
is also that the RCEP will create a new pattern of regional integration centered on China
as it gradually climbs the global value chain. The aspiration is to become a true regional
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center, a center of consumption, innovation and services. Even though China’s
alternative project for the regional economic order covers the AIIB, OBOR, and the
RCEP, of greatest significance hitherto is the establishment of the AIIB since it
represents the clearest, most successful empirical example of China’s revisionist statusenhancement strategy.
Just one year after China’s announcement to set up the AIIB, in October 24,
2014, representatives from 21 Asian countries signed the agreement to establish the
new multilateral development bank. Six months later, in March 12, 2015, the United
Kingdom became the first G7 country to join the bank despite US opposition, a decision
that swiftly triggered France, Germany, Italy, and others to join. China branded the
AIIB as a necessary complement to the established international financial order. By
relegitimizing its benign role as provider of regional development finance, China was
simultaneously delegitimizing the global and regional financial institutions as incapable
of sustaining the needs of the world, often expressed in their incapacity to bridge the
estimated 8-trillion dollar infrastructure-financing gap in Asia.891 As Chinese Minister
of Finance Lou Jiwei puts it:

World economy is undergoing slow recovery and anemic growth in the aftermath of
the 2008 global financial crisis. Investment would play an essential role in spurring
economic recovery and growth, while infrastructure investment, in particular, is the
cornerstone that anchors sustainable economic growth in the long term. Yet financing
gap in infrastructure globally has hindered infrastructure investment from playing its
due role in promoting world economic growth. 892

Therefore, by “mobiliz[ing] more funds to support infrastructure development and
regional connectivity,” China is “promoting regional development” and “inject[ing]
long-lasting momentum into the economic growth of Asia.”893 In view of that, “[t]he
AIIB is nothing but a welcome supplement. It has attracted signatories from near and
far because it conforms to the needs and wants in the region and beyond.”894 China thus
reaffirms and relegitimizes its rise as an opportunity, makes use of the prestige
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associated with its successful development experience, and “welcomes all countries to
ride on its development.”895
Moreover, China debunked the closed, secretive, and unrepresentative
appointment process of the established financial institutions and branded the AIIB an
open, merit-based alternative. The BRICS-countries have long called for “an open and
merit-based selection method, irrespective of nationality, for the heading positions of
the IMF and the World Bank,” and that the “staff of these institutions needs to better
reflect the diversity of their membership.”896 Now, as Lou Jiwei promises, the AIIB
will “tap the global talent pool for management and staff positions through open,
transparent and merit-based multilateral processes.” 897 China assures that the AIIB
“will draw experiences from other multilateral development banks,” “adopt
international good practices,” and adhere to “high standards.”898 In other words, the
AIIB represents continuity, and by learning from past mistakes of the established
financial institutions, the AIIB can further improve the operation of development
lending.899
China also labels the AIIB an advance in the democratization of international
relations that accord with the trends of the times. As stated by Xi Jinping in the AIIB
opening ceremony, “the founding and opening of the AIIB also means a great deal to
the reform of the global economic governance system. It is consistent with the evolving
trend of the global economic landscape and will help make the global economic
governance system more just, equitable, and effective.” 900 Former Executive Vice
Chairman of China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy Wu Jianmin
further debunks Washington’s fierce, but misguided and failed opposition to the AIIB:

What is the trend in world development? Today we are no longer living in a unipolar
world. It is moving towards multipolarity. The US is no longer in the position to dictate
how others should behave. Issues concerning the future of mankind are to be discussed
and resolved democratically by all countries involved. Is the US aware of this trend?
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Does Washington try to adapt to it? I hope America will stop misreading the trends of
world development and adapt to the trend towards multipolarity. 901

Even so, as China’s astounding economic growth started to decelerate and entered a
“new normal” phase, Beijing needed to display confidence in its economic future to
counter concerns about the recent economic downturn and its potential effects on the
viability of its regional economic projects. At the 2013 Boao Forum, while
disseminating his vision for the region coated with a benign veneer of “Asianess,” Xi
acknowledged China’s daunting economic challenges, yet still proclaimed: “looking
ahead, we are full of confidence in China’s future.”902 A year later, at the 2014 APEC
meeting, Xi assured the audience anew: “As its overall national strength grows, China
will be both capable and willing to provide more public goods for the Asia-Pacific and
the world, especially new initiatives and visions for enhancing regional cooperation.”903
Likewise, at the AIIB inauguration ceremony in January 2016, Xi stated, “China has
the confidence and capability to ensure sustained and sound economic development and
bring more opportunities and benefits to Asia and beyond.” 904 Beijing effectively
downplays concerns about China’s new domestic economic situation by confidently
declaring that it is ready to perform the role of a responsible great power, standing up
for its desire to take the lead in the provision of regional public goods.
In terms of infrastructure, China has long been a key player and is the number
one investor in the world. 905 According to Deutsche Bank global strategist Sanjeev
Sanyal, China is a “world investor,” especially so “amid growing demand for
infrastructure investment in other developing countries.”906 Besides, in terms of foreign
exchange reserves, as former US Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman points out,
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“no nation is wealthier.”907 Certainly, accumulating large foreign exchange reserves
primarily denominated in US dollars serves as a wise strategy to insulate the national
economy from future crises; it does not challenge the international financial order,
instead it props up the US dollars and helps the United States to maintain its position
as the global currency leader. However, the fact that China still holds the largest foreign
exchange reserves in the world, around 3.2 trillion US dollars by February 2016 despite
the recent slowdown in its economy and massive stimulus spending,908 gives China a
substantial source of influence that can be used for productive purposes to enhance its
position. This is especially true concerning China created multilateral development
banks, such as NDB and AIIB.
In AIIB China now institutionalizes its leading position or “sets status in stone”
and provides public goods. China’s structural leadership is reflected in the fact that it
holds 30.34% of the stakes and 26.06% of the voting rights, which equips China with
veto power over major decisions in the bank, as they require a minimum of 75% of the
votes (see Table 24).909 At the initial stage, the AIIB is set to provide 100 billion dollars
for infrastructure funding. So far, the approved AIIB projects seem pale in comparison
to China’s many grandiose bilateral loans and development assistance schemes (see
Table 25 and Table 26). The fact that the AIIB will lend in US dollars also shows that
China will not use it as an organization to stimulate the internationalization of the
renminbi, at least not yet. Instead, China sets up a parallel platform that serves as a
crucial and necessary foundation for Chinese regional leadership and incremental
reform of the regional order.
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Table 24. Subscribed Capital and Voting Power in the AIIB (as of July 6, 2016)
Rank

Country

Subscribed

Voting

capital

power

(% of total) (% of total)
1

China

34.6663

29.8777

2

India

9.7401

8.6250

3

Russia

7.6086

6.8076

4

Germany

5.2199

4.7710

5

South Korea

4.3521

4.0311

6

Australia

4.2968

3.9839

7

France

3.9294

3.6707

8

Indonesia

3.9121

3.6559

9

UK

3.5559

3.3522

10

Turkey

3.0381

2.9107

Source: AIIB, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Subscriptions and Voting
Power of Member Countries,” available at http://euweb.aiib.org/uploadfile/2016
/0715/20160715113539537.pdf, accessed September 29, 2016.

Even though the “participatory approach” of the AIIB works according the
principle of “open regionalism” and welcomes all countries interested in contributing
to regional development,910 it effectively erects a positional ceiling to future American
and Japanese participation in the bank. As China makes use of power upwards to
enhance status, the usurpationary closure of the AIIB disavows the United States and
Japan leadership positions.
Moreover, the AIIB is also a testimony to China’s agenda-setting power and
entrepreneurial leadership role. China has long been pushing for a development
approach that pays greater attention to infrastructure provision, which it not only sees
as the foundation for growth, but as a core requirement for economic advancement that
facilitates operations and transactions at all stages of development. 911 To a certain
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extent, this approach differs from the priorities of the established Bretton Woods
Institutions:

China, based on its own experience, agrees with the economic development theories
that infrastructure construction will lay a solid foundation for the economic rise, and
therefore advocates the prioritizing and construction of roads, rails, ports, power plants
and base transceiver stations, instead of focusing on social sectors such as health,
education and other human development — the latter being areas the World Bank’s
aid is currently focused on.912

China’s entrepreneurial leadership role further relates to China’s dual identity as both
a great power and a developing country, and how it performs the role of the voice of
the voiceless by advocating greater “representation” and “say,” not only for itself, but
also for emerging markets and developing countries.913 Lou Jiwei made clear that since
AIIB is “mainly led by developing countries, the AIIB must consider their appeals,”914
which ties the appraisal of the AIIB to alleged voice opportunities. The negotiation
process prior to the establishment of the AIIB reflected this approach:

An open, inclusive, transparent and democratic approach has been adopted and the
concerns and aspirations of all [members] have been taken into account with due
respect. In that spirit, Chief Negotiators' Meetings have been co-chaired by China and
other Prospective Founding Members who volunteered to host, including India,
Kazakhstan and Singapore, and the negotiation process has been accelerated through
a multilateral approach acceptable to all founding members.915

Moreover, China’s disdain for political conditionalities embedded into multilateral
development lending, and its approach to economic development without ideological
straitjackets, charm countries in desperate need of investments. Then development
capital “makes friends” and contributes to the portrayal of China as a benevolent nation
bent on undertaking the arduous task of modernization without intrusive yardsticks.
China has long been pushing this idea, yet with the AIIB, it enters the mainstream and
testifies to China’s intellectual leadership role. This does not mean the absence of
economic conditionalities, as loans have certain grace periods, repayment schedules,
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and interest rates, but it means that the AIIB is imbued with a certain spirit, a spirit best
portrayed by Xi Jinping:

The principle of sovereignty not only means that the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all countries are inviolable and their internal affairs are not subjected to
interference. It also means that all countries’ right to independently choose social
systems and development paths should be upheld, and that all countries’ endeavors to
promote economic and social development and improve their people’s lives should be
respected.916

In this sense, the AIIB represents the sovereign norms and values of the region and
resonates with the diplomatic approach of the Shanghai Corporation Organization
(SCO) and the ASEAN. Far from being an example of transformational diplomacy
designed to change the normative structure, the AIIB rather represents a fortification of
the regional status quo. However, similar to the BRICS institutions, the AIIB represents
the erection of another parallel structure in an alternative China-led international order.
The erection of the AIIB endows China with a leading position for the provision
of development finance that previously was the exclusive domain of the US, Europe,
and Japan. However, the AIIB does not imply a radical change of the rules of the game.
This is evident from the fact that four out of AIIB’s first six approved projects are cofinanced by the ADB, World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), and the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank
group (IFC), and out of the other seven proposed projects still pending approval four
are proposed to be co-financed by the World Bank (see Table 25 and Table 26).917 Jin
Liqun, as paraphrased, claim these “partnerships with other well-established
multilateral development banks…are important for the AIIB’s credibility.”

918

Moreover, the drafting of the AIIB charter was assisted by Natalie Lichtenstein, a
reputable lawyer with over 30 years of experience from the World Bank, which
indicates that China wants to build on the accrued experience of established financial
institutions.919 Hence, “the AIIB will serve to reinforce and supplement the established

Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a
Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” September 29, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
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multilateral development banks as a whole,” as Lou Jiwei puts it. “AIIB will
complement rather than compete with the existing multilateral development banks.”920
The branding of AIIB as following the path of established financial institutions
was important to gain the widest possible circle of recognition, yet we might find
greater normative, institutional, and practical divergence with time. As Jin Liqun puts
it: “Our bank is trying to do things differently, and do different things, finding unique,
Asian approaches to development for the 21st century.” 921 Ding Yifan at the State
Council’s Development Research Center argues that, “it is too early to say if better
integration in Asia and more economic influence over Asian countries will lead to
changes in the region and eventually challenge the US-dominated international
financial system…But it is likely, since changes to the international order have all
gradually begun.”922 This highlights the incremental nature of the change towards a
China-led international order.

Table 25. Approved AIIB Projects as of October 15, 2016
Country

Type of Project

Size of Approved
Loans

Co-financed

Myanmar

Myingyan Power
Plant Project

AIIB: USD 20
million
Other lenders: N/A

Pakistan

Tarbela 5
Hydropower
Extension Project

Bangladesh

Electric Distribution
System Upgrade and
Expansion Project
National Motorway
M-4 (ShorkotKhanewal Section)
Project

WB: USD 390
million
AIIB: USD 300
million
AIIB: USD $165
million

AIIB financing
together with IFC,
ADB and other
commercial lenders
Co-financed with the
World Bank

Pakistan

Tajikistan

DushanbeUzbekistan Border
Road Improvement
Project

AIIB: USD 100
million
ADB: USD 100
million
DFID of the
United Kingdom:
USD 34 million
EBRD: USD 62.5
million
AIIB: USD 27.5
million

Not co-financed
Co-financed with the
Asian Development
Bank

Co-financed with the
European Bank for
Reconstruction and
Development

Lou Jiwei, “Inclusive AIIB Can Make a Difference”
Cecily Liu and Bo Leung, “AIIB’s Global Role ‘Set to Be Crucial,’” China Daily, January 26, 2017,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-01/26/content_28063244.htm, emphasis added.
922
Quoted in Zhao Yinan, “Nations Put Faith in Asian Bank”
251
920
921

Indonesia

National Slum
Upgrading Project

AIIB: USD 216.5
million
WB: USD 216.5
million

Co-financed with the
World Bank

Table 26. Proposed AIIB projects as of October 15, 2016
Country

Type of Project

Size of
Proposed
Loans

Co-Financed

Oman

Duqm Port Commercial
Terminal and
Operational Zone
Development Project
Railway System
Preparation Project
Regional Infrastructure
Development Fund
Project
Dam Operation,
Rehabilitation, and
Improvement Project
Andhra Pradesh 24x7 –
Power for All Project
Center South Road
Corridor Project
Transmission System
Strengthening Project

N/A

Not co-financed

N/A

Not co-financed

N/A

Co-financed with
the World Bank

N/A

Co-financed with
the World Bank

N/A

Co-financed with
the World Bank
Co-financed with
the World Bank
Not co-financed

Oman
Indonesia
Indonesia
India
Kazakhstan
India

AIIB: USD 650
Million
AIIB: USD 150
Million

Source: AIIB, “Projects,” http://euweb.aiib.org/html/PROJECTS/

In the inauguration ceremony at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, Xi Jinping
called the establishment of the AIIB “historic.”923 Lou Jiwei refers to the AIIB as an
“epic journey” 924 and a significant “milestone” in the reform of the international
system.925 To be sure, the AIIB represents a major breakthrough in China’s struggle for
a new international economic order that reflects the new structural reality of the
international system. In this sense, the AIIB “is commensurate with the evolving
economic landscape of the world today, and is testament to the confidence and
aspiration of Asian countries to spur infrastructure development and economic growth

Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Address at AIIB Inauguration Ceremony”
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in the region.”926 The AIIB unequivocally marks China’s ascendance and represents a
positional change to the regional economic order.
In this light, it is wrongheaded to characterize Washington’s refusal to join as
“irrational.” 927 For a superpower bent on ensuring regional leadership in the AsiaPacific it makes perfect sense. A rational decisionmaking process is not necessarily
governed by utility calculations based on wealth maximization, in this case by getting
access to “bidding opportunities” for US corporations; rather, the goal that determines
US rationality is positional. In a China-created organization, the United States would
play second fiddle. The fact that the United States would have been a non-regional
member indicates that the United States would play a more marginalized role, as
regional member-countries are favored over non-regional ones. For instance, the Board
of Directors (BoD) is comprised of nine Asian members and only three non-Asian
members,928 which can be compared to ADB’s ratio of eight Asian members and four
non-Asian members in the BoD.929 In a world characterized by struggle for positional
goods such as leadership, China’s usurpation of a leading position in the regional
economic order implies US status disavowal in the form of a positional ceiling to its
participation, which is a thorn too painful to withstand.
By extension, the AIIB, OBOR, and RCEP all challenge US leadership, and
thus the Obama administration’s blueprint for the regional order. The AIIB has proven
to be complementary to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and China’s
regional projects might indeed be good for capitalist development and economic
growth. Yet capitalist system maintenance goes on irrespective of who the leading
actors are. The refusal of the United States and Japan to join, and Washington’s hamfisted efforts to dissuade its allies from joining, is not about complementarity, but about
positional indivisibility; it is not about rules, but about leadership status; it is not about
humanitarian concerns, but about influence. Joining the AIIB would not be worth it for
Washington. The strain would be too painful – unless the United States gives up its goal
of maintaining sole superpower status and global leadership. If Japan one day escapes
Washington’s disciplining rod and accepts China’s rise, then Tokyo might decide to
join the AIIB in the future.
Lou Jiwei, “Inclusive AIIB Can Make a Difference”
Elisabeth C. Economy, “The AIIB Debacle: What Washington Should Do Now,” Council of Foreign
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China’s push for international reform is mainly about representation and status
and thus resembles an aspirational revisionist project – revise to enhance. The appeal
of the AIIB proves significant with more than 57 countries joining, and with an
additional 25 countries set to become members in June 2017, 930 many of them
American allies who the United States unsuccessfully tried to dissuade from joining.
As China successfully assembles a significant circle of recognition and performs the
role of a responsible great power, it finally assumes a regional leadership position
commensurate with its great power status.
In the following chapter, I will scrutinize China’s revisionist project for the
regional security order.

10.2 “Asia for Asians”: China’s Asian Security Order as a
Transformational Revisionist Project
In relation to the regional security order, China desires to change both primary and
secondary institutions, and in this sense, China’s revisionist project, as far as its
intentions are concerned, is transformational (see Table 4). The question, however, is
if China will succeed or not, but this problem does not alter the fact that China desires
a radical remodeling of the regional security order, covering both positional and
institutional revisionism.
In terms of the primary institution of great power management, China wants to
completely expunge alliances, which it sees as an outdated form of security
management incompatible with the trends of 21st century characterized by
multipolarity, economic globalization, peace and development, reform of the
international order, and prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific. Instead, China
promotes a “new model of great power relations” that, although it represents a genuine
attempt of establishing great power coexistence and equality, means the United States
should know its place on the right side of the Asia-Pacific so as to restore China’s
position as the natural preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific. It thus radically departs
from a configuration where the United States is the sole superpower with a global
sphere of responsibility. On top of that great power foundation, China desires to build
a Community of Common Destiny and a new model of international relations, which

James Kynge and David Pilling, “China-Led Investment Bank Attracts 25 New Members,” Financial
Times, January 24, 2017.
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simply remove the need for alliances as win-win inter-state relations and harmonious
inter-civilizational relations would prove them obsolete. Indeed, this is an extremely
tall order, but it nonetheless represents China’s utopian project for the regional security
order.
On top of this transformation of the primary institution of great power
management, Beijing seeks to improve and create new secondary security institutions
in the form of both bilateral strategic partnerships and multilateral institutions in which
consensus would be the decisionmaking mode, but in practice, China would secure a
“right to speak” or a de facto veto power in relation to regional security affairs.
Bilaterally it seeks to create comprehensive strategic partnerships more in tune with the
new area of international relations, and multilaterally China prefers a regional security
order that ultimately “locks out” the United States from the region and enables China
to establish regional primacy. The strategy China uses to establish this regional order
also contains many economic instruments, both bilateral and multilateral, and involves
making its neighbors dependent on China to bind them to itself and deprive them of
balancing motives. In this way, China seeks to establish itself as the principal organizer
and provider of regional security with the long-term intended outcome to eclipse the
US alliance-based regional security order. In the following part of the section, I will
detail China’s transformational revisionist project for the regional security order.
In order to restore its position atop the regional and global hierarchy, China
seeks new concepts and ways of organizing the regional security order. Already in the
1990s, China launched its New Security Concept, which seeks to “discard the old way
of thinking and replace it with new concepts and means to seek and safeguard
security.”931 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlight four pillars that uphold the
New Security Concept: mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination. Mutual
trust refers to a political approach that “transcend difference in ideology and social
system,” reject the cold war mentality, and “maintain frequent dialogue and mutual
briefings on each other’s security and defense policies and major operations.”932 Mutual
benefit puts the attention on social development and mutual respect for the security
interests of all in order to achieve common security. Equality means that all members

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Position Paper on the New
Security Concept,” available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm, accessed March
9, 2017.
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of the regional security order are equals, which is understood in line with the principle
of noninterference.933 An equal security order thus promotes the “democratization of
the international relations” by giving all members, big or small, voice opportunities and
by ensuring that their internal affairs are respected. Coordination puts the attention on
the settlement of disputes through negotiation and consultation, and “wide ranging and
deep-going cooperation on security issues of mutual concern.”934 Such security issues
primarily concerns cooperation that combats non-traditional security issues, such as
terrorism, piracy, and humanitarian operations, as traditional security issues relate to
the rights and responsibilities associated with the managerial role of the great powers.
China’s New Security Concept is also multifaceted in that it can take many different
forms, including binding and non-binding elements as well as Track 1 and Track 2
diplomatic mechanisms.
China puts forth the SCO as “a successful case of the new security concept” in
that it adheres to a “security cooperation model of non-alignment, non-confrontation
and non-targeting at any other countries or regions.” 935 The Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs also lauds ARF for making “positive progress in promoting confidence
building measures and preventive diplomacy,” and for stimulating “mutual trust and
cooperation.”936 Whereas the New Security Concept supports a strict interpretation of
the master institution of sovereignty and its derivative non-interference, it implies
radical departure from the primary institution of great power management and
traditional alliance systems. Even so, China pursued what we can term a “welcoming
approach” to the United States. A joint statement by Barack Obama and Hu Jintao in
January 2011 declares the following:

The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful
China that plays a greater role in world affairs. China welcomes the United States as
an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the
region. Working together, both leaders support efforts to build a more stable, peaceful,
and prosperous Asia-Pacific region for the 21st century. 937
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However, this stands in stark contrast to Xi Jinping’s speech at the fourth summit of the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in May
2014, where he launched the Asian Security Concept,

To beef up and entrench a military alliance targeted at a third party is not conducive to
maintaining common security…In the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run
the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The
people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the
region through enhanced cooperation.938

Yet in November the same year, Xi stated the following:
I told President Obama that China has proposed the Asian security concept at the CICA
summit here in May in order to encourage Asian countries to view common security
in an inclusive and cooperative spirit. At the same time, I also said that the Pacific
Ocean is broad enough to accommodate the development of both China and the United
States, and our two countries to work together to contribute to security in Asia. 939

This represents seemingly contradictory signals, but Xi essentially declares his
alternative vision for the region, and his assertion that the Asia-Pacific is big enough
for both China and the United States is a cunning word play that means the United
States should know its place on the right side of the Asia-Pacific. In fact, Xi’s statement
cannot be understood outside the concept of a “new type of major power
relations,” which captures all fundamental areas of China’s security strategy into a
unified project for the 21st century, a project fit for the end of the unipolar era. Before
I outline China’s Asian Security Concept further, we thus have to scrutinize the concept
of a “new type of major power relations.”

10.2.1 The New Model of Great Power Relations
When Xi Jinping visited the United States as Vice President in February 2012, he called
for the creation of “a new type of relationship between major countries in the 21 st
century.” Xi urged the United States and China to enhance mutual understanding and
strategic trust; respecting each side’s core interests and major concerns; deepening
mutually beneficial cooperation; increasing cooperation and coordination in
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international affairs and on global issues. 940 In May 2012, at the fourth US-China
S&ED, both Hu Jintao and Dai Bingguo reiterated Xi’s call and urged the United States
and China to learn from the “tragic lessons” of the past by building a “new type of great
power relationship.” 941 When Xi assumed power, the “new model of major power
relations” became formalized and now stands on a foundation consisting of three core
pillars: no conflict and no confrontation; mutual respect; and win-win cooperation.
The first pillar, no conflict and no confrontation, essentially relates to the second
and third aspects of the managerial role of the great powers; namely, avoidance and
control of crises and limitation and containment of wars (see section 2.1.8), which is
also what Yan Xuetong argues is the key for US-China relations – “conflict control.”942
Wang Yi puts this first pillar in a historical light of major wars between great powers
and claims that we now live in a different era.943 The second pillar, mutual respect for
each side’s core interests and major concerns, is more ambiguous. Although Dai
Bingguo articulated China’s “core interests” as (1) regime security, (2) sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and (3) social and economic development, 944 it is arguably an
elusive concept in Chinese discourse and remains somewhat open to interpretation.945
China’s “major concerns” is even more elusive. The ambiguity of the concept is well
illustrated by a Chinese international relations expert at a Beijing-based think-thank:

To be honest, I do not know what major concerns means exactly. It is very
unclear...everything can potentially be a major concern. North Korea and THAAD is
not core interest, but is certainly major concern; the TPP is not core interest, but can
be major concern; global governance is not core interest, but can be major concern. In
the South China Sea, only the specific islands and rocks are core interests as they are
matters of sovereignty, but South China Sea affairs as a whole can be a major
concern.946
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Given that the THAAD deployment in South Korea is a major concern and potentially
South China Sea affairs as well, it is not a stretch too far to argue that “major concerns”
relate to the fifth aspect of the managerial role of the great powers; namely, regional
spheres of influence, interests, and responsibility (see section 2.1.8). China’s struggle
to secure a “right to speak” or “discourse power” in relation to regional security affairs
implies veto power concerning what security deployments and practices are to be
deemed permissible and legitimate. China has demanded that Washington and Seoul
stops the THAAD deployment on the Korean peninsula as it “gravely damage the
strategic balance in the region as well as the strategic security interests of countries in
the region, including China.”947 What China wants is “to work in partnership”948 when
dealing with the North Korean security issue, and views the THAAD deployment as
blatantly ignoring China’s regional rights as a great power. THAAD should simply not
be permissible as it violates China’s right to exercise a regional veto concerning the
security developments in its immediate neighborhood and sphere of influence.
Similarly, the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) of the US navy in
the South China Sea should cease stop or “if you want to conduct naval passage you
should apply for permission from China first.”949 Given the extensiveness of China’s
claims in the South China Sea, as well as China’s security interests in the Yellow and
East China Sea, this pivotal influence arguably covers the whole Western Pacific. As a
Chinese Professor puts it: “China should have decisive influence in Asia and the
Western Pacific at American cost.”950 In a Chinese sphere of influence, “China would
have a final say on important political, economic, and strategic issues,” 951 and in a
Chinese-centered regional security order, China would institutionalize its right to
speak.952
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Hence, the best way to conceive of “core interests” and “major concerns” is that
the former represents China’s security interests,953 whereas the latter concerns China’s
status ambitions and its desire for regional preeminence.
The third pillar, win-win cooperation, is essentially about US-China bilateral
cooperation. The key is that China desires bilateral economic relations with the United
States in line with the global rule set provided by the WTO and as evidenced by the
US-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) currently under negotiation.

954

Multilaterally, China wants to see the establishment of a regional trade agreement
exclusive of the United States. At the Conference on the Diplomatic Work with
Neighboring Countries in October 2013, Xi Jinping urged to “speed up the
implementation of the free trade zone strategy, on the basis of neighboring countries,
to build a new pattern of regional economic integration.”955 As China primarily wants
to trade and cooperate with the United States on a bilateral level, it desires an East Asian
regional bloc exclusive of the United States that would set the groundwork for an
eventual Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and thus pushes for a speedy
finalization of the RCEP. Strategically, there is also an emphasis on bilateral relations:

There is an enormous need and vast potential for bilateral cooperation in all fields.
Besides, the world certainly needs China and the United States, two major countries
with great influence, to work together and contribute on issues ranging from
counterterrorism to cyber security, from nuclear non-proliferation to climate change,
and from peace in the Middle East to Africa’s development. 956

Certainly, this does not prevent wider cooperation between the great powers on global
issues where they share common concerns, as evidenced by the modalities of the P5+1
and the Six-Party Talks in dealing with nuclear non-proliferation in the cases of Iran
and North Korea. When Wang Yi stresses that China and the United States should
“strengthen cooperation” in global and regional hotspots and seek “greater common
responsibilities,”957 it thus connects to the sixth aspect of the managerial role of the
great powers; namely, great power concert or condominium (see section 2.1.8). Yet the
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characteristics of such a concert is more of an ad hoc nature rather than a permanent
confluence of interests and it simultaneously implies respect for China’s regional sphere
of influence.
Significantly, Wang Yi argues that Asia-Pacific is the “testing ground” for the
“new model of major power relations,” yet the only regional hotspots he mentions are
the North Korean nuclear issue, in relation to which he advocates the restarting of the
Six-Party Talks, and Afghanistan.958 The territorial and maritime disputes in the South
China Sea are omitted, as China views them, first, as under control, and second, as none
of the United States’ business. In relation to Taiwan, Wang asks the United States to
“genuinely appreciate and respect China’s efforts to oppose separation and achieve
peaceful reunification.”959 Thus, when Wang is arguing that, “China and the United
States should genuinely respect and accommodate each other’s interests and concerns
in the Asia-Pacific,” he is asking for the impossible since they clash.
From the Chinese perspective, the “new model of major power relations”
reflects the new structural reality in place; that the two most significant economies in
the world are the two most significant great powers in the world, and that China, as a
result, should be treated as an equal.960 As stated by Wang, the new model of great
power relations “is a logical development, because it accords with…the trend of our
times”961 – of multipolarity, peace and development, economic globalization, reform of
the international order, and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. If the United States
buys into the “new model of major power relations,” which despite contradictory
statements from key representatives of the Obama administration962 it has not yet done,
it would mean surrendering its sole superpower status for the sake of establishing a
world of regions with coexisting great powers. This would in effect change the current
shape of the primary institution of great power management (see section 2.1.8.2 and
Table 5).
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10.2.2 Asian Security Order
If we return to Xi Jinping’s articulation of the Asian Security Concept at CICA in 2014,
it is clear that China wants to eliminate the primary institution of alliances and create
new secondary Asian security institutions. The Asian Security Concept consists of four
pillars: common security, comprehensive security, cooperative security, and
sustainable security. Common security implies that the region should be devoid of
alliances directed at third parties; comprehensive security includes both traditional and
non-traditional security issues; cooperative security means the fostering of mutual
thrust through in-depth dialogue and cooperation; and sustainable security upholds
economic development as the foundation for durable security. 963 At CICA, Xi
envisioned “a new path for Asian security,” a path that “in the final analysis” should
lead to a security order where “the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the
problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.”964 This suggests a radical form of
usurpationary social closure that would exclude the United States from the region.
Xi’s declaration at CICA in large parts reiterated Li Keqiang’s message at the
2014 Annual Conference of the Boao Forum where Li outlined China’s vision for a
new regional order. Li sketched a vision that incorporated elements of the economic
domain of the regional order – outlining the RCEP, OBOR, and AIIB as interlocking
parts in the construction of a pan-regional intra-Asian industrial value chain and an
Asian Community of Common Destiny. Li also stressed that in order “to maintain the
general environment of peaceful development,” regional countries should strive to
“build an Asian community of shared responsibilities and actively explore the
establishment of a regional security cooperation framework in Asia.”965 Instead of a
preponderant power that bears the bulk of the responsibilities alone and stands at the
center of an alliance network targeted at third parties, regional countries shall join
together to share responsibility and create a cooperative and comprehensive security
framework that addresses a wide variety of security concerns. Li acknowledges, just
like his American counterparts, the fact that “Asia owes its progress to a peaceful and
stable regional environment, and peace and stability are the fundamental safeguards for
Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation”
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965
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Asia’s development.”966 Yet he departs from the standard American narrative of US
indispensability to this peace, and instead refers to the “Oriental wisdom” that
underpins the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that China, India and Myanmar
jointly

arrived

at.

More

than

embodying

oriental

wisdom,

“[t]hese

principles…represent a major contribution to human civilization.”967 Hence,

To achieve peace and stability in Asia, we the Asian countries should build consensus,
make active efforts and jointly fulfill our due responsibilities. We should promote
security dialogue and consultation, strengthen cooperation on non-traditional security
issues, including disaster management, maritime search and rescue, counter-terrorism
and combating transnational crimes, and actively explore the establishment of a
regional security cooperation framework in Asia. 968

Parallel to the China-led Boao Forum that concentrates on economic issues, China also
leads the Xiangshan Forum that focuses on security issues. In 2014, the biannual
Xiangshan Forum was upgraded from a track 2 dialogue to a track 1.5 high-level
dialogue platform to be held annually as a response to “the new demands of changes in
the security environment in Asia-Pacific.”969 The upgrading of the Xiangshan Forum
can be viewed in a competitive light where the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by an
independent think-tank now coexists with China’s state-led forum.
At the seventh Xiangshan Forum, Chairman of China Association for Military
Science Cai Yingting, argued that, “the security challenges in Asia-Pacific…require us
to abandon any forms of Cold War mentality” and advocated for the need to establish
a security mechanism based on the Asian Security Concept. Cai promoted an “Asian
method” for security cooperation including mutual respect, negotiation, and dialogue
to seek common ground, and pushed for the establishment of “a new model of security
management with Asia-Pacific characteristics,” entailing security partnerships
characterized by tolerance, mutual trust, cooperation, win-win, and shared
responsibility. He also associated the strengthening of regional security management
with global governance reform, which “is the request of times.” Countries should
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“abandon bias”, construct a new model of international relations, and build a
community of common destiny.970
However, China’s white paper on Asia-Pacific security cooperation highlights
that, “a consistent security framework in this region is not foreseeable in the near future,
and it will be normal to see multiple mechanisms advancing together in the evolution
of a regional security framework.” 971 Still, as the white paper outlines the existing
multiple security mechanisms, the white paper mentions SCO, CICA, and ASEAN-led
security forums, and adds that military alliances also exist, but that they are “formed in
history.” 972 They are thus anachronistic to the security order China wants to see
develop. With respect to the diversity of the region, “China promotes the building of a
security framework in the Asia-Pacific region, which does not mean starting all over
again, but improving and upgrading the existing mechanisms,” in which “all the
countries involved should play their respective roles in safeguarding regional peace and
stability.”973
The focus on countries playing their “respective roles” is significant. In other
words, all Asian states enjoy equal status as members of this evolving security order,
yet China will play its “due role as a major power,”974 and therefore power differentials
inevitably result in role differentition. This is further evidenced as the white paper
points out that China views the safeguarding of regional prosperity and stability as “its
own responsibility,” and that it therefore aims to develop its military to make it
“commensurate with China’s international standing and its security and development
interests.” This is “a strategic task” for China, and serves as “a strong guarantee for its
peaceful development” and enables “positive contributions to the maintenance of world
peace and regional stability.” 975 The differentiation between “major powers” and
“medium-sized countries” – where the former should practice “mutual respect” and the
latter “should not take sides” – is another testimony to the hierarchical structuring and
its associated role differentiation, where all states enjoy formal equality but differs in

Cai Yingting, “Closing Remarks by Gen. CAI Yingting, Chairman of China Association for Military
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status and role, and rights and responsibilities. Since China is the preeminent Asian
power, it should play the major role in the regional security order.
The white paper on China’s policy for Asia-Pacific security cooperation
consists of six pillars: common development, building of partnerships, improvement of
regional multilateral mechanisms, promotion of rule-setting, intensification of military
exchanges, and dispute resolution through negotiation, consultation, and consensus
decisionmaking. 976 The first pillar, common development, serves as the economic
foundation of regional security or the “fundamental safeguard for peace and
stability.”977 To this end, China has established the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, which
financially serve the OBOR initiative, and pushes for a speedy completion of the RCEP.
The aspiration is to become a true regional center – a center of consumption, innovation
and services – and to create a regional institutional framework that bind China’s
neighbors to the bandwagon and let them “ride on [China’s] development.”978 This
echoes “sustainable security,” the fourth pillar of China’s Asian Security Concept and
testifies to how China views the regional economic and security orders as inexorably
intertwined.
The second pillar, building of partnerships, serves as the political foundation
for regional peace and stability. To this end, the white paper reiterates China’s call for
the construction of a new model of major power relations with the United States, a new
model of international relations, and a community of shared destiny with its neighbors
along the Lancang-Mekong River, ASEAN, Central Asia, and beyond. China’s
commitment to deepening its comprehensive strategic relationship of coordination with
Russia is also mentioned, as are efforts to improve relations with Japan. The specific
format of the partnerships that China seeks are “comprehensive strategic partnerships.”
China has formed such partnerships with all ASEAN members except Brunei,
Singapore, and the Philippines, and in 2003, China and ASEAN signed a “strategic
partnership for peace and prosperity.” In 2008, China and South Korea engaged in a
“strategic partnership.”
The specific “calculations behind each strategic partnership vary,” yet “as a
whole they are designed to protect China’s core interests (the defensive logic) and to
construct a better environment for China’s rise (the assertive logic)…Despite some
Ibid.
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shortcomings, strategic partnerships have helped China constructively engage with the
world and rise peacefully.”979 Even though this assessment can be criticized since China
still has not managed to solve the territorial and maritime disputes with its Southeast
Asian neighbors or with Japan, “comprehensive strategic partnerships” offer an apt
middle-ground for a great power that claims it adheres to a non-alignment policy980 and
who seeks to win friends while assuaging fears about is rise.981
The third pillar, improving regional multilateral mechanisms, emphasizes the
wide range of regional security mechanisms China has initiated together with relevant
countries, including SCO, Six-Party Talks, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, Xiangshan
Forum, and the China-ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security
Cooperation. CICA and ASEAN-led multilateral security dialogues are also upheld. To
this end, “China will shoulder greater responsibilities for regional and global
security.”982
In terms of improvement, at CICA in 2014, Xi Jinping “called for efforts to
enhance the capacity and institutional building of the CICA, improve the functions of
the CICA Secretariat, and establish a mechanism within the CICA for defense
consultations among member states.” 983 And as mentioned above, in 2014, China
upgraded the Xiangshan Forum to a track 1.5 high-level dialogue. Yet perhaps the most
significant improvement is the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation
(LMC), including China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, who all
have signed “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with China.
In 2016, at the first Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, the LMC
issued the Sanya Declaration, which includes signs of profound security cooperation
and friendliness. The Sanya Declaration affirms, “that our six countries are linked by
mountains and rivers, share cultural similarities and enjoy good neighborliness and
strong friendship, and that our security and development interests are closely interconnected”; that “our six countries enjoy deepening political trust and sound
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cooperation…in boosting peace, stability and development of the region and the world
at large”; and “that the LMC is aimed at building a community of shared future of peace
and prosperity and establishing the LMC as an example of a new type of international
relations, featuring win–win cooperation.” 984 Political and security issues, of which
non-traditional security issues stand out, serve as the first of the three key fields of
regional cooperation upheld in the Sanya Declaration, the other two are economic and
sustainable development and social, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges. The
Declaration also “encourage synergy” between OBOR and LMC activities and projects,
and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, and uphold that the LMC countries
“work together to push forward the [RCEP]” and “seek support from the AIIB.”985 It
further declares that the LMC is “based on the principles of consensus, equality, mutual
consultation and coordination, voluntarism, common contribution and shared benefits,
and respect for the United Nations Charter and international laws.” 986 At the first
Leaders’ Meeting, the LMC countries also agreed to a Joint List of Early Harvest
Projects.
The LMC serves the end of a China-led regional order in the Asia-Pacific and
erects an architecture according to Beijing’s design. In his speech at the first LMC
Leaders’ Meeting, Li Keqiang urged the LMC countries to “jointly pursue peace and
stability,” and that “our six countries are always in one and the same community as
forged by our common interests and shared destiny,” whatever changes occur in the
region. Li pressed on the need to “redouble our efforts and contribute even more to
development and security interests of our countries and the region.” He also emphasized
that the Lancang-Mekong community of shared destiny will “provide useful impetus to
the ASEAN integration process,” and “lay a strong foundation for the fostering of an
Asian community of shared destiny.”987
In other words, the LMC is the springboard; it is the first tangible multilateral
outgrowth of China’s concept of a Community of Common Destiny, an organism ready
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to overgrow and asphyxiate the ASEAN community. Despite the LMC principles of
equality and consensus, the nature of the relationship is strongly asymmetrical. China
is the magnanimous giant ready to provide the necessary capabilities to implement the
nearly 100 early harvest projects that the LMC countries have outlined. The LMC is a
good testimony to how China seeks to establish itself as the principal organizer of the
regional order. By making itself indispensable to its neighbors’ economic development,
China binds them to itself and deprive them of balancing motives. Or once the day
arrives when China’s neighbors are forced to choose, the choice is already laid out for
them, as they will not want to get starved for American bullets. Perhaps Cambodia’s
unilateral suspension of the US-Cambodia Angkor Sentinel joint military exercise in
January 2017 offers a good illustration of what the future holds. China is Cambodia’s
largest economic and military benefactor, and its support comes without political
conditionalities. Although the Cambodian leadership denies that the decision had any
relation to US-China strategic rivalry, 988 it is indicative of the choice that regional
countries might face in the future.
The fourth pillar outlined in the white paper is the promotion of rule setting and
strengthening institutional safeguards for peace. Here the principles of the UN Charter
and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence upheld. Apart from international law,
the white paper also emphasizes that regional rules and norms “should be discussed,
formulated, and observed by all countries concerned, rather than being dictated by any
particular country.”989 The white paper mentions the adoption of CUES, as well as the
DOC and the COC in the South China Sea; the former is designed to curb
miscalculation as the lateral pressure of China’s military expansion intensifies and
increases encounters at sea,990 the latter is about the formulation of regional standards
of behavior by countries directly concerned. Yet beyond that, Chinese leaders are
advocating increasing institutionalization of the regional security order, but what that
exactly means in still vague, especially so when the regional countries are very reluctant
to consent to intrusive institutional measures. China-ASEAN non-traditional security
cooperation are already based on “shared norms” that “govern an institutionalized
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process of regularized consultation leading flexibly to various formal agreements.”991
Yet it is argued that China’s “main objective is securing the right to speak in the process
of making new international rules and conceiving major regional and global polies.”992
China upholds the China-ASEAN Treaty on Good-neighborliness, Friendship
and Cooperation and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as
potential institutional safeguards for regional peace and friendship. At the 2014 ChinaASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Myanmar, Wang Yi mentioned that China and
ASEAN should conclude the China-ASEAN Treaty on Good-neighborliness,
Friendship and Cooperation to “anchor China-ASEAN relations on a more solid legal
basis and ensure long-term and stable development of relations between the two sides.”
Wang also said that China wants to sign on to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone, 993 which China holds “is of great significance for promoting
regional and global peace and stability.”994 Similarly, at the China-ASEAN Expo in
2014, Zhang Gaoli upheld the China-ASEAN Treaty on Good-neighborliness,
Friendship and Cooperation as “the legal and institutional guarantee for lasting
friendship between our two sides.”995 Yet what it will come mean in actual practice
remains to be seen.
The fifth pillar, intensification of military exchanges and cooperation, China
views as a solid guarantee for regional peace and stability. This should focus on “nonaligned and non-confrontational military cooperation not targeting any third party,” and
primarily combat non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, antipiracy,
humanitarian disasters, pandemics, and environmental issues, with a special emphasis
on securing border eras from transnational crimes.996 This is also the priority area of
the cooperation between the SCO and ASEAN.
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After Xi Jinping’s assumption of power, China has increased bilateral military
exercises at an unprecedented rate. Since 2014, China has conducted first-ever military
exercises with several of its Southeast Asian and South Asian neighbors (see Table 27).
These exercises are coupled by the signing of memorandums of understanding and
agreements where China and its counterparts agree to boost defense exchanges, military
exercises, and defense procurements. To the best of my knowledge, China has held no
military exercises with Myanmar, The Philippines, and Brunei, but it has nonetheless
deepened defense exchanges with Myanmar, and Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte
has mentioned that he is open to conduct exercises with China. While China’s bilateral
military cooperation mostly covers non-traditional security, the Joint Sea exercise with
Russia covers traditional security issues however, and involve sophisticated
capabilities, such as sub-marines, destroyers, fighter jets, attack helicopters, and
amphibious vehicles. Overall, China is markedly intensifying its bilateral military
cooperation, which represents a tangible increase in China’s military presence
throughout the region, and if we are to believe the statements by China’s partners, they
view the military engagement as a constructive and positive development.997
At the China-ASEAN Defense Ministers' Informal Meeting in 2016, State
Councilor and Defense Minister Chang Wanquan reiterated China’s proposal for a joint
military exercise with ASEAN, involving maritime search and rescue, disaster relief
and application of the CUES in the South China Sea. Chang further mentioned that
China wants to strengthen its anti-terrorism cooperation with ASEAN, specifically
intelligence sharing and counterterrorism exercises. Yet while China has rapidly
expanded its bilateral military engagement, it has not been successful in attracting
ASEAN as a group to agree on participating in a China-led multilateral drill. On the
other hand, China is participating in the US-led RIMPAC and the ASEAN-led ADMMPlus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) multilateral exercise.
In 2015, Chang Wanquan laid out a five-point proposal for China-ASEAN
defense cooperation, which further showcases China’s strategic intentions: (1) jointly
ensure a good general orientation of cooperation (deepen the China-ASEAN strategic
partnership and building the China-ASEAN community of shared destiny); (2) jointly
maintain regional security and stability (in line with the Asian Security Concept); (3)
jointly build and improve regional security mechanisms; (4) jointly deepen pragmatic
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cooperation in defense fields (non-traditional security issues); and (5) jointly and
properly deal with disputes and manage risks.998 Chang’s last point leads us to the sixth
pillar of China’s policy on Asia-Pacific security cooperation, namely dispute resolution.

Table 27. Chinese Bilateral Military Exercise
Members
China-Cambodia

Name
Golden Dragon

Initial Year
2016

China-Cambodia

Unspecified

2016

China-Thailand

Blue Strike

2010

China-Thailand
China-Laos

Falcon Strike
Unspecified

2015
2016

China-Vietnam

Thien Thanh

2016

China-Vietnam

Border Defense
Friendship Exchange
Program

2014

China-Malaysia

Peace and Friendship

2014

China-Singapore

Maritime
Cooperation

2015

China-India

Hand-in-Hand

2007

China-Sri Lanka
China-Bangladesh
China-Nepal

Silk Route
Unspecified
Pratikar

2015
2016
2017

China-Australia
China-Russia

Panda-Kangaroo
Joint Sea

2015
2012

Purpose
Humanitarian aid
and disaster relief
(HADR)
Naval rescue
operations
Humanitarian aid
and disaster relief
(HADR), counterterrorist operations
Air force drills
Counter-terrorist
police exercise
Counter-terrorist
operations
Coordination of
border guards,
joint patrol in the
Gulf of Tonkin
and along land
border
Humanitarian aid
and disaster relief
(HADR), search
and rescue drills
Communication
drills and
maneuvering
exercises, CUES
Counter-terrorism
operations
Tactical exercises
Naval exercise
Counter-terrorism
operations
Survival exercises
High-end naval
exercise, multiple
scenarios

China Military Online, “China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting Kicks off in Beijing,”
October
16,
2015,
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Sources: China Military, “Highlights of China-Cambodia ‘Golden Dragon 2016’ joint Drill,”
December 27, 2016; Global Times, “Cambodian-Chinese Joint Drill Concludes Successfully”
December 23, 2016; Prak Chan Thul, “Cambodia to Welcome Chinese Warships as Japan Navy Heads
Home,” Reuters, February 17, 2016; Prashanth Parameswaran, “China, Cambodia Hold First Naval
Exercise Amid South China Sea Fears,” The Diplomat, February 24, 2016; Xinhua, “China, Thailand
Start Joint Military Exercise,” May 22, 2016; Jerome Taylor, “Thailand Pivots Closer to China with
Exercises,” The Japan Times, November 29, 2015; Richard S. Ehrlich, “China-Thailand Joint Military
Exercise Shows Longtime U.S. Ally Bangkok Hedging Its Bets,” The Washington Times, November
9, 2015; Xinhua, “Vietnam, China Hold Joint Anti-Terror Exercise,” July 29, 2016; People’s Daily,
“Chinese, Vietnamese Defense Ministers Witness Joint Patrols,” March 30, 2016; Xinhua, “Vietnam,
China Hold Joint Anti-Terror Exercise,” July 29, 2016; Prashanth Parameswaran, “China, Vietnam
Hold Joint Drills,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2016; VietNamNet News, “Vietnam, China Hold Border
Defence Friendship Discussion,” May 16, 2015; Jason Ou, “China, Malaysia Start Joint Military
Exercise,” The Straits Times, September 19, 2015; China Military, “China-Malaysia Joint Military
Exercise Wrapped up,” November 28, 2016; Sumathy Permal, “China and Malaysia’s First-Ever Joint
Military Exercise Is an Important Strategic Move,” The Star Online, September 28, 2015; Prashanth
Parameswaran, “China, Singapore to Hold Naval Exercise,” The Diplomat, September 9, 2016; FranzStefan Gady, “China and India Hold Joint Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, October 12, 2015; Ankit
Panda, “Sri Lanka and China Wrap Up Silk Route 2015 Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, July 18,
2015; Bdnews24.com, “China, Bangladesh Defence Relations Reach ‘unprecedented Heights,’”
bdnews24.com, July 28, 2016; Shannon Tiezzi, “China, Bangladesh Pledge Deeper Military
Cooperation,” The Diplomat, December 4, 2015; Indian Defence News, “Nepal-China Joint Military
Exercise: Envoy Says India Shouldn’t Worry,” December 27, 2016; China Daily, “China to Join
Australia, US in Exercises,” August 26, 2016; Brad Lendon, “China, Russia Begin Joint Exercises in
South China Sea,” CNN, September 13, 2016; Ankit Panda, “Chinese, Russian Navies to Hold 8 Days
of Naval Exercises in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, September 12, 2016.

The sixth pillar upheld in China’s white paper is proper dispute resolution.
Disputes should be solved by countries directly involved and “countries in the region
should follow the tradition of mutual respect, seeking common ground while reserving
differences, and peaceful coexistence, and work to solve disputes properly and
peacefully through direct negotiation and consultation.”999 China’s view on regional
hotspot issues differs from the US perspective in that China regards them as “basically
under control.”1000 In his speech at the Xiangshan Forum, General Cai Yingting stated
that, “At present, the Asia-Pacific situation is stable in general…Asia-Pacific maritime
security is guaranteed, and freedom of navigation is not a problem.” 1001 However, it is
noted that this stability is at times disturbed by both traditional and non-traditional
security issues. Director of the Expert Consultation Committee of the PLA Navy Yin
Zhuo, states that the Asia-Pacific is “the only region in the world that still suffers from
the looming wound of the Cold War.”1002 Therefore, China wants to work with ASEAN
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“in dispelling interference” in the South China Sea, as put forward by Li Keqiang in
September 2016 during a meeting with ASEAN leaders. 1003 In Wang Yi’s words,
“China and ASEAN countries have the ability and wisdom to make the South China
Sea a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.”1004
China’s view is that the United States and ASEAN do not “have a common
responsibility to ensure the maritime security of critical sea, lands and ports,” as John
Kerry claimed in 2014.1005 ASEAN secretary-general Le Luong Minh rebuffed the US
proposal for a suspension on provocative acts in the South China Sea: “It is up to
ASEAN to encourage China to achieve a serious and effective implementation of this
commitment, rather than ASEAN asking whether it should support or not support the
(US) proposal.”1006 Former Minister of Information and Spokesperson for the President
of Myanmar U Ye Htut argues that the disagreement between ASEAN members and
China should be settled by themselves, and it is not workable for irrelevant countries to
make indiscreet remarks.”1007 Malaysian Prime Minister Razak, as paraphrased, prefers
disputes “to be worked out through dialogue and peaceful negotiations.” 1008 And
according to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, China “is not a threat for any country
in the region.”1009 Even so, ASEAN is divided in relation to the South China Sea issue,
which represents a significant impediment to the acceptance of China’s project for the
regional security order. I will soon deal with this aspect below.
To get a good overview of China’s concept and policies in relation to the
regional security order, I organize two tables below that covers core concepts, policies,
and multilateral mechanisms (see Table 28 and Table 29). Even though China has a
long way to go, it is clear as that China’s intentions for the regional security order
represents a transformation of the US dominated security system in favor of a regional
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security order where China enjoys preeminent status and plays its due role as first
among equals. Such a regional order would probably dilute the effectiveness of, and
even the need for, ASEAN-centred security forums. China’s intention is rather to create
new China-centered security groupings and forums in the Asia-Pacific while
maintaining the status quo in ASEAN-led forums with an extra-regional scope, that is
to say, China does not desire further institutional deepening. As the United States,
Japan, and China support different interpretations of the primary institution of great
power management and push alternative secondary security institutions in the region,
ASEAN-led multilateral security processes will remain as contested rhetorical
battlegrounds where major powers delegitimize each other’s contending projects for
regional order, while they simultaneously construct parallel regional arrangements.

Table 28. Core Pillars of China's Security Concepts and Policies
New Security
Concept

Asian Security
Concept

New Model of Great
Power Relations
(US-China)
No conflict and no
confrontation

Mutual Trust

Common
Security

Mutual Benefit

Comprehensive
Security

Mutual Respect
(core interests and
major concerns)

Equality

Cooperative
Security

Win-Win Cooperation
(bilateral)

Coordination

Sustainable
Security

China’s Policies on
Asia-Pacific Security
Cooperation
Common Regional
Development (AIIB,
OBOR, RCEP)
Comprehensive
Strategic Partnerships
(improvement of)
Regional multilateral
mechanisms
(promotion of)
Rule-setting
(intensification of)
Military Exchanges
Dispute Resolution
(through negotiation
and consultation with
countries concerned)
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Table 29. Regional Security Mechanisms
China

US

Both

US Alliance System
Trilateral Security
Relationships
CICA
Lancang-Mekong Sub-Region

ARF, EAS
Lower Mekong Initiative

China-ASEAN Informal
US-ASEAN Informal
ASEAN Defense Ministers’
Defense Ministers’ Meeting
Defense Ministers’ Meeting
Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)
Xiangshan Forum (inclusive,
Shangri-La Dialogue
yet Chinese-led forum)
In addition: both the United States and China are engaging in parallel and overlapping bilateral
and multilateral military exercises. While the United States is engaging in wide-ranging and
sophisticated military exercises that clearly dominate the region, China is making significant
strides in developing the quality and quantity of its military exercises with regional countries.

China’s call for major powers to play a “constructive role” or a “proper role”
undoubtedly means that the United States and Japan ought to heed China’s major and
legitimate concerns in the region, as exemplified by Beijing’s position on THAAD and
the FONOPS in the South China Sea.1010 In fact, China’s call for prudence1011 very
much resembles classical realist thinking on the making of constructive diplomatic
relations through balance of power. 1012 Moreover, from the perspective of English
School theorist Hedley Bull, it is vital to protect the rules of coexistence, to contain
ideological conflicts and to appease dissatisfied states, and as great powers exercise
their special rights and duties, they need to secure the acquiescence of secondary
states.1013 Since the United States will not retrench or appease China, it is up to China
to gain a significant circle of recognition, a struggle in which it faces considerable
challenges – primarily due to the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China
Sea, which tarnish Beijing’s prestige. What follows is an analysis on how the South
China Sea issue impedes the acceptance of China’s project for the regional security
order.
Yeganeh Torbati and Michael Martina, “China Tells U.S. to Play Constructive South China Sea Role,”
Reuters, June 7, 2016; David Brunnstrom and Lesley Wroughton, “China Calls Obama, Xi Talks
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10.2.3 The South China Sea Disputes and the Damage to China’s Prestige
Despite the expansiveness of China’s claims in the South China Sea and widespread
accusations of Chinese assertiveness with pejorative connotations, the fact is that China
has exercised moderation and its involvement in the disputes is to a certain extent
reactive. Even so, the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea is the
major obstacle to China’s status recognition since it seriously damages one of the two
core status components, namely China’s prestige.
If we look into the reactive nature of China’s involvement in the South China
Sea first, a number of events illustrate this fact. In 2011, the Chinese Maritime
Surveillance Force interference with Filipino and Vietnamese oil exploration activities
and the cutting of seismic cables on Petro-Vietnam’s vessel “occurred after survey
activity by other claimants increased.”1014 The same dynamic is found in relation to
China’s submission of two note verbale documents (in 2009 and 2011) and a
declaration of an extended continental shelf to the United Nations in 2011. Although
spurring much controversy, “the submission of the three documents did not constitute
new, unilateral actions by China. They were all taken in response to requests for
information made by the UN with specific deadlines or in reaction to the actions of
other nations.”1015 In 2012, after the Philippine Navy dispatched a warship to inspect
Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal, ostensibly violating domestic
Filipino law and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, China
responded by sending two surveillance ships to the area, 1016 which lead to the long
standoff between vessels from both countries that received world-wide attention.
Likewise, China’s establishment of a regional prefecture for the South China Sea, the
founding of Sansha City in the Paracels, and the construction of military garrisons can
be viewed as rejoinders to the activities of other littoral states.
Even if China so desired, engaging in unilateral attempts to seize control of the
South China Sea would result in world-wide condemnation, invite a response from the
US, and alienate its neighboring states. Moreover, “China’s rise is very much dependent
on external factors. The Chinese economy remains largely dependent on external
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demand and external supply of investment capital.”1017 A disturbance to these flows
resulting from unilateral assertions would cause damage to China’s own economic wellbeing and would be utterly self-defeating. Hence, the Chinese government stresses that
its economic development necessitates a “peaceful and stable international
environment” 1018 and signals its peaceful intentions by insisting on the unremitting
continuance of China’s good neighbor policy. The structural interplay between US
military power and beneficial economic interactions produce a distinct logic of
consequences that make antagonist assertions in order to establish regional hegemony
utterly costly and irrational. Furthermore, antagonistic assertions violate the
international peremptory norm of war of aggression, just as they go against China’s
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and its deeply held exceptionalist beliefs of
benevolent pacifism and harmonious inclusionism.1019
On the other hand, when the other littoral states, Vietnam and the Philippines in
particular, assert their claims and China merely reacts, then the logic of consequences
literally turn around and activate an actor-centric perspective that favors China.
Precipitously, China becomes part of a game where it has to defend its position in order
to maintain its claimed historic entitlement to the South China Sea. Reactive
assertiveness is thus a legitimate response towards circumstances initiated by others. It
is not an antagonist call for hegemonic subduance, but part of the game played by
sovereigns in dispute. From Beijing’s perspective, it is “a logical and necessary
response, in order to defend its policies and prevent an adverse change in the status
quo.”1020
However, China’s reactions move beyond mere tit-for-tat reciprocity. In a report
released by International Crisis Group, this reactive assertiveness is defined as a tactic
where “Beijing uses an action by another party as justification to push back hard and
change the facts on the ground in its favour.” 1021 It displays “a disproportionate
propensity to punish and to physically assert its sovereign claims in a manner that is
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disconcerting, and which frankly frightens regional states.”1022 For instance, following
the standoff at Scarborough Shoal China boycotted imports of Filipino bananas and
stopped sending tourists to the Philippines1023 – a reprimand of importance for a small
country that is dependent on trade with China. 1024 In light of the growing regional
asymmetry,1025 for China’s neighbors to maintain their claims over the Spratly islands
while reaping the benefits of trading with China presents a delicate vulnerability for
regional states that China can exploit. Thus, when China perceives the others as pushy,
China will push back even harder to deter future attempts that go against its national
goals. More than frightening regional states, it tarnishes China’s prestige.
The current security situation and the competition for maritime rights in the
South China Sea stem from an increasing readiness among all the involved countries to
secure their claims, much related to the “creeping jurisdiction” that follows from the
expansion of the international maritime regime. It contributes to forming a game of
international law where “all sides are under some pressure to act as if their claims are
legitimate – whether it is to fish, occupy, drill, survey or expel others for
‘trespassing.’”1026 Nonetheless, whether China’s actions should be considered reactive
or not depends on one’s time span and what actions one includes in the analysis. For
instance, in 1996 China set baselines around the Paracels, which was strongly protested
by Vietnam and the Philippines.1027 In 1997, China moved an oilrig into waters claimed
by Vietnam and granted an American oil company exploration rights in what Vietnam
considers its exclusive economic zone.1028 If we include China’s earlier assertions in
the Spratly islands and the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 as part of the analysis,
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instead of being disregarded for reasons of historic periodization, then China’s reactive
approach becomes even more tainted. In addition, China’s imposition of annual
unilateral fishing bans and interceptions of foreign vessels further contribute to a more
nuanced narrative. Whereas the other disputants, Vietnam and the Philippines in
particular, are certainly not innocent, the problematic, however, lies in the fact that,

China considers itself entitled to patrol the area and intercept vessels that are seen to violate
its right to resources and to refuse passage…What counts is not that China appears to exercise
moderation. Rather, it is Beijing’s alleged discretionary right to intervene that engenders
insecurity in the international system, forcing other states to hedge against China’s random
use of force in the South China Sea…The Sino-Centric rules suggested by China’s behavior
in the South China Sea appear to be sovereign rights to territory and maritime space based on
historical claims as defined by the strongest power and exercised at its discretion.1029

Therefore, “not surprisingly, having had the experience of encountering Chinese oil
rigs, warships, and fishermen operating in the vicinity of the disputed South China Sea
islands, the Philippines and the Vietnam are in favour of an expanded US role in
Southeast Asia.”1030 Certainly, China has not used aggressive force to subdue the South
China Sea. Beijing justifiably argues that an unfair amount of attention has been
directed against China as analysts and commentators take opportunity to disseminate
stories about China’s rise and its supposed perilous maneuvering, which injects new
life into the “China threat theory.” It is, nonetheless, intelligible why China’s actions
have been interpreted as “creeping expansionism,”
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“gradual, creeping

occupation,” 1032 and “creeping assertiveness.” 1033 What we are witnessing is a fastgrowing great power that consolidates its claims, expands its military and naval
presence, and employs a discretionary right to intercept foreign vessels. Albeit
representing a mixture of reactive and unilateral assertions, it is suggested that China’s
actions allow the stronger part to slowly materialize its claims as any move by the
counter-claimants are worthy a reaction from China. The claim that the improvement
in Sino-ASEAN relations “was due to tactical, not substantive, shifts in China’s
calculus vis-à-vis its Southeast Asian neighbors” 1034 still resonate among some of
1029
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China’s neighbors. Putting the lid on a pressing security issue and seeking to win hearts
by redirecting the focus towards China’s magnanimous economic deeds do not reassure
secondary states of the prospective benign intensions of the benefactor.
Even though I claim that revisionism and change of the international order must
be pro-social in that the leadership pretender must attract a significant circle of
recognition, there is another more abrasive, self-assertive side to China’s restorationist
ambition. The liberal argument is that economic interdependence and externally
oriented economies cause moderation. However, China’s economic relations with its
Southeast Asian neighbors are better characterized as asymmetric rather than
interdependent. Also, liberal proponents often ignore that “globalization does not lead
to an automatic harmony of interests [and tend] to skirt rather easily over the problem
of managing power, especially unequal power, and the difficulties of mediating
between conflicting values.”1035 While it is true that the means to develop the material
substrata of the state transcend boundaries, other political and cultural boundaries are
being erected that stress the uniqueness of the state as a “unit of meaning,” which stands
in relation to the difference of others – despite economic interlinkages.1036 At the center
of this notion stands China’s restorationist impetus, a core component of Chinese
assertiveness that is intimately connected to the great renewal of the Chinese nation –
the dream of restoring China’s past glory and rightful place atop the regional and global
hierarchy.
Expounding on Max Weber’s view of “the nation,” Peter Baehr elucidates how
this unit of meaning functions in the form of a “community of sentiment” that derives
its purpose from shared memories of conflict and struggle:
As an idea abbreviating a human collectivity, the nation transfigures the “naked prestige of
‘power’” into a value. That value, in turn, consists of the belief that a certain community
possesses distinctive cultural peculiarities and even a worldly providential mission. Cementing
idea and value is what Weber repeatedly calls a “sentiment of solidarity” or a “community of
sentiment” typically derived from shared memories. These memories are especially strong
when they recall times of trial and conflict in which one collectivity (“the nation”) has been
pitted against another or several.1037
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The colonial subjugation of China and the “century of national humiliation,” is a
prominent example of such a conflictual encounter. “China’s memory of this period as
a time when it was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists serves as the
foundation for its modern identity and purpose.”1038 The “strong interest in topics such
as the Unequal Treaties, national humiliations, and the indigenization of international
law indicate that China today still believes it has a wrong to rectify.” 1039 Although
China’s Southeast Asian neighbors were not responsible for the humiliation of China,
their claims to the South China Sea is inherently a colonial product. Therefore, one
indisputable “wrong to rectify” is the colonial partition of the South China Sea,
motivated by the desire “to restore the Chinese motherland.”1040 As Arnold Wolfers
emphasized in his seminal work: states seek to restore the “core national values” that
they have been denied, and “almost any nation which has suffered a loss of territory or
has been subjected to discrimination will, when its power permits, take some action to
redress its grievances – and thus fall into the ‘revisionist’ category.”1041 Imperative to
Wolfers conception is that an important feature of revisionism is restorationist, and that
revisionist purposes do not merely emerge because of power. Power, in Wolfer’s
account, is intimately connected to action and enables the state to transform the
meaning of an often-broad revisionist telos into a specific project. In other words, power
enables the addressing of the grievance. China’s claim to the South China Sea and its
wider restorationist purpose have been consistent throughout the decades, but what has
changed is China’s power. What the growing structural asymmetry means is an everenhancing hypothetic possibility for China to turn its historical entitlement into practice
– to restore the Chinese motherland in accordance with the “nine-dashed line” and
resume its preeminent position. However, power is not sufficient, and without a benign
military reputation, China will not gain recognition from its neighbors.
China’s silence on what its expansive claims in the South China Sea exactly
means generates ambiguity, as “Beijing’s aspirations to restore the Chinese motherland
appear to encourage disregard for the need to demonstrate commitment to
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coexistence.”1042 In fact, in Chinese official documents and speeches, magnanimous
proposals and initiatives that form parts of China’s project for the regional order often
exist side-by-side with assertions that China will not give up an inch of its territory and
that it will never hesitate in defending its legitimate rights. China’s growing military
capabilities, economic strength, and political influence forms a new and fast-changing
context in which China’s international practice and restorationist objectives are given
new meaning; not only as part of standard stories of China as pursuant of regional
hegemony, but also in the way that it might inspire and legitimize future Chinese state
conduct. Steve Tsang aptly summarizes the ambiguous situation:

Nothing is wrong in wanting China to be great. But it must be uncomfortable for the
rest of the world, particularly China’s neighbors, to see a new general secretary who
wants to be identified as the man who reasserts China’s illustrious past – which, despite
Chinese rhetoric was primarily the result of establishing hegemony. 1043

Against this ambiguous background, external observers are led to interpret China’s
actions as signs of rising aggressiveness, and neighboring states are left wondering what
China really wants.
The tension between attraction and self-assertion displays that “issues that are
physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to
the identities of the decision makers.”1044 The disputes in the South China Sea thus turns
into a problem of national consciousness. In addition, “identity motivations, such as the
need to save face or maintain an image of toughness, can affect conflict
behavior…[and] what people care about affects their assertiveness in conflict and
negotiation.”
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With Chinese nationalism as an important pillar of regime

legitimacy, 1046 “any Chinese leader, who…gives up ‘historical’ claims, risks being
ostracized for surrendering the ‘sacred motherland’”1047 and for failing “to maintain
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China’s national face.”1048 Hence, when China responds successfully to attacks against
the nation – by appearing tough and assertive in territorial disputes – the party “gains
face before nationalist audiences, and solidifies regime legitimacy.” 1049 Compromises
are thus seen as weakness and the space for concessions gets smaller, in the process,
China’s prestige is damaged and its neighbors remain uncertain about its intentions.
If China wants to become the principal organizer of the regional economic and
security orders, it must compromise in the South China Sea as it did in its inland border
disputes, 1050 which gave a tremendous boost to China’s reputational capital, and
without which the SCO would not have been what it is today. After all, regional
leadership status is not just about power, it is equally about prestige. As Xi Jinping
pointed out, “[g]ood diplomacy with neighboring countries is a requirement for
realizing the Two Centenary Goals, and the Chinese Dream of the rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation.”1051 If China is willing to compromise and take a minor loss, it will win
something much greater – that is, a circle of recognition that accepts China’s leadership
status and buys into its transformational project for the regional security order.
With this said, the empirical part of the dissertation is now completed and what
follows is the conclusion.
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11. Conclusion
Before I answer the questions formulated in the introduction, I will briefly recapitulate
the dissertations structure.
I started out the dissertation by addressing core puzzles related to revisionism,
both conceptually and theoretically, specifically by suggesting, in contrast to
conventional wisdom, that both the declining dominant power and the rising power can
be understood as revisionist actors that desire to change the international order. In order
to tackle this problem, I developed a novel conceptual framework of international order
and a theory of status driven revisionism. I then demonstrated the relevance and
plausibility of my framework by applying it to four different contemporary cases part
of a positional struggle for leadership status in the Asia-Pacific.

11.1 Findings
Two general questions of theoretical relevance and three particular questions of
empirical relevance guided the dissertation. They are the following:

Overarching research questions (of theoretical interest):
 When and why do great powers seek to revise the status quo?
 How can we reconcile the counterintuitive proposition that both the
dominant power and the rising power, simultaneously, can be
understood as status quo-seeking and revisionist powers?

Specific empirical questions:
 Is there an ongoing positional struggle for leadership between the United
States and China in the Asia-Pacific?
 How can we understand the US pivot to Asia as a status-maintenance
strategy designed to change the regional order?
 How can we understand China’s reaction as a status-enhancement
strategy designed to change the regional order?

In terms of the first two questions, the theory proposes that we shift the
analytical focus from security to status in order to grasp the core impetus behind
revisionism. The theory further proposes that both the dominant power and the rising
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power can be revisionists. I develop a set of assumptions and a causal mechanism that
incorporates fundamental change in both the distribution of power and prestige as well
as institutional barriers that prevent the attainment of status. These core causal factors
explain revisionism for both the declining dominant power and the rising power. For
the dominant power, decline in both power and prestige induces status anxiety, which
motivates action, while the existence of institutional barriers to status maintenance
(status disavowal and/or systemic unfavorability) necessitates a revisionist project. For
the rising power, increase in both power and prestige induces status expectations, but
the preventive measures of the dominant power frustrates its status expectations, which
motivates actions, while the existence of institutional barriers to status enhancement
(status disavowal and/or systemic unfavorability) necessitates a revisionist project.
The dominant power engages in exclusionary social closure: by excluding the
rising power and revising the regional order, the dominant power attempts to maintain
its preeminent status. The TPP and the US alliance network in Asia-Pacific are clear
examples of this exclusionary strategy. The rising power, on the other hand, engages in
usurpationary social closure: by excluding the dominant power or erecting a positional
ceiling to its participation in the new order, the rising power attempts to enhance its
status. The AIIB is a clear example of this usurpationary strategy. China also desires to
push the United States out of the regional security order, yet for now, it remains an
unfulfilled utopian scheme.
The counterintuitive proposition that both the dominant power and the rising
power, simultaneously, can be understood as status quo-seeking and revisionist powers
is reconciled, first, by showing how the dominant power revises to maintain and how
the rising power revises to enhance, and second, by analyzing their respective
revisionist projects in terms of both positional and institutional revisionism.
Considering this, I developed a 2x2 table that captures the dynamic of preservation and
change in the international order in terms of four particular projects (see Table 4). My
empirical cases attempt to demonstrate the plausibility of my theoretical framework.
In terms of the three empirical questions, I find that the Obama administration,
through the US pivot to Asia, intensified a struggle between alternative regional orders
in the Asia-Pacific. The Obama administration pursued a strategy designed to maintain
an Americancentric liberal world order – that is, a world with a sole superpower, one
global leader, one global security hierarchy, and one dominant mode of capitalist
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modernity. China, on the other hand, pursues a strategy designed to establish a
Sinocentric international order – that is, a world of regions with coexisting great powers,
regional leaders, spheres of influences, and various modes of capitalist modernity. This
is primarily a struggle between global and regional orders.
Moreover, the Obama administration pursued a status-maintenance strategy
intended to revise the regional order of the Asia-Pacific. The TPP was a
transformational revisionist project designed to dismantle the “noodle bowl” structure,
the neomercantilist values, and the exclusionary tendencies of the regional economic
order, and thus represents a change of the scope, rules, and normative underpinnings of
the regional economic order. The TPP would remodel both the status order and the
established institutional order of the region. The purpose was to restore steering
capacity and ensure American regional leadership in order to maintain global
leadership.
In relation to the regional security order, America’s Principled Security
Network is a reformist revisionist project designed to move beyond the hub-and-spokes
system, first, by changing the US-Japan asymmetric patron-client relationship to a more
symmetric and equal alliance that elevates Japan’s security role, and second, by creating
new bilateral partnerships, trilateral security practices, and multilateral engagement
short of binding alliance commitments. Through these new security practices, the
Obama administration aimed at building collective capacity and enabling concerted
action in a way that clearly goes beyond the hub-and-spokes system. The Obama
administration’s regional projects excluded China, for it is only through exclusionary
social closure and preventive measures that high status actor can maintain its dominant
status when faced with a competitor.
The US pivot to Asia sparked the US-China struggle for regional leadership,
which forced China to elevate its status-enhancement strategy to the next level. The
China Dream articulated by Xi Jinping essentially means that China no longer hides its
desires to restore its place atop the regional and global hierarchies.
The first and thus far clearest empirical example of China’s new active
pursuance of regional leadership we find in the AIIB. The AIIB is an aspirational
project. It complements the BRICS institutions and the global capitalist system as a
whole, but it sets up a parallel governance structure for the provision of public goods
that clearly challenges Japanese and American leadership. In the AIIB, China enjoys
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veto power and its structural leadership widely exceeds that of the other members. It
represents a clear example of usurpationary closure; China does not close the door for
Japan or the United States, however, it has established an institutional structure where
the ADB leaders have to play second fiddle. Since the AIIB primarily is about
leadership, China’s push for institutional reform is essentially about status and
representation and thus clearly resembles an aspirational revisionist project.
In relation to the regional security order, China pursues a transformational
revisionist project. It desires to change both the positional and the institutional
dimension of the regional order. China has developed a clear vision that implies a
radical remodeling of the US-led regional security order. China wants to expunge
alliances, which it sees as an outdated form of security management incompatible with
the trends of 21st century. China’s intention is to create and Asian Security Order for
Asians, which effectively would constitute a truly exclusionary form of usurpationary
closure. Although China promotes a “new model of great power relations” that
represents a genuine attempt of establishing great power coexistence and equality, it
implies restoration of China as the natural preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific and
that the United States should now its place on the right side of the Asia-Pacific. China’s
vision thus departs from a configuration where the United States is the sole superpower
with a global sphere of responsibility. Yet it resembles more of a constructivist and
liberal security order in that China desires to establish a Community of Common
Destiny, win-win inter-state relations, bilateral strategic partnerships, and harmonious
inter-civilizational relations as the basis for the regional security order, which primarily
would be directed towards non-traditional security threats. This is certainly a tall order,
but it nonetheless represents China’s utopian project for the regional, and by extension,
the global order.
We now have a good overview of the different revisionist projects and where
they belong in accordance with the 2x2 table (see below).
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With the above, I have summarized the dissertation and answered the research
questions. However, there is one significant caveat to the findings that I wish to clarify.
The election of Donald Trump and his Jacksonian neoisolationist/populist “America
First” principle represents a radical departure from US grand strategy that, in various
forms and guises, have rested on a foundation of Wilsonian internationalism for the last
70 years. For the first time since the Second World War, the United States might take
a radical step back from global leadership, which is well illustrated by the decision to
withdraw from the TPP.
This, however, does not invalidate my analysis about the TPP. In fact, the TPP
is the epitome of a revisionist project designed to maintain dominant status in times of
relative decline and is thus best explained by system-level factors. As Randall
Schweller makes clear, we should only make use of domestic-level variables when
behavior and outcome diverge from the expectations of system-level theories,1052 and
the Obama administration’s decision to push the TPP did not. It was a revisionist project
designed to transform the regional economic order as the United States faces relative
decline and the rise of China. Yet Trump’s populist neoisolationist rhetoric and his
decision to withdraw from the TPP indeed diverge from what system-level theories

Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International
Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2003), 346.
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would lead us to expect and are therefore better explained by domestic-level variables.
As described in chapter seven, US anxieties triggered by the 2008 Financial Crisis were
prevalent throughout American society. Whereas the US public was rather ignorant
about the TPP, vocal activists and a majority in the US congress disapproved of the TPP,
yet the foreign policy elite of the Obama administration followed the imperatives of
system-level factors and rightly saw the TPP as crucial to maintain US global leadership.
Even though structural factors work against the United States, the TPP, however,
would have prolonged US dominance. But now, with Trump’s decision, the longevity
of an Americancentric liberal world order is at stake, which in fact leaves the regional
economic status quo intact and opens an opportunity for China to assume the leadership
position. Although China has made significant strides in developing its military power
and expanding defense ties, China still suffers from strategic mistrust and a tarnished
reputation in the regional security order, something the United States certainly will
continue to exploit. Therefore, China might very well continue to be the economic
protagonist, while the United States will continue to be the security protagonist in the
“Tale of Two Asias”1053 – a regional economic order centered on China and a regional
security order centered on the United States.

11.2 Contribution
The contribution of the dissertation is the following. First, the dissertation provides a
novel conceptual framework based on a meticulous scrutiny of core concepts, which
further our understanding of status-quo seeking and revisionism. The specific
contribution is reconceptualization. Second, the conceptual framework can be applied
to other cases and serve as a useful, context-transcending heuristic devise. The specific
contribution is methodological development. Third, the dissertation develops a dynamic
theoretical framework that explains both the revisionist status-maintenance strategy of
the dominant power and the status-enhancement strategy of the rising power. This
departs from the traditional one-sided focus on the rising power and sheds new
theoretical light on why and how the preventive measures of the dominant power are
revisionist. The specific contribution is theoretical innovation. Fourth, in contrast to
many other IR scholars who study historical cases, the dissertation sheds light on

Evan Feigenbaum and Robert Manning, “A Tale of Two Asias,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012,
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contemporary international relations and revisionist processes. The fact that we are
currently observing fundamental structural change provides a good opportunity to study
how great powers are acting amidst this historical transition. The specific scientific
contribution is contemporary relevance. Fifth, I have contributed to answering the
perennial IR question of what states want, and I argue that, apart from security, great
powers desire status, and even more so today as nuclear weapons mitigate violent forms
of great power competition. The specific contribution is engagement in a core IRdebate. Together – reconceptualization, methodological development, theoretical
innovation, contemporary relevance, and engagement in IR-debate – all form
interlocking parts of the greater contribution of the dissertation as a whole. Yet the
contribution of particular significance is theoretical innovation, and therefore a brief
recapitulation on how my theory improves earlier IR theories follows.
To begin with, I depart from neorealism’s focus on security-maximization. The
offensive positional logic of my theory is absent in neorealism, and by emphasizing that
great powers enjoy abundance of security in the nuclear age, I put the analytical focus
on the fact that great powers struggle for the secondary objective of status when the
primary objective of security is assured. Similar to offensive realism, I acknowledge
that states maximize power. Yet I depart from offensive realism by arguing, first, that
power-maximization serves as a means to the end of status, not merely security, and
second, that power is not sufficient to attain leadership status in the international order.
Aside from power, prestige is necessary to attain status and influence. I then modify
power-transition theory and build on hegemonic stability theory, and argue that not only
the rising power, but also the dominant power can suffer from a prestige deficit or
declining reputational capital. It is when the power and prestige balances change, and
with it, the growing possibilities for the rising power to institutionalize leadership status
that the dominant power becomes anxious and feels that it needs to act. Besides, I depart
from hegemonic stability theory and liberal historical institutionalism’s treatment of
institutions as favoring the dominant power, and argue that institutional barriers can
prevent both status enhancement and status maintenance, which necessitates revisionist
projects. Hence, the competitive logic is about a recurring struggle to acquire both
power and prestige in order to attain status and influence in the international order.
In this way, we shift the analytical focus from security to status; from a singular
focus on power to integration of prestige; and from exclusive attention on the rising
290

power to a framework, that explains both the revisionist status-maintenance strategy of
the dominant power and the revisionist status-enhancement strategy of the rising power.
This is a matter of theoretical and conceptual priority, not a claim that traditional
considerations of security are unimportant or irrelevant. Neither does the analytical
focus on the competitive logic of US-China relations mean the absence of substantial
US-China cooperation. Again, it is a matter of perspectival priority, not empirical onedimensionality.

11.3 Concluding Remarks
Several scholars point out that we are now living in a world without leaders. Richard
Haass captures this situation with the concept of nonpolarity: “a world dominated not
by one or two or even several states but rather dozens of actors possessing and exercising
various kind of power.”1054 According to Randall Schweller, we have entered an age of
entropy, or an age of increasing disorder, where polarity has become less meaningful
and the future international relation is profoundly uncertain.1055 Ian Bremmer conceives
the current international order in terms of the notion G-Zero, a world without leadership
– “a period of transition from the world we know toward one we cannot yet map.”1056
Steven Weber and Bruce Jentleson terms it a Copernican world characterized by
“competing propositions about how world politics ought to be ordered and conducted”
and “competition among several possible centers of authority for where legitimacy
resides.”1057 All these various concepts are insightful, but they downplay the material
structure of the global economy and the dominant role of the great powers.
The global economy consists of a regionalized tripolar structure where North
America, the European Union, and East Asia contain the vast bulk of global wealth. The
international system is characterized by a multipolar structure, and if the current trends
continue we are yet again moving towards a bipolar structure constituted by two
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dominating great powers – the United States and China. The bifurcation of the regional
order of Asia-Pacific, with a regional economic order increasingly centred on China and
a regional security order still centred on the United States, is a reflection of the material
structure where China dominates the economic landscape and the United States is doing
everything to maintain its dominance of the security environment. In other words,
polarity still matters. Certainly, competition for leadership is increasing and will
continue to increase, but this is primarily a struggle for prestige among the principal
power wielders to gain the acquiescence of secondary states and to institutionalize
leadership status. Even if we can find examples of initiatives led by mid-sized powers,
these initiatives stand or fall depending on the active participation and support of the
great powers.
For instance, the RCEP was launched by ASEAN and the lead negotiating
committee is chaired by Indonesia, yet without China and Japan the RCEP is little more
than an empty castle. It is true that China, and other great powers, have to “show
leadership…by way of example,”1058 or to put it in theoretical parlance, they have to
perform honorable deeds and provide public gods that boost their reputational capital.
Yet it is equally true that without the participation of the principal power wielders there
would be no project to begin with. The key issue is who organizes the international order,
and without the necessary material capabilities, your good ideas will remain just that –
good ideas. The reason we observe increasing competition and rivalry is not that we are
living in a world of ambiguous power diffusion with multiple smaller centers of power;
the reason is that the core components of the status dimension have undergone rapid
change. Power transition and ambiguous prestige hierarchies’ call the established
unipolar status order into question and give birth to a more uncertain and unpredictable
situation. A long-drawn-out struggle of piecemeal reordering processes and incremental
erection of parallel governance structures is indeed to be expected. It is true that great
powers cannot dominate the international order in the same way as they did in the past,
yet they are still the major players of the game. If you count them out, you do so at your
own peril.
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